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I. Executive Summary 
OVERVIEW 
Two countervailing trends exemplified human rights and rule of 
law developments in China this past year. On the one hand, the 
Commission observed the Chinese people, often at great risk, exer-
cising the basic freedoms to which they are entitled and demanding 
recognition of these rights from their leaders. This development did 
not arise from any external force, but originated from the Chinese 
people themselves, and was evident not just among a handful of ac-
tivists but at all levels of Chinese society. At the same time, the 
Commission observed a deepening disconnect between the growing 
demands of the Chinese people and the Chinese government’s abil-
ity and desire to meet such demands. In a year marked by a major 
internal political scandal and leadership transition, Chinese offi-
cials appeared more concerned with ‘‘maintaining stability’’ and 
preserving the status quo than with addressing the grassroots calls 
for reform taking place all over China. 
Citizen protests against lack of basic freedoms and official abuse 
cut across the diverse issues monitored by the Commission and in 
some cases were unprecedented. In late 2011 and early 2012, Chi-
na’s beleaguered workers continued to strike and organize for high-
er wages and better working conditions in reportedly the most sig-
nificant series of demonstrations since the summer of 2010. The 
Commission documented demonstrations in multiple industries 
taking place in at least 10 provincial-level areas during that period. 
A tragic and unprecedented wave of self-immolations across the Ti-
betan plateau indicated a new level of frustration with the Com-
munist Party and government’s increasing cultural and religious 
repression. During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, 45 (39 
reported fatal) Tibetan self-immolations focused on political and re-
ligious issues reportedly took place, out of a total of 50 since Feb-
ruary 2009. Mongols in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
held a series of protests in April, June, and July over the confisca-
tion of grassland for government and private development projects. 
Demonstrators took to the streets in large numbers to protest 
against land seizures, pollution, and large-scale energy projects. 
From July until September, tens of thousands of Hong Kong resi-
dents protested a controversial Beijing-backed national education 
policy forcing a dramatic retreat by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive 
C Y Leung. The number of mass incidents in China has reportedly 
doubled since 2005. 
Chinese citizens’ desire for the free flow of information and an 
unfettered channel for expressing grievances and questioning gov-
ernment policies continued to have a powerful presence on the 
Internet. The number of Internet users in China continued to rise 
rapidly, reaching 538 million in June 2012. By April 2012, there 
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were reportedly more than one billion mobile phone accounts in 
China. While some major events either went unreported or faced 
heavy censorship in the state-controlled media, citizens flocked to 
the Internet, particularly China’s popular microblog services, in a 
bid to freely share and gain information about important issues of 
public concern. These included the scandal involving ousted Polit-
ical Bureau member and Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and 
massive flooding in Beijing in July. After graphic photos were wide-
ly disseminated on the Internet, citizens across China expressed 
outrage at the case of Feng Jianmei, a woman kidnapped and 
forced by local officials to undergo an abortion, unmasking the 
workings of China’s repressive population planning policy. Democ-
racy advocates such as Chen Wei and Chen Xi received harsh sen-
tences for sharing their views online. 
Chinese citizens also sought to engage with and strengthen Chi-
na’s weak political and legal institutions. Officials continued to 
wield heavy control over local people’s congress elections, but that 
did not prevent large numbers of independent candidates from at-
tempting to run in this past year’s elections held across the coun-
try. Not surprisingly, many of these candidates faced intense pres-
sure and harassment, and many were winnowed out before the ac-
tual elections took place. Concerned citizens continued to make in-
formation requests under China’s open government information 
laws, in hopes of increasing the transparency of China’s opaque in-
stitutions. As government officials considered amending some of 
the country’s major laws and regulations, citizens sought to make 
known their views about the proposed legislation. They supported, 
for example, amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law that 
would better protect the rights of the accused. 
The Chinese government and Communist Party failed to keep 
pace with citizens’ rising demands. In many areas, officials re-
sponded with half-measures that did not fully address citizen con-
cerns and in some cases increased the government’s capacity for 
abuse. On the much-discussed PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the 
government passed major amendments in March that, while in-
cluding some improvements, legalized forms of secret detention 
that put Chinese citizens at risk of torture and abuse and have 
been used against dissidents in the past. Beginning in January, 
government officials in some areas expanded environmental trans-
parency to a limited degree by making public information on fine 
particulate pollution (PM2.5), but also were poised to erect barriers 
to independent monitoring of the environment. In February, offi-
cials issued a circular outlining policies intended to reform China’s 
hukou system, which limits the rights of Chinese citizens to freely 
determine their permanent place of residence. Chinese scholars and 
media criticized the vague nature and limited scope of the proposed 
policies. The government continued to expand access to the Inter-
net, but passed measures aimed at stemming ‘‘rumors’’ and pre-
venting anonymity that could have a chilling effect on free expres-
sion. The government signaled a desire for government-approved 
religious groups to participate in some areas of civil society, but re-
ligious affairs bureaus became more intrusive. Repression against 
unsanctioned religious groups, including house churches and Falun 
Gong, continued, and relations with the Holy See deteriorated. Au-
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thorities continued to imprison, detain, and fine Uyghur Muslims 
for engaging in ‘‘illegal religious activities.’’ 
In other areas, reform and forward movement have simply 
stalled. On the issue of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR), which Chinese officials have expressed an 
intent to ratify for a number of years, the government’s position re-
mained unchanged. In its 2012–2015 National Human Rights Ac-
tion Plan, released in June, the government said it had carried out 
unspecified ‘‘administrative and judicial reforms’’ to prepare for ap-
proval of the ICCPR at an unspecified future date—an even vaguer 
formulation of a similar claim made in the government’s 2009–2010 
action plan. Equally troubling, the 2012–2015 action plan removed 
language appearing in the 2009–2010 action plan that referred to 
the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
‘‘fundamental principles’’ on which the plan was created. In the 
area of civil society, the government continued to delay amend-
ments to national regulations that would remove obstacles to the 
registration of civil society organizations, preferring piecemeal ex-
perimentation at the local level. Resumption of dialogue with rep-
resentatives of the Dalai Lama did not occur, extending the longest 
break from dialogue since talks resumed in 2002. 
Meanwhile, egregious human rights abuses continued along with 
attempts to increase official capacity for repression. The govern-
ment persisted in detaining and repatriating North Korean refu-
gees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite 
the severe punishments refugees face once returned. Arbitrary de-
tention of activists remained commonplace as authorities handed 
down harsh sentences for political writings, pro-democracy activity, 
and petitioning. In the case of prominent human rights lawyer Gao 
Zhisheng, who had been missing for years, Chinese officials 
claimed he violated the conditions of his parole less than a week 
before his five-year suspended sentence was set to expire, meaning 
he would have to serve out his original three-year sentence. 
In the face of protests in ethnic minority areas of China, includ-
ing Tibetan autonomous areas and Xinjiang, authorities continued 
to respond with policies that can only be expected to further tram-
ple on the protection of language, culture, and religion, as well as 
impede prospects for local autonomous governance that the Chinese 
Constitution and law are supposed to protect. Officials in Xinjiang 
expanded the implementation of the ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy, 
which promotes the use of Mandarin in education at the expense 
of Uyghur and other ‘‘ethnic minority’’ languages. In Qinghai prov-
ince, Tibetan students protested the attempted substitution of Ti-
betan-language textbooks with Chinese-language textbooks. In a 
sign that the government and Party may be considering even more 
counterproductive policies, Zhu Weiqun, the Executive Deputy 
Head of the Party’s United Front Work Department and an influ-
ential voice on ethnic minority affairs, wrote an article in February 
2012 supporting greater ethnic assimilation, a policy change that 
almost certainly would further undercut protection of ethnic mi-
norities’ languages, cultures, and religions. A campaign to elimi-
nate Falun Gong and ‘‘transform’’ its practitioners entered its third 
year. In the name of ‘‘social management,’’ the Party and govern-
ment expanded their reach into society, enhancing surveillance and 
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monitoring of not only democracy and rights advocates but also the 
citizenry at large. 
The Commission observed potential bright spots this past year. 
Officially reported deaths from mining accidents have reportedly 
decreased, and the Chinese government issued measures that re-
ward workers who report occupational safety hazards and coverups 
of accidents in the workplace. The newly revised PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law now provides for expanded access to legal defense, 
recorded interrogations, longer trial deliberations, mandatory ap-
pellate hearings, and more rigorous judicial review. Officials con-
tinued to increase funding for legal aid and expand access to this 
important service. The draft of the country’s first national mental 
health law, currently being reviewed by the National People’s Con-
gress Standing Committee, contains provisions that could constrain 
officials from abusing psychiatric detention, although it fails to 
mandate independent reviews of an initial diagnosis and lacks safe-
guards such as time limits on involuntary commitment. Rhetori-
cally, Chinese officials continued to offer promising pledges, such as 
abolishing organ harvesting from death-row prisoners and not dis-
criminating against political and human rights groups wishing to 
register for legal status. As he has been in the past, Premier Wen 
Jiabao continued to be a lone voice at the top willing to state pub-
licly his support for political reform, albeit within one-party rule, 
and curbing the power of the Party and government. These encour-
aging statements and legal and policy developments appeared mod-
est at best, however, either because they were not backed by con-
crete plans for implementation or because they failed to address 
the root of the problem: Chinese citizens’ continuing lack of the 
fundamental rights to which they are entitled under both Chinese 
and international law. 
The Commission continued to observe divergent voices within the 
Chinese government, including support for some reforms. In Feb-
ruary 2012, the Development Research Center of the State Council 
and the World Bank issued ‘‘China 2030: Building a Modern, Har-
monious, and Creative High-Income Society.’’ While acknowledging 
China’s economic successes over the past 30 years, the report said 
that China had ‘‘reached another turning point in its development 
path, one that calls for a second strategic, and no less fundamental, 
shift.’’ The report called for reforming China’s state-owned sector, 
which is an important source of trade conflicts. It called for allow-
ing Chinese people greater freedom of movement by accelerating 
reforms of the hukou system. The report said greater public partici-
pation was needed to empower China’s citizens to contribute to the 
country’s development and raise standards of living. ‘‘The govern-
ment should respond proactively to these needs and grant rights to 
individuals, households, enterprises, communities, academia, and 
other non-governmental organizations through clear rules that en-
courage broad participation,’’ the report said. Finally, the report ar-
gued forcefully for strengthening the rule of law in China. Accord-
ing to the report, China ‘‘will need to transform itself into a lean, 
clean, transparent, and highly efficient modern government that 
operates under the rule of law.’’ The report underscored the strong 
relationship between the human rights and rule of law issues mon-
itored by the Commission and China’s long-term economic stability. 
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The Commission’s legislative mandate tasks the Commission 
with monitoring China’s compliance with human rights, particu-
larly those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
as well as monitoring the development of the rule of law in China. 
As part of its mandate, the Commission issues an annual report 
every October, covering the preceding 12-month period and includ-
ing recommendations for U.S. legislative or executive action. What 
follows are the Commission’s main recommendations to Members of 
the U.S. Congress and Administration officials, followed by more 
specific findings and recommendations for each of the 19 issue 
areas covered in this report. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
• International Law and Fundamental Freedoms. Mem-
bers of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should 
urge Chinese officials to ratify and implement in law the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) imme-
diately. China signed the ICCPR in 1998 and has repeatedly 
pledged to ratify it. The ICCPR is an important basis for the 
many freedoms Chinese officials continue to systematically 
deny citizens, as documented in this report, including the free-
doms of expression, religion, association, and movement. Work-
ers cannot form independent trade unions. Religious worship-
pers of all faiths—including Buddhists, Catholics, Falun Gong 
practitioners, Muslims, Protestants, and Taoists—and civil so-
ciety groups cannot freely associate and are subject to heavy 
government oversight. China’s more than half a billion Inter-
net users cannot freely share information on the Internet, and 
China’s press remains heavily censored. Dissidents cannot free-
ly travel. 
• Political Prisoners and Rights Advocates. Members of 
the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should urge 
Chinese officials to immediately release and cease the harass-
ment and abuse of Chinese citizens who have exercised inter-
nationally recognized human rights, including Nobel Peace 
Prize winner and imprisoned political activist Liu Xiaobo; 
housing rights advocate and lawyer Ni Yulan; human rights 
lawyer Gao Zhisheng; Tibetan nomad Ronggye Adrag; Catholic 
bishop Su Zhimin; Uyghur journalist Gheyret Niyaz; democ-
racy advocate Chen Wei; elections expert Yao Lifa; well-known 
artist and rights advocate Ai Weiwei; and others named in this 
report. 
• Rule of Law. Members of the U.S. Congress and Adminis-
tration officials should urge Chinese officials to strengthen the 
rule of law in all areas. Officials should be encouraged to con-
sider the recommendations of the China 2030 report, including 
the creation of a ‘‘highly efficient modern government that op-
erates under the rule of law.’’ In order to reach this point, offi-
cials should be urged to end unfair trading practices, such as 
currency manipulation, industrial policies, and the use of 
quotas and subsidies, and to ensure that China fully complies 
with its commitments as a member of the World Trade Organi-
zation. Chinese officials should be encouraged to dismantle in-
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centives that encourage rule of law violations, such as quotas 
and rewards that encourage local officials to commit forced 
abortions and sterilizations. Officials should also be encour-
aged to ensure the independence of the judiciary by removing 
the influence of the Communist Party. As the case of Chen 
Guangcheng is emblematic of rule of law challenges in China, 
officials should be encouraged to fulfill the commitment to in-
vestigate abuses committed against Chen and his family and 
seek just punishment under China’s laws. Only by improving 
the rule of law in all areas, not just in the economic sphere, 
can China realize the economic development goals laid out in 
the China 2030 report. 
• Ethnic Minority Policy. Developments in the area of eth-
nic minority policy appear especially troubling, given the un-
precedented and ongoing wave of self-immolations occurring 
across the Tibetan plateau. Members of the U.S. Congress and 
Administration officials should urge Chinese officials to guar-
antee the fundamental rights of ethnic minorities and to in-
crease promptly and substantially dialogue and public engage-
ment with all ethnic minority communities and their rep-
resentatives, including the representatives of the Dalai Lama, 
without preconditions. 
• Transparency. This report found that across many issue 
areas, a common problem has been the Chinese government’s 
glaring lack of transparency. From the carrying out of Internet 
censorship to the release of environmental pollution data, Chi-
nese officials too often prefer secrecy over transparency. Chi-
nese officials should be urged to ensure that government and 
Party actions and information—including decisionmaking and 
judicial processes, government data and statistics, opinions, 
and directives—enjoy broad transparency and are open to pub-
lic input and public participation. In particular, the govern-
ment should encourage the use of the 2008 Open Government 
Information Regulations by Chinese citizens and provide great-
er incentives for government agencies to release information. 
The Commission’s Executive Branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this 
Annual Report, including its findings, views, and recommendations, 
does not necessarily reflect the views of individual Executive Branch 
members or the policies of the Administration. 
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 19 to 0.† 
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SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A summary of specific findings follows below for each section of 
this Annual Report, covering each area that the Commission mon-
itors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues 
that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with 
the Commission’s legislative mandate, submits for each a set of rec-
ommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or 
executive action. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese offi-
cials continued to maintain a broad range of restrictions on 
free expression that do not comply with international human 
rights standards, including Article 19 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such stand-
ards permit states to restrict expression in limited cir-
cumstances to protect interests such as national security and 
public order, Chinese restrictions covered a much broader 
range of activity, including peaceful dissent and expression 
critical of the Communist Party. 
• According to the China Internet Network Information Cen-
ter, the administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs, 
there were over 538 million Internet users in China by the end 
of June 2012—an increase of 53 million users over the previous 
year. The Chinese government has pledged to expand access to 
mobile technologies and the Internet to promote economic de-
velopment and to expand government propaganda. 
• During the reporting year, China’s Twitter-like 
microblogging (weibo) sites continued strong growth and con-
tinued to develop as prominent places for Internet users to 
voice discontent over controversial topics, organize collective 
actions, and circulate independent news reports. China’s 
microblogging sites—including China’s most popular microblog 
site, Sina Weibo—experienced dramatic growth with 250 mil-
lion registered accounts at the end of 2011, compared with 63 
million at the end of 2010. 
• While international and domestic observers continued to 
note the vibrancy of Internet and cell phone use in China, gov-
ernment and Party officials showed little sign of loosening po-
litical control. This past year, Chinese authorities continued at-
tempts to block and filter content deemed politically sensitive 
by implementing large-scale deletions, instituting real-name 
registration requirements, forcing Web site closures, imple-
menting censorship directives, and carrying out detentions. 
• Officials continued to restrict expression arbitrarily by abus-
ing vague criminal law provisions and broad regulations and 
registration requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, 
news media, and the Internet. Citizens who criticized the gov-
ernment were charged with national security crimes such as 
‘‘inciting subversion.’’ Official campaigns to train and supervise 
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journalists conducted in the name of combating corruption con-
tinued to be heavily imbued with political indoctrination. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Raise concerns over and draw enhanced international atten-
tion to the Chinese government’s continued insistence that its 
restrictions on freedom of expression are consistent with inter-
national standards. Chinese officials assert that such measures 
are taken to protect national security or public order, while 
available information indicates that many measures are aimed 
at silencing opposition to the Party or blocking the free flow of 
information on politically sensitive topics. 
Æ Emphasize that the Chinese government’s position under-
mines international human rights standards for free expres-
sion, particularly those contained in Article 19 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 
and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Æ Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party and 
government censorship of the Internet and the press can lead 
to instability by eroding public faith in the media and govern-
ment. 
Æ Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese officials on 
the issue of how governments can best ensure that restrictions 
on freedom of expression are not abused and do not exceed the 
scope necessary to protect national security, minors, and public 
order. Emphasize the importance of procedural protections 
such as public participation in formulation of restrictions on 
free expression, transparency regarding implementation of 
such restrictions, and independent review of such restrictions. 
Æ Highlight Chinese officials’ own calls for greater trans-
parency and public participation in lawmaking. Such discus-
sions may be part of a broader discussion on how the U.S. and 
Chinese governments can work together to ensure the protec-
tion of common interests on the Internet, including protecting 
minors, computer security, and privacy. 
Æ Acknowledge the Chinese government’s efforts to expand ac-
cess to the Internet and cell phones, especially in rural areas, 
while continuing to press officials to comply with international 
standards. Support the research and development of tech-
nologies that enable Chinese citizens to access and share polit-
ical and religious content that they are entitled to access and 
share under international human rights standards. Support 
practices and Chinese-language tools and training materials 
that enable Chinese citizens to access and share content in a 
way that ensures their security and privacy. Support the dis-
semination of online Chinese-language information on the 
Internet, especially popular Chinese social media sites, that 
discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese citizens 
are entitled under international standards. 
Æ Raise concerns regarding Chinese officials’ instrumental use 
of the law, including vague national security charges, as a tool 
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to suppress citizens’ rights to freedom of expression, and ques-
tion whether such actions are in keeping with the spirit of the 
‘‘rule of law.’’ 
Æ Elevate concern over the increased harassment of foreign 
journalists, who this past year have been beaten or expelled. 
Raise concerns over reports that authorities repeatedly have 
delayed or denied the approval of journalists’ visa applications. 
WORKER RIGHTS 
Findings 
• Workers in China are not guaranteed, either by law or in 
practice, full worker rights in accordance with international 
standards, including the right to organize into independent 
unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, 
is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower 
level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU. 
• Tasked with Party and government loyalty, local-level unions 
did not consistently or uniformly advance the rights of work-
ers. ACFTU branches reportedly continued to prioritize ‘‘har-
mony’’ and ‘‘stability’’ in labor relations even at the expense of 
workers’ rights. In some cases this past year, union representa-
tives sought to end disputes expediently without necessarily 
addressing workers’ grievances. 
• Concerned with the effect of worker actions on ‘‘harmony’’ 
and ‘‘stability,’’ officials in some cases used force against or de-
tained demonstrating workers while seeking to stop worker 
demonstrations. For example, in October 2011, officials in 
Shaoyang municipality, Hunan province, ordered coal worker 
Zhao Zuying to serve 10 days of administrative detention after 
Zhao and 18 other coal workers gathered in a public square in 
Shaoshan and expressed labor-related grievances. The Com-
mission documented cases in which officials used force against 
demonstrating workers in Dongguan city, Guangdong province; 
Shanghai municipality; Huzhou municipality, Zhejiang prov-
ince; and Chengdu city, Sichuan province. 
• In January 2012, the Provisions on Consultation and Medi-
ation for Enterprise Labor Disputes (Provisions) took effect, re-
quiring all medium and large enterprises to establish commit-
tees responsible for mediating disputes in the workplace. The 
Provisions stipulate some limited protections for worker rights 
but fail to address the fact that workers in China are not guar-
anteed the right to organize into independent unions, leaving 
the government, Communist Party, and employers with greater 
bargaining power in the process of dispute resolution. 
• Migrant workers remained particularly vulnerable to exploi-
tation in the workplace. This past year, migrant workers con-
tinued to face problems such as wage arrears, ineffective 
means of redress for grievances, and abuse from managers. As 
China faced a growing migrant worker population, an increas-
ing urbanization rate, and a new generation of young, more 
educated, rights-conscious migrant workers, some local govern-
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ments took steps to accommodate migrant workers seeking to 
integrate into urban areas. 
• In early 2012, Apple Inc. and Foxconn agreed to a set of 
measures designed to improve working conditions at Foxconn 
factories, including bringing working hours into full compliance 
with Chinese law by July 1, 2013. Some observers have argued 
that these measures, if implemented as described, could create 
incentives for other employers in China to improve conditions 
for workers. It is too early to assess the effects of the proposed 
measures, but Hong Kong-based non-governmental organiza-
tion Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior re-
ported ongoing problems with working conditions at Foxconn 
factories in May 2012. 
• Chinese workers, especially those in the coal mining sector, 
continued to face persistent occupational safety and health 
risks. Fatalities have been consistently reduced over the past 
few years, but officially reported cases of disease in the mining 
sector have increased during the same period. There were re-
ports that some mine managers and local officials attempted to 
conceal information about mine accidents. In May 2012, the 
State Administration of Work Safety and the Ministry of Fi-
nance issued the Measures on Rewards for Safe Production Re-
porting, which stipulate cash rewards and protection under the 
law for whistleblowers who report occupational safety hazards. 
In December 2011, an amendment to the PRC Law on Preven-
tion and Control of Occupational Diseases (PRC Occupational 
Disease Law) took effect. The amended PRC Occupational Dis-
ease Law contains provisions that could help workers obtain 
the certification they need in order to receive compensation for 
work-related diseases, but workers continued to face obstacles 
to obtaining compensation. Such obstacles included difficulty 
obtaining a diagnosis and proving a working relationship with 
their employer, steps that are required for the certification 
process. 
• It is unclear how widespread the use of child labor is in 
China, in part because the government does not release data 
on child labor despite frequent requests by the U.S. Govern-
ment, other countries’ governments, and international organi-
zations. While a national legal framework exists to address the 
issue, systemic problems in enforcement have weakened the ef-
fects of these legal measures. Reports of child labor continued 
to surface this past reporting year. For example, in February 
2012, Suzhou authorities reportedly found over 10 child work-
ers at an electronics factory in Suzhou. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support projects promoting reform of Chinese labor laws and 
regulations to reflect internationally recognized labor prin-
ciples. Prioritize projects that not only focus on legislative 
drafting and regulatory development but also analyze imple-
mentation and measure progress in terms of compliance with 
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internationally recognized labor principles at the shop-floor 
level. 
Æ Engage in dialogue with government officials, workers, and 
trade union officials in locations that have experienced success-
ful cases of collective bargaining; identify ways to increase 
awareness of those experiences; and convey those experiences 
to officials and trade unions in areas that have had less suc-
cess with collective bargaining. Where possible, prioritize pro-
grams that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective bar-
gaining pilot projects even in factories that do not have an offi-
cial union presence. 
Æ Convey support for direct elections of trade union represent-
atives. Engage in dialogue with government and local trade 
union officials to identify opportunities to increase awareness 
of successful experiences with direct elections of trade union 
representatives. 
Æ Encourage the expansion of exchanges between U.S. collec-
tive bargaining practitioners and Chinese labor rights advo-
cates in non-governmental organizations, the bar, academia, 
and the official trade union. Prioritize exchanges that empha-
size face-to-face meetings with hands-on practitioners and 
trainers. 
Æ Encourage research that identifies factors underlying incon-
sistency in enforcement of labor laws and regulations. Such re-
search could include the compilation and analysis of Chinese 
labor dispute litigation and arbitration cases and guidance doc-
uments issued by, and to, courts at the provincial level and 
below, leading to the publication of Chinese-language case-
books for use by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers, employ-
ers, union officials, and law schools in China. 
Æ Support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese 
labor and legal aid organizations involved in defending the 
rights of workers. Encourage Chinese officials at local levels to 
develop, maintain, and deepen relationships with labor organi-
zations inside and outside of China, and to invite these groups 
to increase the number of training programs in China. Support 
programs that train workers in ways to identify problems at 
the factory-floor level, equipping them with skills and problem- 
solving training so they can communicate their concerns to em-
ployers effectively. 
Æ Where appropriate, share the United States’ ongoing experi-
ence and efforts in protecting worker rights—through legal, 
regulatory, or non-governmental means—with Chinese offi-
cials. Expand site visits and other exchanges for Chinese offi-
cials to observe and share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, 
lawyers, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other 
regulatory agencies at all levels of U.S. Government that work 
on labor issues. 
Æ Support USDOL’s exchange with China’s Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) regarding setting 
and enforcing minimum wage standards; strengthening social 
insurance; improving employment statistics; and promoting so-
cial dialogue and exchanges with China’s State Administration 
of Work Safety (SAWS) regarding improving workplace safety 
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and health. Support the annual labor dialogue with China that 
USDOL started in 2010 and its plan for the establishment of 
a safety dialogue. Support USDOL’s technical cooperation pro-
gram with SAWS on workplace safety and health and the ex-
pansion of mining cooperation into broad occupational safety 
and health areas. Support pilot projects that establish public- 




• During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese gov-
ernment officials promised to strike a balance between crime 
control and the protection of individual rights. In March, the 
National People’s Congress reviewed and passed its first major 
overhaul of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) since 
1996. In June 2012, the State Council Information Office re-
leased a new National Human Rights Action Plan for the pe-
riod from 2012 to 2015. These reforms appear to contain some 
encouraging policy goals for the fair and lawful treatment of 
criminal suspects and defendants. 
• Actions taken by law enforcement authorities in the exercise 
of their police powers threaten to undermine recent reforms 
and reflect a continuing focus on ‘‘maintaining social stability’’ 
and the Party’s monopoly control above all else. The 2012 re-
porting year saw further expansion of local authority without 
requisite accountability, culminating in the fall of former Polit-
buro member and former Communist Party Secretary of 
Chongqing municipality, Bo Xilai. Bo authorized an allegedly 
lawless campaign against organized crime in Chongqing, which 
a group of 16 retired Party officials condemned as a ‘‘guise’’ for 
the torture and persecution of critics and rights defenders. 
• Chinese officials continue to harass and intimidate writers, 
artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, reform advocates, and ordi-
nary citizens who advocate for their rights or the rights of oth-
ers. These individuals are subjected to various forms of extra-
legal detention, including enforced disappearances, confine-
ment in ‘‘black jails,’’ and commitment to psychiatric hospitals 
in the absence of compelling medical need. Article 73, a new 
provision in the revised CPL, lends itself to manipulation and 
effectively legalizes such actions by law enforcement authori-
ties. 
• Chinese defendants continue to confront obstacles in pre-
senting an adequate defense. While the revised CPL has the 
potential to improve access to counsel for many individuals in 
detention, barriers still exist for those suspected of ‘‘endan-
gering state security’’ and other politically sensitive crimes. In 
addition, Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law, which imposes 
criminal liability on lawyers who force or induce a witness to 
change his or her testimony or falsify evidence, continues to 
hinder effective criminal defense. 
• A double standard appears to exist for citizen activists who 
peacefully advocate for their lawful rights, as opposed to other 
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citizens accused of criminal behavior. Recent reforms promise 
protections for the latter while legalizing the repression and 
abuse of the former. The rights to which citizen activists are 
entitled under such a system fall short of those guaranteed 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as 
under the CPL and China’s Constitution. 
• There were a number of positive developments during the 
2012 reporting year. A spate of unnatural deaths of individuals 
in custody helped prompt new regulations that prohibit the hu-
miliation, corporal punishment, or abuse of those in detention, 
prison, and reeducation through labor. Criminal liability is 
now prescribed in certain instances. In addition, the Chinese 
government has taken steps toward increasing transparency 
and improving standards of review for sentencing decisions, in-
cluding in death penalty cases. It continues to keep informa-
tion about executions a state secret, however, and has dis-
closed that the harvesting of organs from death-row prisoners 
provides up to two-thirds of China’s limited supply of livers, 
kidneys, hearts, lungs, and corneas for transplantation. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to guarantee the rights of 
criminal suspects and defendants in accordance with inter-
national human rights standards and to provide the inter-
national community with a specific timetable for ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not yet rati-
fied. 
Æ Make clear that the international community regards as 
laudable the commitments to fair trial rights and detainee 
rights that the Chinese government has made in the 2012– 
2015 National Human Rights Action Plan. Request information 
on the formalization of those commitments into laws and regu-
lations and on what further steps authorities will take to en-
sure their successful implementation. Support bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation and dialogue to support such efforts. 
Æ Encourage the Chinese government to fulfill the promises 
that it has made through the revised CPL and to eliminate the 
dual track that provisions such as Article 73 create for citizen 
activists and all other citizens. Press the Chinese government 
to immediately release advocates who are in prison or deten-
tion for the exercise of their lawful rights and to adhere to fair 
trial standards and ensure procedural protections in cases that 
involve easily abused concepts such as ‘‘endangering state se-
curity.’’ 
Æ Press the Chinese government to adopt the recommendation 
of the UN Committee against Torture to investigate and dis-
close the existence of ‘‘black jails’’ and other secret detention 
facilities as a first step toward abolishing such forms of extra-
legal detention. Ask the Chinese government to extend an invi-
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tation to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to 
visit China. 
Æ Support the establishment of exchanges between Chinese 
provincial law enforcement agencies and U.S. state law en-
forcement agencies to study policing, evidence collection, in-
mate rights, and other criminal justice reforms currently un-
derway in China. 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Findings 
• The Chinese government continued in the past reporting 
year to restrict Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion. China’s 
Constitution guarantees ‘‘freedom of religious belief’’ but limits 
protections for religious practice to ‘‘normal religious activi-
ties,’’ a term applied in a manner that contravenes inter-
national human rights protections for freedom of religion. The 
government continued to recognize only five religions—Bud-
dhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism—and 
required groups belonging to these religions to register with 
the government. Registered groups received some legal protec-
tion for their religious activities but remained subject to ongo-
ing state controls. Members of both unregistered and reg-
istered groups deemed to run afoul of state-set parameters for 
religion faced risk of harassment, detention, and other abuses. 
Some unregistered groups had space to practice their religions, 
but this limited tolerance did not amount to official recognition 
of these groups’ rights. Authorities also shut down the activi-
ties of some unregistered groups and maintained bans on other 
religious or spiritual communities, including Falun Gong. [For 
separate findings and recommendations relating to freedom of 
religion in Xinjiang and Tibet, see those sections.] 
• The government continued to use law to control religious 
practice in China rather than protect the religious freedom of 
all Chinese citizens, continuing efforts in the past reporting 
year to revise or pass new legal measures. Newly issued legal 
measures, like others passed in recent years, build on provi-
sions contained in the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs 
(RRA). Recent legal measures have added uniformity to exist-
ing provisions in the RRA but also have enhanced already tight 
controls. 
• Authorities continued to ensure that Buddhist doctrines and 
practices conformed to Party and government objectives. 
• Authorities continued to deny Catholics the freedom to recog-
nize the authority of the Holy See in matters relating to the 
practice of their faith, including selecting Chinese bishops. Au-
thorities continued to harass, detain, and place under surveil-
lance some unregistered priests and bishops, as well as forced 
some bishops to attend what the Holy See considers illegit-
imate state-controlled church events against their will. 
• Local governments across China continued to prohibit Mus-
lims from engaging in religious outreach and preaching activi-
ties independent of state-set parameters. 
15 
• The continued harassment and detention of Protestants, 
pressure on landlords to refuse to rent premises to house 
church congregations, information gathering, and increased 
contact with unregistered groups by officials of religious affairs 
bureaus all indicate the resolve of authorities to pressure 
house church groups to affiliate with the government-spon-
sored Three-Self Patriotic Movement. 
• Authorities maintained controls over Taoist activities and 
urged that Taoism be ‘‘modernized.’’ 
• Authorities are continuing and may extend the three-year 
campaign to pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce 
their belief in and practice of Falun Gong. This campaign is 
part of a broader campaign—lasting more than a decade—that 
has been extensive, systematic, and in some cases violent. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all citizens 
freedom of religion in accordance with Article 18 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and to remove the govern-
ment’s framework for recognizing only select religious commu-
nities for limited state protections. Stress to Chinese authori-
ties that freedom of religion includes the right to practice a re-
ligion, as well as the right to hold religious beliefs, and that 
China’s limited protections for ‘‘normal religious activities’’ do 
not meet protections for freedom of religion as defined by inter-
national human rights standards. Call on officials to integrate 
steps to protect freedom of religion into initiatives to improve 
human rights in China. Stress to the Chinese government that 
the right to freedom of religion includes: The right of Bud-
dhists to carry out activities in temples independent of state 
controls over religion, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to ex-
press openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan Buddhist 
teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right of Catholics to 
recognize the authority of the Holy See in matters relating to 
the practice of their faith, including to make bishop appoint-
ments; the right of Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice 
Falun Gong inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in re-
ligious outreach and preaching activities independent of state- 
set parameters and not face curbs on their internationally pro-
tected right to freedom of religion in the name of ‘‘upholding 
stability’’; the right of Protestants to worship free from state 
controls over doctrine and to worship in unregistered house 
churches, free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; 
and the right of Taoists to interpret their teachings free from 
government guidance. 
Æ Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined, detained, or 
imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing their right to freedom of 
religion (including the right to hold and exercise spiritual be-
liefs). Such prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (a Tibetan Bud-
dhist nun sentenced in 2009 to 10 years’ imprisonment after 
she and other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan inde-
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pendence and the Dalai Lama’s long life and return to Tibet); 
Su Zhimin (an unregistered Catholic bishop who disappeared 
after being taken into police custody in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (a 
Falun Gong practitioner serving a 16-year sentence for orga-
nizing peaceful protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); 
Nurtay Memet (a Muslim man sentenced to five years’ impris-
onment for a ‘‘superstition’’-related activity connected to his re-
ligion); Fan Yafeng (a legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, 
and house church leader kept under home confinement since 
November 2010 in connection with his advocacy for unregis-
tered Protestant communities and coinciding with a broader 
crackdown on rights advocates), as well as other prisoners 
mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political 
Prisoner Database. 
Æ Call for authorities to freely allow Chinese lawyers to rep-
resent religious citizens and to challenge the legality of laws, 
regulations, rulings, or actions by officials, police, prosecutors, 
and courts that relate to religion. 
Æ Call for officials to eliminate criminal and administrative 
penalties that target religions and spiritual movements and 
have been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their 
right to freedom of religion. Specifically, call for officials to 
eliminate Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which crim-
inalizes using a ‘‘cult’’ to undermine implementation of state 
laws) and Article 27 of the PRC Public Security Administration 
Punishment Law (which stipulates detention or fines for orga-
nizing or inciting others to engage in ‘‘cult’’ activities and for 
using ‘‘cults’’ or the ‘‘guise of religion’’ to disturb social order 
or to harm others’ health). 
Æ Promote legal exchanges that bring Chinese experts to the 
United States, and American experts to China, to increase 
knowledge of international human rights standards for the pro-
tection of freedom of religion, including the rights of religious 
citizens, religious communities, and faith-based charities. Sup-
port non-governmental organizations that collect information 
on conditions for religious freedom in China and that inform 
Chinese citizens how to defend their right to freedom of reli-
gion against Chinese government abuses. Support organiza-
tions that help religious practitioners appeal prisoners’ sen-
tences and orders to serve reeducation through labor stemming 
from citizens’ exercise of freedom of religion; challenge govern-
ment seizure of property; and challenge job discrimination 
based on religion. 
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, ethnic minori-
ties in China continued to face unique challenges in upholding 
their rights, as defined in both Chinese and international law. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipu-
lates that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities within a 
state ‘‘shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
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profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own lan-
guage.’’ The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law stipulates 
some protections for minority rights and provides for a system 
of regional autonomy in designated areas. Limits in the sub-
stance and implementation of government policies, however, 
prevented ethnic minorities from fully enjoying their rights in 
line with international standards and from exercising mean-
ingful autonomy in practice. 
• Government controls were harshest in areas where authori-
ties perceived the greatest threat to their authority, including 
in the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autono-
mous areas, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See separate findings and rec-
ommendations on Xinjiang and Tibet.] Government authorities 
continued to detain or hold in extralegal detention ethnic Mon-
gols who attempted to promote their rights or were perceived 
to challenge state power. 
• Leading Chinese officials and scholars stepped up discussion 
of proposals to scale back ethnic autonomy and promote as-
similative policies in ethnic minority areas. An article pub-
lished in a Communist Party publication, as well as com-
mentary published on a Web page hosted by the State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission, featured discussion of a uniform applica-
tion of policies throughout China, and the abandonment of poli-
cies specific to ethnic minorities. 
• The Chinese government continued to implement top-down 
development policies that brought some economic improvement 
but undercut the promotion of regional autonomy and limited 
the rights of ethnic minorities to maintain their unique cul-
tures, languages, and livelihoods. The government continued to 
implement longstanding grasslands policies that impose graz-
ing bans and require herders to resettle from grasslands and 
abandon pastoral livelihoods, a development that affects Mon-
gols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other ethnic minority groups in 
China. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support rule of law programs and exchange programs that 
raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for 
governance that protect ethnic minorities’ rights and allow 
them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in 
line with both Chinese law and international human rights 
standards. 
Æ Support programs that promote models for economic devel-
opment in China that include participatory decisionmaking 
from ethnic minority communities. Call on the Chinese govern-
ment to examine the efficacy of existing grasslands policies in 
ameliorating environmental degradation and to take steps to 
ensure that the rights of herders are also protected. 
Æ Support non-governmental organizations that address 
human rights conditions for ethnic minorities in China, ena-
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bling them to continue their research and develop programs to 
help ethnic minorities increase their capacity to protect their 
rights. Encourage such organizations to develop training pro-
grams on promoting economic development that includes 
participatory decisionmaking from ethnic minority commu-
nities; programs to protect ethnic minority languages, cultures, 
and livelihoods; and programs that document conditions and 
research rights abuses in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re-
gion, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous 
Region, and other ethnic minority areas. 
Æ Encourage human rights and rule of law programs operating 
in China to develop projects that address issues affecting eth-
nic minorities in China. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained, 
imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for advocating ethnic 
minority rights, including Mongol rights advocate Hada (who 
remains in custody without apparent legal basis despite the ex-
piration of his 15-year sentence in December 2010) and other 
prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Po-
litical Prisoner Database. 
POPULATION PLANNING 
Findings 
• Chinese government officials continued to implement popu-
lation planning policies that interfere with and control the re-
productive lives of citizens, especially women. Officials em-
ployed various methods including fines, withholding of state 
benefits and permits, threats of eviction or home demolition, 
forced sterilization, forced abortion, and arbitrary detention to 
punish policy violations. 
• The Commission observed during the 2012 reporting year 
that local governments continued to carry out population plan-
ning policies and measures with a special focus on migrant 
workers. 
• The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is not con-
sistent with the standards set forth in the 1995 Beijing Dec-
laration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development. Controls 
imposed on Chinese women and their families, and additional 
abuses engendered by China’s population planning system, 
from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against ‘‘out-of- 
plan’’ children, also violate standards in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. China is a state party to 
these treaties and is bound to uphold their terms. 
• Chinese law prohibits official infringement upon the rights 
and interests of citizens while implementing population plan-
ning policies but does not define what constitutes a citizen’s 
right or interest. Chinese law does not stipulate punishment 
for officials who demand or implement forced abortion. Provin-
cial population planning regulations in at least 18 of China’s 
31 provinces explicitly endorse mandatory abortions, often re-
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ferred to as a ‘‘remedial measure’’ (bujiu cuoshi), as an official 
policy instrument. 
• Chinese officials have allowed for limited relaxation of local 
population planning policies during this reporting year, yet 
continue to rule out the near-term possibility of major nation-
wide population planning policy reform or cancellation. Citi-
zens have increased calls this year for population policy re-
form. 
• The Chinese government’s population planning policies con-
tinue to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, 
which include an aging population, diminishing workforce, and 
skewed sex ratio. 
• Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal advocate who has 
been the object of continued official harassment and maltreat-
ment after he publicized population planning abuses in 2005, 
escaped from illegal home confinement in April 2012 and left 
for the United States with his family in May. Chen has ex-
pressed frustration with the Chinese government’s failure to 
conduct an investigation into official abuses against him and 
his family, and concern regarding the continued harsh treat-
ment of family members who remain in Shandong. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge Chinese government officials to cease coercive methods 
of enforcing family planning policies. Urge the Chinese govern-
ment to dismantle coercive population controls and employ a 
human rights-based approach to provide greater reproductive 
freedom and privacy for all citizens, especially women. 
Æ Urge Chinese officials to reevaluate the PRC Population and 
Family Planning Law and bring it into conformance with inter-
national standards set forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration 
and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development, as well as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Æ Urge China’s central and local governments to enforce vigor-
ously provisions under Chinese law that provide for punish-
ments of officials and other individuals who violate the rights 
of citizens when implementing population planning policies 
and to clearly define what these rights entail. Urge the Chi-
nese government to establish penalties, including specific 
criminal and financial penalties, for officials and individuals 
found to commit abuses such as coercive abortion and coercive 
sterilization—practices that continue in China. Urge the Chi-
nese government to bar material, career, and financial incen-
tives and disincentives that motivate officials to use coercive or 
unlawful practices in implementing family planning policies. 
Æ Support the development of programs and international co-
operation on legal aid and training that help citizens pursue 
compensation under the PRC State Compensation Law and 
that help citizens pursue other remedies against the govern-
20 
ment for injury suffered as a result of official abuse related to 
China’s population planning policies. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to discontinue all forms of re-
prisal against those connected to Chen Guangcheng and to 
thoroughly investigate the officially sanctioned abuses he and 
his family have suffered. 
FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT 
Findings 
• The Chinese government’s household registration (hukou) 
system continues to limit the right of Chinese citizens to freely 
establish their permanent place of residence and hinders ac-
cess to social services. Hukou regulations that condition legal 
rights and access to social services on residency status have re-
sulted in discrimination against rural hukou holders who mi-
grate to urban areas for work. The discriminatory effect of 
these regulations is especially pronounced in the area of edu-
cation. 
• Chinese authorities continued to relax some hukou restric-
tions consistent with earlier efforts. The key provisions of these 
reforms make it easier for some rural hukou holders to trans-
fer residency status to urban areas, based on meeting certain 
criteria. Despite these limited attempts to relax hukou criteria, 
most reforms still exclude the majority of migrants. 
• The Chinese government introduced new guidelines on 
hukou reform that reflect a gradual and controlled approach to 
hukou reform. Some notable reforms include prohibiting coer-
cive requisition and conversion of rural residents’ land in ex-
change for urban hukous and barring future policies that use 
hukou status as a precondition for access to social services. 
Chinese scholars and media outlets, however, have criticized 
the lack of specifics and limitations of these measures, leading 
some to question their eventual effectiveness. 
• The Chinese government continued to impose restrictions on 
freedom of movement that are inconsistent with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. During the Commission’s 2012 re-
porting year, Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily pre-
vent rights defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving 
China. 
• The Chinese government also continued to place restrictions 
on liberty of movement within China to punish and control 
rights defenders, advocates, and critics. These restrictions, 
which appear to violate international legal standards, were es-
pecially harsh during politically sensitive periods. Authorities 
employed a range of measures including stationing plainclothes 
police or hired personnel to monitor the homes of rights de-
fenders, forcing rights advocates to ‘‘drink tea’’ with security 
personnel, moving or relocating rights defenders from their 
homes to unknown locations, and imprisoning them. 
• Chinese authorities used particularly forceful techniques to 
intimidate and control the family members and supporters of 
human rights advocates during this reporting period. 
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Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with Chi-
nese policymakers and academic institutions engaged in re-
search and outreach to migrant workers in order to advance 
legal assistance programs for migrant workers and encourage 
policy debates on the hukou system. 
Æ Encourage U.S. academic and public policy institutions to 
consult with the Commission on avenues for outreach to Chi-
nese academic and public policy figures engaged in policy de-
bates on reform of the hukou system. 
Æ Stress to Chinese government officials that non-compliance 
with international agreements regarding freedom of movement 
negatively impacts confidence outside of China that the Chi-
nese government is committed to complying with international 
standards more generally. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC Exit and 
Entry Control Law and the PRC Passport Law to clarify the 
meaning and scope of harm or loss to state security or national 
interests under Article 12(5) and Article 13(7), respectively. 
Æ Raise specifically Chinese authorities’ restriction on liberty 
of movement of rights defenders, advocates, and critics includ-
ing Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo; 
Dong Xuan, daughter of housing rights advocate and lawyer Ni 
Yulan; and family members and supporters of self-trained legal 
advocate Chen Guangcheng. 
STATUS OF WOMEN 
Findings 
• Chinese officials continue to promote existing laws that aim 
to protect women’s rights, including the amended PRC Law on 
the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the 
amended PRC Marriage Law; however, ambiguity and lack of 
clearly outlined responsibilities in China’s national-level legis-
lation limit progress on concrete protections of women’s rights. 
• In its domestic laws and policy initiatives and through its 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Chinese gov-
ernment has committed to ensuring female representation in 
government. Female representation at all levels of government 
appears to have made no significant progress in the 2012 re-
porting year. 
• In August 2011, the Supreme People’s Court issued a new 
interpretation of the PRC Marriage Law, which, some have ar-
gued, leaves women’s property rights unprotected. 
• In June 2012, the Shenzhen Municipal Fifth People’s Con-
gress Standing Committee passed the Shenzhen Special Eco-
nomic Zone Gender Equality Promotion Regulations, the first 
legislation of its kind in China to focus on gender equality. 
• China has committed under CEDAW to take ‘‘all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
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field of employment.’’ While China’s existing laws such as the 
PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the Protection of 
Women’s Rights and Interests, and the PRC Employment Pro-
motion Law prohibit gender discrimination, women continue to 
experience widespread discrimination in areas including job re-
cruitment, promotion, wages, and retirement. 
• The amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights 
and Interests (LPWRI) and the amended PRC Marriage Law 
prohibit domestic violence, and individuals charged with the 
crime of domestic violence are punishable under the PRC 
Criminal Law. These national legal provisions leave many who 
encounter domestic violence unprotected, however, as they do 
not define domestic violence or outline specific responsibilities 
of government departments in prevention, punishment, and 
treatment. Domestic violence reportedly remains pervasive, af-
fecting men, women, and children. China’s amended LPWRI 
also prohibits sexual harassment and provides an avenue of re-
course for victims. The LPWRI does not, however, provide a 
clear definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and 
procedures for prevention and punishment, presenting chal-
lenges for victims in protecting their rights. Surveys show that 
sexual harassment remains commonplace in China. 
• Statistics and analysis from studies published in recent 
years regarding China’s skewed sex ratio suggest that sex-se-
lective abortion remains widespread, especially in rural areas, 
despite the government’s legislative and policy efforts to deter 
the practice. Some observers, including Chinese state-run 
media, have linked China’s skewed sex ratio with an increase 
in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and other forms of 
human trafficking. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support programs in China that increase women’s leader-
ship training through U.S.-China exchanges and international 
conferences. Support exchanges and legal programs that pro-
mote women’s land rights, especially in rural areas, and urge 
higher levels of government to increase supervision over village 
committees to ensure that local rules and regulations are in ac-
cordance with national-level laws and policies and to ensure 
adequate protection of women’s rights and interests. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to take steps to faithfully im-
plement provisions in the PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC 
Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, and 
the PRC Employment Promotion Law that prohibit gender dis-
crimination. Urge Chinese officials to address specifically gen-
der discrimination in job recruitment, promotion, wages, and 
retirement. Support programs that teach women how to protect 
and advocate for their rights and interests in the workplace. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to follow through on stated 
plans to enact comprehensive national-level legislation that 
clearly defines domestic violence, assigns responsibilities to 
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government and civil society organizations in addressing it, 
and outlines punishments for offenders. Urge officials to re-
lease drafts of such legislation for public comment. Urge the 
Chinese government to further revise the PRC Law on the Pro-
tection of Women’s Rights and Interests or enact new com-
prehensive national-level legislation to provide a clear defini-
tion of sexual harassment and specific standards and proce-
dures for prevention and punishment. Support training pro-
grams that increase awareness among judicial and law enforce-




• China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination 
for the trafficking of men, women, and children. The majority 
of human trafficking cases are domestic and involve trafficking 
for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage. The 
full extent of the forced labor problem in China is unclear. 
• The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in December 2009; 
however, Chinese domestic legislation still does not fully con-
form with the UN TIP Protocol. 
• As Chinese law conflates human smuggling, illegal adoption, 
and child abduction with human trafficking, accurate official 
statistics on the number of trafficking cases the government in-
vestigated and prosecuted during the past reporting year are 
not available. In cooperation with non-governmental organiza-
tions and international organizations, Chinese authorities took 
limited steps to improve protection, services, and care for vic-
tims of trafficking but continued to focus efforts on women and 
children. 
• The Chinese government does not offer legal alternatives to 
deportation for foreign victims of trafficking, and continues to 
deport North Korean refugees under the classification of ‘‘eco-
nomic migrants,’’ regardless of whether or not they are victims 
of trafficking. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to abide by its commitments 
under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and to 
bring anti-trafficking legislation into alignment with inter-
national standards. Specifically, urge the Chinese government 
to legally distinguish the crimes of human smuggling, child ab-
duction, and illegal adoption from that of human trafficking, 
and to expand the current definition of trafficking to include 
all forms of trafficking, including offenses against adult male 
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victims, certain forms of non-physical coercion, and commercial 
sex trade of minors. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide more protective 
services for trafficking victims. Support expanding training 
programs for law enforcement personnel and shelter managers 
that help raise awareness and improve processes for identi-
fying, protecting, and assisting trafficking victims. Support 
legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of both for-
eign and Chinese trafficking victims. 
Æ Object to the continued deportation of North Korean traf-
ficking victims as ‘‘economic migrants.’’ Urge the Chinese gov-
ernment to abide by its international obligations under the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol with regard to North Korean trafficking victims 
and provide legal alternatives to repatriation. 
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, central and 
local authorities continued policies classifying all North Korean 
refugees in China as ‘‘illegal’’ economic migrants and forcibly 
repatriating North Korean refugees in China, amid rising con-
cerns over humanitarian crises and political instability in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 
• The Chinese government continued to deny the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to the Chinese- 
North Korean border and to North Korean refugees in north-
east China. The inability of the UNHCR to access North Kore-
ans seeking asylum in China makes it difficult for the UNHCR 
and human rights organizations to obtain accurate information 
on the number of North Korean refugees and de facto stateless 
persons, the reasons behind the North Korean defections, and 
the concerns of North Korean refugees over forced repatriation. 
• North Korean women in China continue to be trafficked into 
forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. The Chi-
nese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean 
women contravenes the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), 
as well as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (UN TIP Protocol). The Chinese government’s failure 
to take adequate measures to prevent North Korean women 
from being trafficked and to protect North Korean victims of 
trafficking contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the 
UN TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). 
• During this reporting year, Chinese authorities forcibly de-
tained, tortured, and deported those who attempted to assist 
North Korean refugees in China, including foreign aid workers 
and those involved with humanitarian organizations. 
• Chinese local authorities near the border with the DPRK 
continued to deny household registration (hukou) to the chil-
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dren of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. 
Without household registration, these children live in a state-
less limbo and cannot access education and other social bene-
fits. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support the efforts of the UNHCR to gain unfettered access 
for itself and its implementing partners to North Korean refu-
gees and de facto stateless populations in China, beginning 
with children born to a North Korean parent in China. Encour-
age the Chinese government to work with the UNHCR in en-
acting and implementing national asylum legislation that con-
forms with China’s obligations under the 1951 Convention and 
its Protocol. Urge the Chinese government to immediately 
cease detaining and repatriating North Koreans in China. 
Æ Urge central and local Chinese government officials to abide 
by their obligations under the UN TIP Protocol (Article 9) and 
CEDAW (Article 6) to prosecute human traffickers in north-
eastern China and along the border with the DPRK. 
Æ Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status and related 
social benefits to North Koreans married to Chinese citizens 
and to grant the same to their children. In particular, urge 
local Chinese officials to allow these children to receive an edu-
cation in accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) 
and the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5). Urge the 
Chinese government to provide greater numbers of North Ko-
rean refugees with safe haven and secure transit until they 
reach third countries. 
Æ Support exchanges between U.S. agencies and Chinese pub-
lic security officials on issues regarding human trafficking, asy-
lum processing, immigration, and border control. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
Findings 
• Public health advocates continued to face government har-
assment and interference in their advocacy work during the 
Commission’s 2012 reporting year. Restrictions that central au-
thorities placed on registration and funding of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) in 1998 and 2009, respectively, 
remain in effect and have reportedly been used to monitor, con-
trol, and limit NGO activities. In the Commission’s 2012 re-
porting year, Beijing Huiling, an NGO that provides housing 
and services to disabled persons, continued to face obstacles in 
securing registration, which could impact its operations. 
• The Chinese government’s domestic legislation explicitly for-
bids discriminatory practices in employment, and as a state 
party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Chinese government has committed to 
eliminate discrimination in employment and education against 
persons with disabilities or infectious diseases. Health-based 
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discrimination in employment and education remains common-
place, and those who seek legal recourse face challenges. Re-
ports also indicate that discrimination based on HIV status re-
mains a barrier that prevents many from accessing adequate 
healthcare. 
• The Chinese government reviewed revised drafts of the first 
national mental health law in October 2011 and August 2012. 
The drafts contain revisions that, if faithfully implemented, 
could further constrain officials from abusing psychiatric de-
tention to stifle or punish dissent. Despite these potential im-
provements, the revised drafts continue to raise concerns re-
garding the law’s compliance with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which China has signed 
and ratified. 
• In March 2012, a top Chinese health official announced 
plans to ‘‘abolish’’ the practice of organ harvesting from death- 
row prisoners within three to five years. The announcement 
follows a trend in recent years of increased government regula-
tion surrounding the transfer of human organs, and comes 
amid numerous reports of illegal organ transplant cases this 
year. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to stop repression of public 
health advocates and provide more support to U.S. organiza-
tions that work with Chinese NGOs to address public health 
issues in China. 
Æ Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on effective imple-
mentation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law and related 
regulations that prohibit discrimination in employment, edu-
cation, and healthcare against persons living with HIV/AIDS, 
Hepatitis B virus, and other illnesses or disabilities. Support 
Chinese NGO programs that raise rights awareness among in-
dividuals living with medical conditions. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to address concerns that indi-
viduals and NGOs have raised regarding the most recent 
drafts of the Mental Health Law. Urge Chinese officials to 
enact the Mental Health Law in a timely manner and then to 
ensure the consistent implementation of the law across local-
ities. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to close gaps in the 2007 Reg-
ulations on Human Organ Transplantation in which illegal 
organ trafficking currently operates. Urge Chinese officials to 
take prompt measures to accomplish their stated goal of abol-
ishing the practice of organ harvesting from death-row pris-




• Despite some progress, pollution problems remain severe, es-
pecially in rural areas, and the associated financial costs con-
tinue to grow. In addition to the migration of polluting indus-
tries, pollution incidents and environmental protests continue 
to pose long-term challenges. Authorities continue to develop a 
regulatory framework to address these environmental prob-
lems, although some efforts appear stifled. Authorities released 
draft revisions to the PRC Environmental Protection Law 
(EPL) to the public for comments. The draft contained some in-
centives for greater transparency and official accountability, 
but did not contain language that specified stronger support 
for public participation that had been present in previous 
drafts. Work to pass an administrative guideline regarding 
public participation in environmental impact assessments ap-
peared to have stalled. In a positive development, 2011 revi-
sions to the PRC Criminal Law expanded the scope of behav-
iors affecting the environment that could be considered crimi-
nal. Significant challenges for the development of the rule of 
law in the sector remain, including lax enforcement and non- 
compliance with environmental laws and regulations. 
• Access to formal legal remedies remains unreliable, despite 
potential advancements in public interest law. In October 
2011, an environmental tribunal in Yunnan province accepted 
an environmental public interest lawsuit filed jointly by non- 
governmental organizations and a local environmental protec-
tion bureau. Citizens, however, continued to face barriers in 
bringing environmental cases to court, including judges reluc-
tant to accept cases. 
• During the reporting year, authorities also continued to har-
ass or in some cases detain environmental advocates, including 
Liu Futang, Wu Lihong, and Zhang Changjian. In February 
2012, authorities in Sichuan province detained three environ-
mental advocates associated with the Tawu Environmental 
Protection Association. In addition, there are many cases of 
citizens who complain about pollution problems and later face 
retribution from officials. 
• Protests regarding pollution are increasing and are often a 
tool of last resort for citizens seeking justice or the alleviation 
of environmental harms. Official and academic reports report-
edly give a combined range of 20 to 30 percent increase in pro-
tests annually, although the academic report notes the actual 
number remains a secret. In some of these cases, protesters be-
came destructive, and authorities beat, detained, or sentenced 
protesters. 
• Authorities in various locations took steps to improve some 
aspects of environmental information transparency, but some 
locations have not made much progress, and a report high-
lighted the widening gap in information disclosure between 
more transparent eastern coastal regions and western and cen-
tral regions. Some news reports highlighted cases of non-trans-
parency related to environmental accidents. In addition, cen-
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tral government officials are revising a regulation that, if 
passed in its current form, could strengthen the government’s 
tight control over environmental quality monitoring and re-
porting. During the reporting year, however, central environ-
mental authorities passed measures to gradually improve air 
quality information transparency. In addition, citizens have be-
come more proactive in making requests for environmental 
data, but barriers to obtaining information remain. 
• During this reporting year, the State Council issued the 12th 
Five-Year Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Work Program 
and a white paper on climate change, which outlined a variety 
of actions and plans to mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
Chinese leaders have pledged to improve data reliability and 
transparency related to energy use and climate change, as well 
as baseline data related to international greenhouse gas reduc-
tion projects. Nevertheless, reports detailed significant chal-
lenges in this regard. 
• Some hydroelectric dam projects reportedly continued to in-
volve involuntary relocation practices and arbitrary detention. 
Grassland herder relocation programs, reportedly conducted by 
authorities to address grassland degradation as well as mod-
ernize the animal husbandry industry, have also in some cases 
been involuntary. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call upon the Chinese government to cease punishing citi-
zens for their grassroots environmental activism or for utilizing 
official and institutionalized channels to voice their environ-
mental grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts by 
Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand aware-
ness of citizens’ environmental rights and to promote the pro-
tection of those rights. Include environmental law issues in the 
bilateral human rights and legal expert dialogues. 
Æ Support multilateral exchanges regarding environmental en-
forcement and compliance tools, including environmental in-
surance, market mechanisms, criminal prosecution of serious 
environmental infringements, and public interest litigation 
mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen environ-
mental impact assessment processes and citizen participation 
in those processes. Engage Chinese officials and others who 
seek to devise a fair compensation system for people harmed 
by pollution. 
Æ Support continued expansion of environmental information 
disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government experiences with 
the Toxics Release Inventory Program and other U.S. programs 
that seek to provide more environmental transparency. Sup-
port programs that educate Chinese citizens about China’s sys-
tem of open government information. In addition, continue 
U.S. Government engagement with relevant individuals and 
organizations in developing China’s capacity to reliably meas-
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ure, report, publicize, and verify emissions reduction strategies 
and techniques. 
Æ Encourage the development of environmental non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) in China, including incorporating 
joint U.S.-China non-governmental participation into bilateral 
projects. Support efforts to raise the technical and operational 
capacity of Chinese environmental NGOs. 
Æ Urge Chinese authorities to end non-voluntary relocation of 
nomadic herders and to conduct relocation programs in a man-
ner consistent with international scientific and human rights 
norms. To this end, urge authorities to consider the sugges-
tions contained in the 2012 Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food; Addendum, Mission to China, to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Findings 
• Chinese civil society organizations continue to grow in num-
ber and engage in valuable educational work, social welfare 
service provision, and issue advocacy. A restrictive regulatory 
environment, however, limits the development of an inde-
pendent civil society. Official policy is to control the develop-
ment of civil society by expanding and bringing under govern-
ment control groups that promote Chinese government and 
Communist Party objectives, while marginalizing groups that 
seek to operate more independently. 
• The government’s broad restrictions on a citizen’s ability to 
form an organization contravene the right to freedom of asso-
ciation guaranteed in Article 22 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and de-
clared an intention to ratify. 
• Chinese law recognizes three main types of civil society orga-
nizations—social organizations (SOs), non-governmental and 
non-commercial enterprises (NGNCEs), and foundations. These 
organizations must obtain a government-approved sponsor or-
ganization and register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or its 
provincial or local counterpart. The government tightly re-
stricts the number of organizations that cover an issue and re-
quires minimum thresholds for staff and funding. Once reg-
istered, the organization remains subject to annual government 
reviews and sponsor organization oversight. Organizations that 
try to carry out activities independently without registration 
are considered illegal. A 2009 State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange circular that places bureaucratic burdens and for-
eign exchange restrictions on foreign funding remains in place, 
and authorities continue to express suspicion toward foreign- 
funded groups. 
• Chinese officials, scholars, state-controlled media, and non- 
governmental organization (NGO) leaders continued to criticize 
the current system, pointing to the large number of groups 
that cannot register because they are unable to secure a spon-
sor organization and the slow growth of registered groups. Un-
registered groups and those registered as businesses do not 
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enjoy certain tax benefits, are ineligible for government 
projects, cannot legally solicit donations, and face the risk of 
shutdown at any time. Official campaigns against unregistered 
groups continue. 
• Harassment of NGOs engaged in advocacy on issues the gov-
ernment and Party deem politically sensitive continued this 
past year. A crackdown on NGOs advocating for workers in the 
manufacturing center of Guangdong province was reported to 
have started early in 2012 and continued throughout the sum-
mer. 
• Chinese officials continue to pursue local and provincial ini-
tiatives intended to streamline the registration process, but not 
fundamentally alter the government’s role in approving and 
overseeing all groups. This past year, the Commission observed 
examples of such developments in the Shenzhen Special Eco-
nomic Zone and in Yunnan and Guangdong provinces. At the 
national level, such proposals have reportedly stalled. In July 
2012, the Ministry of Civil Affairs published regulations for the 
management of foundations in an effort to improve trans-
parency and accountability of charitable donations. 
• The Minister of Civil Affairs reportedly said political and 
human rights NGOs would be treated equally in the registra-
tion process, but reiterated the government’s broad discretion 
to decide who may form an organization. The government and 
Party also issued an opinion to ‘‘encourage and standardize’’ re-
ligious communities’ participation in public service, including 
calling for ‘‘equal treatment’’ of religious groups in establishing 
charitable organizations. The opinion emphasizes, however, 
consistency with the Party’s basic policy on religion. 
• The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed 
an amendment to the PRC Civil Procedure Law in August 
2012 which states that ‘‘relevant organizations’’ (youguan 
zuzhi) determined by law will be able to bring to court public 
interest cases on environmental protection and consumer 
rights issues, among others. It is not yet clear to what extent 
NGOs will be included in this broad term. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Ask Chinese officials for updates on recent reforms at the 
local level relating to registration of NGOs, domestic financial 
support to NGOs via foundations and government procurement 
of services from NGOs, the role of NGOs in public interest liti-
gation, and other aspects of civil affairs. Encourage these offi-
cials to broaden reform efforts that relax constraints on NGOs 
and apply them to other parts of the country through national 
legislation and regulatory development. 
Æ Ask the Chinese government to refrain from applying un-
even or selective enforcement of regulations to intimidate 
groups that they consider to be handling sensitive work. Re-
quest the Chinese government to revisit the recently issued 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange circular concerning 
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overseas donations to Chinese organizations. Emphasize that 
NGOs, both domestic and international, are outlets for citizens 
to channel their grievances and find redress, and in turn con-
tribute to the maintenance of a stable society. Conversely, 
point out that stricter controls over civil society organizations 
could remove a potentially useful social ‘‘safety valve,’’ thereby 
increasing the sources of instability. During discussions with 
Chinese officials, mention the Tsinghua University report that 
found that, even as the government increased spending on pub-
lic security and tightened its control over civil society, social 
conflicts were happening with greater regularity. 
Æ Take measures to facilitate the participation of Chinese citi-
zens who work in the NGO sector in relevant international 
conferences and forums, and support training opportunities in 
the United States to build their leadership capacity in non-
profit management, public policy and public interest legal ad-
vocacy, strategic planning, and media relations. 
INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Findings 
• During the 2012 reporting year, the Communist Party con-
tinued to dominate political affairs, government, and society 
through networks of Party committees or branches that exist 
at all levels in government, legislative, and judicial agencies, 
as well as in businesses, major social groups (including 
unions), the military, and most residential communities. Party 
officials stepped up efforts to expand Party organizations and 
focused Party-building and Party-loyalty campaigns in univer-
sities, non-state-owned businesses, social organizations, and 
the military. 
• China’s political institutions do not comply with the stand-
ards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which Chinese leaders have signed 
and declared an intention to ratify. Nor do China’s political in-
stitutions comply with the standards outlined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. During this reporting year, at 
least one top central-level Chinese leader continued to make 
public statements about ‘‘political structural reform.’’ The 
statements, however, lacked details, and any proposed reforms 
would still take place within the framework of one-party con-
trol. Local governments issued measures meant to improve the 
efficiency of bureaucratic governance and to bolster trust in the 
Party. 
• Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and sentence democ-
racy advocates who exercised their right to freedoms of assem-
bly, speech, movement, and association guaranteed in China’s 
Constitution and under international human rights standards. 
This reporting year, authorities imposed particularly harsh 
prison sentences, including those of Chen Wei, Chen Xi, Li Tie, 
Zhu Yufu, and Xue Mingkai. Other democracy advocates given 
long prison sentences over the last four years remained impris-
oned, including Liu Xiaobo, Liu Xianbin, Guo Quan, Zhou 
Yongjun, Xie Changfa, and Huang Chengcheng. 
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• The Party continues to strengthen its legitimacy and control 
in the political realm by intensifying and extending its reach 
into citizens’ social lives through institutions at all administra-
tive levels in the name of ‘‘social management’’ and maintain-
ing ‘‘social stability.’’ Party and government leaders plan to es-
tablish ‘‘social management structures’’ under the leadership of 
the Party and with roles for government, social organizations, 
and the general public. Mass organizations, residence commit-
tees, workplace personnel, students, and ordinary citizens will 
assist with social management tasks, including monitoring of 
citizens. 
• During the reporting year, elections continued for local peo-
ple’s congress deputies at the township and county levels. 
Party authorities influenced elections through investigative 
groups sent to lower levels with control and supervision tasks. 
In some places, the groups acted to ‘‘optimize’’ nomination lists. 
Officials took a variety of other actions to interfere in local con-
gress elections and to prevent independent candidates from 
being nominated or elected as delegates. 
• Village elections for ‘‘villager committees’’ have spread 
throughout China; their implementation, however, remains 
problematic. Ongoing problems with elections included vote 
buying, ballot stuffing, cancelled elections, interference from 
township officials, lack of transparency, and higher level offi-
cials’ efforts to ‘‘optimize’’ the mix of personnel on villager com-
mittees. 
• Central authorities reportedly encouraged the strengthening 
of open government information (OGI) procedures and policies, 
and also clarified conditions under which information would 
not be disclosed. Proactive disclosure of information remained 
sporadic. Citizens continued to be proactive in making open 
government information requests. Nevertheless, challenges in 
accessing information and bringing OGI cases to court re-
mained. 
• Central and provincial authorities encouraged policies to en-
hance government accountability. The lack of accountability, 
however, remained a challenge. In October 2011, an official 
media report noted the prevalence of ‘‘selective governance’’ at 
the grassroots level in some areas. The cases of Wang Lijun, 
Bo Xilai, and Gu Kailai raise issues of official lack of account-
ability, abuse of power, and non-transparency. 
• Corruption reportedly remains high and Chinese authorities 
took regulatory steps to address it. Corruption in state-owned 
enterprises and public institutions increased. Protections for 
whistleblowers remained insufficient and authorities continued 
to have little tolerance for non-governmental anticorruption ef-
forts. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support U.S. research programs that shed light on the struc-
ture, functions, and development of the Chinese Communist 
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Party, including its roles within government institutions, non- 
state-owned companies, and social organizations. Urge Chinese 
officials to further increase the transparency of Party affairs. 
Support research by U.S. citizens that focuses on under-
standing China’s shift toward ‘‘social management.’’ Make in-
quiries into recent campaigns to ‘‘send down to the country-
side’’ teams of Party and government officials. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained 
or imprisoned for exercising their right to call for political re-
form within China, and other political prisoners mentioned in 
this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Data-
base, including Chen Wei, Chen Xi, Li Tie, Zhu Yufu, Xue 
Mingkai, Zhou Yongjun, Liu Xiaobo, Liu Xianbin, Guo Quan, 
Xie Changfa, and Huang Chengcheng. 
Æ Support continued substantive exchanges between Members 
of the U.S. Congress and delegates of the National People’s 
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference, especially in relation to congressional oversight proc-
esses and responding to constituent demands. Support re-
search programs for U.S. citizens to study political and social 
developments at the grassroots level in China. Expand the 
number of U.S. consulates throughout the country to facilitate 
understanding of China. 
Æ Support projects by U.S. or Chinese organizations that re-
search village and local people’s congress elections in China. 
Support programs that include expansion of domestic election 
monitoring systems, training of Chinese domestic election mon-
itors, and joint U.S.-Chinese election monitoring activities. 
Æ Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations that seek 
to work with local Chinese governments in their efforts to im-
prove transparency and accountability, especially efforts to ex-
pand and improve China’s government information disclosure 
initiatives. Such projects might include joint efforts to better 
publicize the Open Government Information (OGI) Regulations 
at local levels and citizen and group trainings about how to 
submit OGI requests. 
Æ Support programs that assist local governments, academics, 
and the nonprofit sector in expanding transparent public hear-
ings and other channels for citizens to incorporate their input 
into the policymaking process. Such programs could include 
pilot projects in China in which citizens’ suggestions to au-
thorities about draft laws, regulations, or policies are made 
available to the public. 
COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW 
Findings 
• December 11, 2011, was the 10th anniversary of China’s ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Supporters of 
China’s membership in the WTO had hoped that WTO mem-
bership would bring about changes in China, which appeared 
at the time to be developing a market economy. The Chinese 
government, however, has flouted WTO rules and ‘‘gamed the 
system.’’ Over the past five years, the Chinese government has 
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developed a state-capitalist system that is not compatible with 
the WTO, and has intensified the state’s intervention in the 
economy. 
• China has been a party to several WTO cases since acceding 
to the WTO. In March 2012, the United States, in coordination 
with the European Union and Japan, requested consultations 
with China in a case concerning restraints on exports of rare 
earths, tungsten, and molybdenum, and in July the WTO es-
tablished a panel to hear the dispute. The United States also 
brought two WTO cases against China concerning the auto in-
dustry. The first case, initiated in July, challenges China’s im-
position of antidumping and countervailing duties on certain 
automobiles from the United States. The United States re-
quested consultations in the second case in September 2012, 
challenging certain of China’s export subsidies to auto and 
auto parts manufacturers. 
• The Chinese government reportedly intimidates some foreign 
companies that raise concerns with China’s WTO compliance, 
threatening ‘‘to withhold necessary approvals or take other re-
taliatory actions against foreign enterprises if they speak out 
against problematic Chinese policies or are perceived as re-
sponding cooperatively to their government’s efforts to chal-
lenge them.’’ This makes it difficult for other WTO members to 
bring WTO cases against China. 
• Foreign investment into China must undergo a government 
approval process to ensure that it is in keeping with Chinese 
policies on economic growth. In 2012, the Chinese government 
revised the foreign investment guidance catalogue, listing in-
dustries in which investment is encouraged, restricted, or for-
bidden. Investments in industries that are not listed are al-
lowed. Chinese authorities issued the first foreign investment 
guidance catalogue in 1995, and have amended it five times, 
including the 2012 amendment. The 2012 amendment reflected 
policies outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Eco-
nomic and Social Development, which was passed in March 
2011, including those for development of seven ‘‘strategic 
emerging industries.’’ 
• Chinese outbound investment has continued to grow, with 
investments in the form of mergers and acquisitions tending to 
be in mining, manufacturing, transportation, electric power, 
and retailing and wholesaling. Like foreign investment in 
China, Chinese outbound investment is highly regulated. 
• Though the value of the yuan rose about 8 percent against 
the U.S. dollar between June 2010 and May 15, 2012, accord-
ing to the U.S. Treasury Department, the yuan is still under-
valued. China has taken several measures to loosen controls on 
cross-border capital flows, however, with the goal of inter-
nationalizing the yuan. 
• China continued to have serious food safety problems during 
the 2012 reporting year, impacting consumers in China and in 
other countries, including the United States. While China has 
taken a number of regulatory and other measures to deal with 
food safety, the efficacy of these measures is limited; authori-
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ties have found it difficult to control China’s small and scat-
tered food producers. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Develop and support a project surveying the role of China’s 
industrial policies in the Chinese economy from the perspective 
of WTO requirements, including how the development of these 
policies and the role they play in directing China’s economy in-
fluence transparency, rule of law, and China’s compliance with 
its international commitments. 
Æ Through the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), 
the International Trade Enforcement Center, or other chan-
nels, conduct a comprehensive study of situations in which 
Chinese authorities have intimidated or retaliated against U.S. 
companies for speaking out against Chinese government poli-
cies or actions. Support USTR in developing or furthering a 
strategy of challenging Chinese regulatory procedures, includ-
ing the approval process and other administrative licensing 
procedures, that provide channels for Chinese authorities to 
engage in intimidation or retaliation against U.S. companies. 
Æ Through bilateral dialogues between (1) USTR and the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and (2) China’s Ministry of Com-
merce, the National Development and Reform Commission, 
and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, obtain details on the amount of Chinese invest-
ment (other than in financial instruments) in the United 
States, the criteria Chinese authorities use in making approval 
decisions concerning such investment, and how such invest-
ment is financed. 
Æ Implement capacity-building programs for Chinese food safe-
ty regulators on U.S. best practices in food safety programs. 
Pass legislation authorizing a larger U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration presence in China, with additional inspectors; 
support training programs in China conducted by U.S. inspec-
tors, producers, and food safety experts; and ensure that regu-
lated products imported from China into the United States are 
certified by the relevant bodies in China. 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Findings 
• Chinese citizens’ ability to seek redress of perceived wrongs 
continued to face significant challenges during the Commis-
sion’s 2012 reporting year. Authorities continued to promote a 
‘‘harmonious’’ socialist society with Chinese characteristics. 
Key policies and regulations during the past year reflect the 
Communist Party’s ongoing concern with handling social con-
flicts and maintaining stability. 
• Party and government officials continued to limit judicial 
independence and exert political control over courts and 
judges. Although Article 126 of China’s Constitution specifi-
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cally guarantees judicial independence from ‘‘any administra-
tive organ, public organization or individual,’’ China’s judiciary 
continued to be subject to a variety of internal and external 
controls—from political legal committees to official inter-
ference—that significantly limit its ability to engage in inde-
pendent decisionmaking. 
• During the reporting year, Chinese citizens continued to use 
petitioning as a means to seek redress. The petitioning—or 
xinfang (often translated as ‘‘letters and visits’’)—system exists 
to provide a channel, outside of formal legal challenges, 
through which citizens may present their grievances and seek 
to appeal government, court, and Communist Party decisions. 
• Citizen petitioners seeking redress of their grievances contin-
ued to face reprisals, harassment, violence, and detention, es-
pecially by local governments, due to incentive structures 
linked to citizen petitioning. This past year, some Chinese 
media reports addressed the phenomenon of citizens ‘‘having 
faith in petitioning and not having faith in the law.’’ 
• During the 2012 reporting year, government and Party offi-
cials continued to promote ‘‘people’s mediation’’ (renmin tiaojie) 
as a tool to maintain social stability. In his work report to the 
National People’s Congress, Supreme People’s Court President 
Wang Shengjun emphasized the role of mediation in resolving 
disputes and highlighted that 67.3 percent of civil cases in 
2011 were either mediated or withdrawn. 
• During the reporting year, official Chinese sources an-
nounced increased funding for legal aid and the expansion of 
legal aid access. In February 2012, the Ministry of Justice re-
ported a substantial increase in the number of cases involving 
legal aid. Local legal aid agencies handled a total of 844,624 
cases in 2011, up 16.1 percent from 2010 statistics. The central 
government allocated 200 million yuan (US$31.4 million) dur-
ing the year to help with legal aid, up from 100 million yuan 
(US$15.7 million) in the previous year, and central special lot-
tery funds for legal aid programs increased to 100 million yuan 
in 2011 from 50 million yuan (US$7.8 million) in 2010. 
• Officials at various levels of government continued to dis-
courage, intimidate, and detain human rights lawyers who 
take on issues, cases, and clients that officials deem to be ‘‘sen-
sitive.’’ Officials employed a spectrum of measures, including 
stationing police to monitor the homes of rights defenders; forc-
ing them to travel to unknown areas or to attend meetings to 
‘‘drink tea’’ with security personnel; and imprisoning them. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support the U.S. State Department’s International Visitor 
Leadership Program and other bilateral exchange programs 
that bring Chinese human rights lawyers, advocates, and 
scholars to the United States for study and dialogue. Support 
similar programs in the non-governmental organization and 
37 
academic sectors that partner with China’s human rights law-
yers and nonprofit legal organizations. 
Æ Support exchange, education, and training in legal aid ex-
pertise with Chinese criminal defense lawyers, legal profes-
sionals, and law schools. 
Æ Continue to monitor the policy of mediation as the Chinese 
government’s preferred way to resolve disputes. Achieve a clear 
understanding of its implications for Chinese citizens’ access to 
justice and the Chinese government’s compliance with inter-
national standards. 
Æ Express concern to Chinese authorities over treatment of pe-
titioners and encourage Chinese leaders to examine the incen-
tive structures at the local level that lead to abuse of peti-
tioners who seek to express their grievances. 
Æ Object to the continued harassment of human rights lawyers 
and advocates. Call for the release of lawyers and activists who 
have been subject to unlawful home confinement, ‘‘disappear-
ance,’’ or harassment by officials for their activities defending 
and promoting the rights of Chinese citizens. 
XINJIANG 
Findings 
• Chinese government and Communist Party authorities con-
tinued to commit serious human rights abuses in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Authorities in the XUAR 
used repressive security policies to stifle peaceful expression 
and dissent, especially among Uyghurs. Authorities have ap-
plied the ‘‘three forces’’ label (terrorism, separatism, and reli-
gious extremism) to include peaceful political dissent and reli-
gious activity outside of state control, while providing limited 
and conflicting information to support claims of terrorist or 
separatist threats. The Chinese government continued to ob-
scure information about people tried in connection with the 
July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi city. The num-
ber of trials completed in the XUAR in 2011 for crimes of en-
dangering state security—a category of criminal offenses that 
authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism and 
dissent—increased over 2010. 
• During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, central gov-
ernment-led development projects, which authorities have 
strengthened in recent years, undercut the rights of Uyghurs 
and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, lan-
guages, and livelihoods. Authorities intensified regional devel-
opment objectives announced at the Xinjiang Work Forum, con-
vened in Beijing in 2010 by central government and Party 
leaders. XUAR authorities bolstered efforts to relocate and re-
settle farmers and herders away from grasslands. 
• Authorities strengthened campaigns against ‘‘illegal religious 
activities’’ during this reporting year, and maintained harsh 
legal restrictions over religion in the XUAR. Authorities used 
the specter of ‘‘religious extremism’’ to enforce continuing con-
trols over the practice of Islam, continued to identify ‘‘religious 
extremism’’ as one of the ‘‘three forces’’ threatening stability in 
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the region, and targeted religious practice in security cam-
paigns. Some Muslims continued to serve prison sentences in 
connection with exercising their faith. Reports of official cam-
paigns to prevent men from wearing ‘‘large beards’’ and women 
from wearing veils or clothing perceived to have religious con-
notations appeared to increase during the reporting year, 
based on Commission monitoring. Officials required some re-
cipients of welfare benefits in the XUAR to agree not to wear 
veils or large beards. Officials also continued to place controls 
over the observance of the Islamic holiday of Ramadan. 
• Some government and private employers in the XUAR con-
tinued to discriminate against non-Han (‘‘ethnic minority’’) job 
candidates. Authorities also continued programs to ‘‘transfer 
the excess rural labor force’’ to jobs outside workers’ home 
areas, a practice that has focused on young non-Han men and 
women. 
• Chinese government development policies continued to pre-
vent Uyghurs from preserving their cultural heritage. Authori-
ties continued to demolish and rebuild the Old City section of 
Kashgar city, as part of a five-year project launched in 2009 
that has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other ob-
servers for requiring the resettlement of the Old City’s 220,000 
residents and for undermining cultural heritage protection. 
State media also reported on demolitions and the resettlement 
of residents in traditionally Uyghur communities in areas 
throughout the XUAR, with XUAR authorities stating that 1.5 
million homes would be ‘‘reconstructed’’ regionwide by 2015. 
• This past year, Western media reported that authorities sen-
tenced 16 of the 20 Uyghur asylum seekers who were forcibly 
returned from Cambodia to China in 2009 to prison terms 
ranging from 16 years to life in prison. Chinese officials had 
earlier linked some of the asylum seekers to terrorism, but the 
exact charges they were convicted of are unknown. The 
‘‘refoulement’’ of such asylum seekers raised concerns regard-
ing the risk of unfair trials, torture, and other types of mis-
treatment that Uyghur asylum seekers may face after fleeing 
to neighboring countries under the sway of China’s influence 
and its disregard for international law. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources 
for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for protecting 
Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to pro-
tect their human rights. 
Æ Raise concern to Chinese officials about human rights condi-
tions in the XUAR and condemn the use of security campaigns 
to suppress human rights. Call on the Chinese government to 
release people imprisoned for advocating for their rights or for 
their personal connection to rights advocates, including 
Gheyret Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for 
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‘‘leaking state secrets’’ after giving interviews to foreign 
media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in 
prison for allegedly ‘‘inciting racial hatred or discrimination’’ or 
‘‘inciting separatism’’ after writing a short story); Alim and 
Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, 
sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respec-
tively, for alleged economic and ‘‘separatist’’ crimes), as well as 
other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commis-
sion’s Political Prisoner Database. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide details about 
each person detained, charged, tried, or sentenced in connec-
tion with demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, 
including each person’s name, the charges (if any) against each 
person, the name and location of the prosecuting office (i.e., 
procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the name of 
each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned. Call on 
the Chinese government to ensure people suspected of crimes 
in connection with events in July 2009 are able to hire a law-
yer and exercise their right to employ legal defense in accord-
ance with Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure 
Law and to ensure suspects can retain legal defense of their 
own choosing. 
Æ Support non-governmental organizations that address 
human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue 
to gather information on conditions in the region and develop 
programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to preserve 
their rights and protect their culture, language, and heritage. 
Provide support for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news 
to the XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand 
their capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored 
information to XUAR residents. Provide support for libraries 
that hold Uyghur-language collections to increase their capac-
ity to collect and preserve books and journals from the XUAR. 
Support organizations that can research and take steps to safe-
guard tangible and intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to support development 
policies in the XUAR that promote the broad protection of 
XUAR residents’ rights and allow the XUAR government to ex-
ercise its powers of regional autonomy in making development 
decisions. Call on central and XUAR authorities to ensure eq-
uitable development that not only promotes economic growth 
but also respects the broad civil and political rights of XUAR 
residents and engages these communities in participatory deci-
sionmaking. 
Æ Raise concern about the demolition of the Old City section 
of Kashgar city, as well as demolitions and the resettlement of 
residents in traditionally Uyghur communities in areas 
throughout the XUAR. Call on authorities to ensure that devel-
opment projects take into account the particular needs and 
input of non-Han ethnic groups, who have faced unique chal-
lenges protecting their rights in the face of top-down develop-
ment policies and who have not been full beneficiaries of eco-
nomic growth in the region. Call on authorities to ensure that 
residents have input into resettlement initiatives and receive 
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adequate compensation. Call on authorities to take measures 
to safeguard the rights of herders to preserve their cultures 
and livelihoods. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to ensure government and 
private employers abide by legal provisions barring discrimina-
tion based on ethnicity and cease job recruiting practices that 
reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on authori-
ties to monitor compliance with local directives promoting job 
opportunities for non-Han groups, who continue to face dis-
crimination in the job market. Call on Chinese authorities to 
investigate reports of coercion and exploitative working condi-
tions within labor transfer programs that send rural non-Han 
men and women to jobs in other regions of China. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide information on 
the whereabouts and current legal status of Uyghur asylum 
seekers forcibly returned from Cambodia in December 2009. 
Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers with 
Chinese officials and with officials from international refugee 
agencies and from transit or destination countries for Uyghur 
refugees. Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or 
destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee 
designations of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and 
the refugee and citizenship designations of other countries. 
Call on transit and destination countries for Uyghur asylum 
seekers, refugees, and migrants to abide by requirements on 
‘‘refoulement’’ in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the Convention against Torture. 
TIBET 
Findings 
• Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives 
and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has 
been stalled since the January 2010 ninth round, the longest 
interval since such contacts resumed in 2002. During the Com-
mission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese officials reiterated posi-
tions that seek to prevent Tibetans from securing protection for 
their culture, language, religion, and environment, and instead 
pressure the Dalai Lama to support Party positions on Tibetan 
history and the relationship between China and Taiwan. The 
Dalai Lama’s representatives—his Special Envoy and Envoy— 
resigned their positions effective on June 1, 2012, citing ‘‘the 
deteriorating situation inside Tibet since 2008 leading to the 
increasing cases of self-immolations by Tibetans.’’ 
• The incidence of Tibetans resorting to self-immolation accel-
erated sharply this past year and spread from Sichuan prov-
ince into Qinghai and Gansu provinces and the Tibet Autono-
mous Region (TAR). Forty-five Tibetan self-immolations (39 
fatal) reportedly took place during the period from October— 
the start of the Commission’s reporting year—through August 
27, 2012. Reports of self-immolators’ calls for Tibetan freedom 
and the Dalai Lama’s return are concurrent with increasing 
Chinese government and Party use of legal measures to re-
press and control core elements of Tibetan culture, and with 
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the China-Dalai Lama dialogue’s failure to achieve any sign of 
progress. The Party and government have not indicated any 
willingness to consider Tibetan grievances in a constructive 
manner and to hold themselves accountable for Tibetan rejec-
tion of Chinese policies, and handled the crisis as a threat to 
state security and social stability instead of as a policy failure. 
• The status of religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists de-
clined steeply. The government and Party initiated unprece-
dented measures to further strengthen control over the Tibetan 
Buddhist religion and monastic institutions and transform 
them into entities prioritizing loyalty to the Party and patriot-
ism toward China while seeking to bring to an end the Dalai 
Lama’s influence on Tibetans. Officials opened a TAR ‘‘com-
prehensive school for Tibetan Buddhism’’ that the Party ex-
pects to ‘‘establish a normal order’’ for the religion that con-
forms to current Party and government objectives. The Party 
established management committees whose members are Party 
and government officials within all TAR monasteries and nun-
neries. In a signed statement, the Dalai Lama rejected Party 
attempts to use historical misrepresentation and government 
regulation to impose unprecedented control over lineages of 
teachers whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations. 
• The Party and government increased pressure on and inter-
ference with the Tibetan people’s aspiration to preserve the vi-
ability and vibrancy of their culture and language. A senior 
Party official influential on Tibet policy expressed views favor-
ing ethnic assimilation and ending or changing some policies 
that have the potential to benefit ethnic minority cultures, 
such as educational programs in ethnic minority languages. 
Such views, if implemented, could adversely affect the Tibetan 
people’s cultural and linguistic identity and further deepen re-
sentment against the government. The Party deployed teams of 
cadres to every village-level administrative entity in the TAR 
to strengthen Party grassroots control. The first-ever such de-
ployment will last at least through 2014. Public security offi-
cials continued to detain Tibetan writers, entertainers, and cul-
tural advocates; Tibetan students continued to protest lan-
guage policy. 
• The Party and government continued to impose ‘‘adherence 
to a development path with Chinese characteristics and Ti-
betan traits,’’ a policy the Political Bureau of the Party Central 
Committee established in 2010 that subordinates Tibetan cul-
ture and aspirations to Party economic, social, and political ob-
jectives. A senior Party official influential on Tibet policy called 
for development initiatives in ethnic minority areas to promote 
‘‘consolidating national unification and central authority,’’ and 
to promote and make irreversible ‘‘mixed habitation’’ among 
ethnic groups. TAR officials called for accelerating railroad con-
struction; the central government issued an opinion calling for 
the settlement of all herders nationwide (including on the Ti-
betan plateau) to be ‘‘basically’’ accomplished by 2015. Officials 
continued to detain Tibetans who protested against develop-
ment initiatives they consider harmful to the environment. 
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Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive dia-
logue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without pre-
conditions. Urge dialogue on matters including protecting the 
Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and 
Yunnan provinces. As tensions continue to rise in Tibetan 
areas and Tibetans express their respect for the Dalai Lama, 
a Chinese government decision to engage in dialogue can result 
in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for the Chinese 
government and Tibetans that will improve the outlook for 
local and regional security in coming decades. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to consider the role of govern-
ment regulatory measures and Party policies in the wave of Ti-
betan self-immolations. Point out to Chinese officials that if 
the government and Party address Tibetan grievances in a con-
structive manner, the results could benefit state security and 
social stability; point out to Chinese officials that strength-
ening the measures and policies that Tibetans resent most 
strongly is unlikely to result in conditions that could be charac-
terized as consistent with ‘‘social stability’’ or a ‘‘harmonious 
society.’’ 
Æ Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of 
refraining from expanding use of intrusive management com-
mittees or legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan 
Buddhists’ right to the freedom of religion. Point out to Chi-
nese officials that government- and Party-led campaigns to es-
tablish a new ‘‘order’’ for Tibetan Buddhism are inconsistent 
with state respect for ‘‘freedom of religious belief’’; and that in-
creased pressure on Tibetan Buddhists created by aggressive 
use of regulatory measures, ‘‘patriotic’’ and ‘‘legal’’ education, 
and anti-Dalai Lama campaigns is likely to harm ‘‘social sta-
bility,’’ not protect it. Urge the government to respect the right 
of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers 
in a manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and tradi-
tions. 
Æ Request that the Chinese government follow up on a 2010 
statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that 
Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai 
Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an ‘‘ordinary 
citizen’’ along with his family. Urge the government to invite 
a representative of an international organization to meet with 
Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can ex-
press to the representative his wishes with respect to privacy; 
photograph the international representative and Gedun 
Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s 
statement and the photograph. 
Æ Convey to the Chinese government the importance of re-
specting and protecting the Tibetan culture and language. 
Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant Tibetan culture by 
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honoring the Chinese Constitution’s reference to the freedoms 
of speech, association, assembly, and religion, and refraining 
from using the security establishment, courts, and law to in-
fringe upon and repress Tibetans’ exercise of such rights. Urge 
officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain the role of both 
the Tibetan and Chinese languages in teaching modern sub-
jects and not to consign Tibetan language to inferior status by 
discontinuing its use in teaching modern subjects. 
Æ Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into ac-
count the views and preferences of Tibetans when the govern-
ment plans infrastructure, natural resource development, and 
settlement or resettlement projects in the Tibetan areas of 
China. Encourage the Chinese government to engage appro-
priate experts in assessing the impact of such projects and in 
advising the government on the implementation and progress 
of such projects. 
Æ Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to 
develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their ca-
pacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, lan-
guage, and heritage; that can help to improve education, eco-
nomic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of 
ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that cre-
ate sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an 
influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. 
Æ Continue to convey to the Chinese government the impor-
tance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters 
and rioters; condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress 
human rights; and request the Chinese government to provide 
complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sen-
tenced for protest-related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings 
and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans 
who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of 
human rights. Representative examples include: former Ti-
betan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year 
sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later 
shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying 
Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); 
Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincar-
nated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life 
imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’); and nomad Ronggye 
Adrag (sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting polit-
ical slogans at a public festival). 
Æ Encourage the Chinese government to respect the right to 
freedom of movement of Tibetans who travel domestically, in-
cluding for the purpose of visiting Tibetan economic, cultural, 
and religious centers, including Lhasa; to provide Tibetans 
with reasonable means to apply for and receive documents nec-
essary for lawful international travel; to respect the right of Ti-
betan citizens of China to reenter China after traveling abroad; 
and to allow access to the Tibetan autonomous areas of China 
to international journalists, representatives of non-govern-
mental organizations, representatives of the United Nations, 
and United States government officials. 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Hong Kong 
held its first elections since the Legislative Council (LegCo) 
passed legislation in 2011 implementing electoral reforms that 
fell short of provisions in Hong Kong’s Basic Law concerning 
universal suffrage. A 1,200-member selection committee chose 
Hong Kong’s chief executive in March 2012 in a process that 
was inherently non-democratic. The selection was character-
ized by extensive interference by the mainland government, 
disregarding the principle of ‘‘one country, two systems.’’ 
• On September 9, 2012, Hong Kong held its first LegCo elec-
tions since the 2011 electoral reforms. Democracy advocates 
picked up three of the five new seats created under the elec-
toral reforms, and retained the one-third of the seats needed 
to block ‘‘fundamental changes’’ in Hong Kong laws, which may 
be critical when LegCo considers legislation for the 2017 elec-
tions. However, pro-Beijing parties gained seats as well, poten-
tially leading to legislative gridlock. 
• In the run-up to the LegCo election, thousands took part in 
demonstrations against Hong Kong’s controversial National 
Education Plan, and some Hong Kong students and teachers 
staged a hunger strike to protest the plan. In the face of the 
demonstrations, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive C Y Leung with-
drew the requirement that schools start teaching the Beijing- 
backed curriculum by 2015. Former chief executive Donald 
Tsang initiated the plan in 2010, which the People’s Daily de-
fended as in keeping with international practice of ‘‘patriotic 
education.’’ However, in an editorial in the New York Times, 
one Hong Kong parent who took part in a demonstration 
against the plan in July 2012 described the new curriculum as 
a ‘‘one-sided, totally positive portrayal of Communist Party 
rule . . . .’’ 
• According to one journalists’ organization, press freedom de-
teriorated in Hong Kong in 2011, with Hong Kong’s inter-
national ranking dropping to 54th from 34th the previous year. 
Another organization listed the Hong Kong press as ‘‘partly 
free.’’ Journalists in Hong Kong report that press freedom has 
deteriorated, with one prominent representative citing a num-
ber of causes, including government control of information, 
rough treatment of reporters, denial of media access to events, 
restrictions on movement around government offices, self-cen-
sorship, and censorship by media outlets, many of the owners 
of which have business interests in the mainland. 
• The government of Macau proposed reforms to its electoral 
system, seeking an opinion from the mainland Chinese Na-
tional People’s Congress Standing Committee on the procedure 
for reform, and undergoing two consultation exercises. The 
first consisted of 8 sessions, only 1 of which was open to the 
public, and the second consisted of 10 sessions, only 3 of which 
were open to the public. The final reforms were minor. Some 
civil groups said the consultation exercise was manipulated to 
‘‘fabricate’’ public opinion. In June, the National People’s Con-
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gress Standing Committee approved the proposed reforms, pro-
viding for the addition of two directly elected and two indi-
rectly elected seats to the Legislative Assembly, and increasing 
the number of members of the Chief Executive Selection Com-
mittee from 300 to 400. In August, Macau’s Legislative Assem-
bly passed laws making the proposed changes, which one legis-
lator had earlier described as ‘‘democracy rolling back.’’ 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Continue to make every effort to visit Hong Kong when trav-
eling to mainland China. U.S. Government delegations’ meet-
ings in Hong Kong should include meetings with members of 
the Hong Kong Legislative Council, officials with the Hong 
Kong government administration, members of the judiciary, 
and representatives of reporters’ organizations. Such meetings 
show U.S. support for a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong 
under the system of ‘‘one country, two systems’’ and for rule of 
law. 
Æ In meetings with Chinese government officials, urge them to 
allow the people of Hong Kong to enjoy the high degree of au-
tonomy articulated in the Basic Law and the Sino-U.K. Joint 
Declaration, especially in matters concerning elections, and to 
allow the introduction of universal suffrage with ‘‘one man, one 
vote,’’ if this is the wish of the people of Hong Kong. 
Æ Make every effort to visit Macau when traveling to mainland 
China or Hong Kong. While there, meet with members of the 
Legislative Assembly, especially directly elected members, with 
the Macau government administration, and with leaders out-
side the government. 
Æ Support and encourage agencies and organizations to explore 
projects to support the development of democracy, and to 
strengthen democratic practices and rule of law in Macau. 
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POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE 
Recommendations 
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a 
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to 
China, Members of Congress and Administration officials are en-
couraged to: 
• Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http:// 
ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a prisoner 
or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner’s database record for 
more detailed information about the prisoner’s case, including 
his or her alleged crime; specific human rights that officials 
have violated; stage in the legal process; and location of deten-
tion or imprisonment, if known. 
• Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to 
present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious 
prisoners compiled from database records. 
• Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens in-
volved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China 
to explore the database and to advocate for the release of polit-
ical and religious prisoners in China. 
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY 
The Commission’s 2012 Annual Report provides information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners1 in the context of 
specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses 
result from the Chinese Communist Party’s and government’s ap-
plication of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Polit-
ical Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database 
maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research 
work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and rou-
tinely uses the database to prepare summaries of information 
about political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and 
Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to read 
about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of 
this Annual Report and to access and make use of the upgraded 
PPD at http://ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is 
available at: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.) 
The PPD received approximately 61,900 online requests for pris-
oner information during the 12-month period ending August 31, 
2012. During the 12-month period ending in August 2012, the 
United States was the country of origin of the largest share of re-
quests for information (approximately 51 percent), followed by 
China (20 percent), Germany (7 percent), France (4 percent), and 
Great Britain (3 percent). Approximately 19 percent of the requests 
originated from worldwide commercial (.com) Internet domains, 16 
percent from worldwide network (.net) domains, 11 percent from 
U.S. Government (.gov) domains, 5.4 percent from domains in Ger-
many (.de), 2.9 percent from domains in France (.fr), 2.1 percent 
from U.S. education (.edu) domains, 1.0 percent from domains in 
the Russian Federation (.ru), 0.8 percent from worldwide nonprofit 
organization (.org) domains, 0.8 percent from domains in Japan 
(.jp), and 0.6 percent from domains in Australia (.au). Approxi-
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mately 36 percent of the requests for information were from nu-
merical Internet addresses that do not provide information about 
the name of the registrant or the type of domain. 
POLITICAL PRISONERS 
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that 
is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work to 
maintain and update political prisoner records based on the staff 
member’s area of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective anal-
ysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and 
trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China. 
As of September 1, 2012, the PPD contained information on 
6,989 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of 
those, 1,475 are cases of political and religious prisoners currently 
known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 5,514 are 
cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been re-
leased, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after re-
lease, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are consid-
erably more than 1,475 cases of current political and religious im-
prisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing 
basis to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the 
PPD. 
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the 
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 
extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners 
in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The 
Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies 
on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on in-
formation provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and oppos-
ing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources 
of information. 
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY 
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a 
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and Adminis-
tration, other governments, NGOs, educational institutions, and in-
dividuals who research political and religious imprisonment in 
China or who advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The July 2010 
PPD upgrade significantly leveraged the capacity of the Commis-
sion’s information and technology resources to support such re-
search, reporting, and advocacy. 
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to 
cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in 
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is struc-
tured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. 
Each prisoner’s record describes the type of human rights violation 
by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These types 
include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of reli-
gion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the 
freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change and to criti-
cize government policy or government officials. 
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet 
to query the database and download prisoner data without pro-
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viding personal information to the Commission and without the 
PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user’s com-
puter. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows 
them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require 
a user to provide any personal information to set up such an ac-
count. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a 
user’s computer as the result of setting up such an account. Saved 
queries are not stored on a user’s computer. A user-specified ID 
(which can be a nickname) and password are the only information 
required to set up a user account. 
49 
I. Human Rights 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Introduction 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese officials 
took steps to restrict free expression, control access to information, 
and punish those who peacefully expressed their opinions. The re-
strictions and punishments not only failed to comply with inter-
national human rights standards, but also violated rights and pro-
tections afforded under Chinese domestic legislation and the Con-
stitution. While international standards permit states to restrict 
expression in limited circumstances to protect interests such as na-
tional security and public order, Chinese restrictions covered a 
much broader range of activity—including peaceful expression crit-
ical of the Communist Party and independent news reporting on 
human rights developments. 
Over the past year, Chinese authorities called for strengthening 
the Party’s guidance of online opinion, targeted so-called ‘‘online ru-
mors,’’ and consistently censored politically sensitive information. 
The dramatic increase in Internet users and microblog services ap-
peared to create new challenges, and opportunities, for official cen-
sorship. As citizen expression on China’s popular microblogs has 
grown, Chinese officials have implemented new regulations to exert 
stricter control over social media providers and users. 
Chinese authorities continued to harass and punish citizens for 
exercising their right to free expression. Officials continued to 
abuse vague criminal charges—including ‘‘inciting subversion of 
state power’’—to target peaceful discussion of government policies 
and political debate. Newly adopted regulations on journalists and 
real-name registration requirements on microblog users threatened 
to end online anonymity and produce a chilling effect. At the same 
time, Chinese authorities maintained broad regulations and reg-
istration requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, news 
media organizations, and Internet users. 
International Standards for Free Expression 
Many official Chinese restrictions on free expression failed to 
comply with international human rights standards. Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights permit officials to restrict expression so long as it is (1) for 
the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of others or pro-
tecting national security, public order, public health or morals, or 
the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) necessary and the 
least restrictive means to achieve the purported aim.1 Regarding 
the purpose requirement, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
has said restrictions on ‘‘discussion of government policies and po-
litical debate,’’ ‘‘peaceful demonstrations or political activities, in-
cluding for peace or democracy,’’ and ‘‘expression of . . . dissent,’’ 
are inconsistent with Article 19 of the ICCPR.2 In June 2012, the 
UNHRC passed a landmark resolution supporting freedom of ex-
pression on the Internet, affirming that ‘‘the same rights that peo-
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ple have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom 
of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and 
through any media of one’s choice.’’ 3 
As outlined in this section, Chinese officials continued to restrict 
expression on the Internet and in the media for purposes that are 
impermissible under international law, such as to stifle peaceful 
criticism of the Communist Party. As to restrictions clearly set 
forth in law, this past year, Chinese officials abused vaguely word-
ed criminal law provisions and resorted to extralegal measures to 
restrict free expression arbitrarily. As documented in this section, 
Chinese restrictions continued to be overly broad and dispropor-
tionate in protecting stated interests. 
Internet and Other Electronic Media 
BLOCKING AND FILTERING POLITICAL CONTENT 
This past year, Chinese authorities continued attempts to block 
and filter online content deemed politically sensitive by imple-
menting large-scale deletions, instituting real-name registration re-
quirements, forcing Web site closures, implementing censorship di-
rectives, and carrying out detentions.4 Chinese officials remained 
non-transparent in disclosing content that is blocked or why it is 
blocked, and officials continued to block content arbitrarily for pur-
poses impermissible under international standards.5 Chinese offi-
cial censors maintained a growing list of blacklisted keywords as 
they tried to prevent the public from circulating information about 
controversial developments and news topics, including legal advo-
cate Chen Guangcheng’s April 2012 escape from illegal home con-
finement, the June 2012 Tianjin shopping mall fire,6 the August 
2012 Gu Kailai criminal trial,7 and the 2011 anticorruption and 
land rights protests in Wukan village.8 
In late 2011, Chinese authorities announced plans to step up ef-
forts to ‘‘stop rumors and punish individuals and Web sites spread-
ing rumors.’’ 9 In late March and early April 2012, officials intensi-
fied the clampdown on Internet users and microbloggers following 
controversial news developments and various unsubstantiated re-
ports of a coup in Beijing.10 Xinhua, for instance, reported on 
March 30 that the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) and 
Beijing public security officials closed 16 Web sites and detained 6 
people responsible for ‘‘fabricating or disseminating online ru-
mors.’’ 11 Chinese authorities initiated an unprecedented three-day 
suspension of comment functions on two of China’s most popular 
microblogging service providers, Sina and Tencent, from March 31 
to April 3.12 A lack of government transparency surrounding the 
suspension of services and Web site closures makes it difficult to 
confirm the nature of information being targeted and to determine 
the legitimacy of these actions. The suspensions and closures, in 
some cases, appeared politically motivated and appeared to counter 
internationally promoted standards on freedoms of opinion and ex-
pression.13 
In addition to restrictions on social media Web sites, Chinese 
regulators issued new regulations on online video content. In July 
2012, the SIIO and the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT) jointly issued a circular that requires online 
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video content providers to review videos before making them avail-
able online and informs content providers that they will be held re-
sponsible for online video content on their sites.14 In discussing the 
circular, a spokesperson for SARFT claimed that the policy will 
‘‘adhere to the correct orientation and dissemination of mainstream 
values.’’ 15 A China Daily report quoted a film theorist who said 
that online videos and micro-films (commonly referring to short- 
length films appearing on the Internet) require supervision in order 
to avoid negatively influencing the masses.16 Internet users, how-
ever, reportedly criticized the efforts to further manage and control 
online content.17 
Officials continued to detain and harass Chinese citizens who 
sought to share online material that authorities deem to be politi-
cally sensitive. In April 2012, public security officials in Guangzhou 
city, Guangdong province, criminally detained Internet user Xu Lin 
and later held him under ‘‘residential surveillance’’ at an undis-
closed location, after he attended a public protest in support of offi-
cials’ financial disclosure and posted ‘‘sensitive’’ material online.18 
Authorities prevented Xu’s lawyers and family members from vis-
iting him until July, stating that Xu’s case involved ‘‘state se-
crets.’’ 19 On July 5, authorities reportedly sent Xu home and 
placed him under ‘‘soft detention’’ (ruanjin), a form of illegal home 
confinement.20 
Chinese regulatory and legal measures do not clearly define pro-
hibited online content. Chinese Internet regulations contain vague 
and broad prohibitions on content that, for example, ‘‘harms the 
honor or interests of the nation,’’ ‘‘spreads rumors,’’ or ‘‘disrupts na-
tional policies on religion.’’ 21 Chinese law does not define these 
concepts, and Chinese law does not contain specific benchmarks to 
establish whether an action presents a ‘‘harm’’ to the ‘‘honor or in-
terests of the nation.’’ 22 In China, the government places the bur-
den on Internet service and content providers to monitor and re-
move content based on these vague standards and to maintain 
records of such activity and report it to the government.23 
52 
Microblogging and Free Expression 
During this reporting year, China’s Twitter-like microblogging (weibo) 
sites continued strong growth and continued to develop as prominent 
places for Internet users to voice discontent over controversial topics, or-
ganize collective actions, and circulate independent news reports.24 Chi-
na’s microblogging sites—including China’s most popular microblog site 
Sina Weibo—experienced dramatic growth with 250 million registered 
accounts at the end of 2011, compared with 63 million at the end of 
2010.25 Despite weibo censorship and blacklisted keywords, rights advo-
cates, citizen journalists, and others successfully used various methods 
to circumvent official guidelines and circulate information online 
throughout the reporting year.26 In addition, advocates and activists 
used virtual private networks (VPNs), among other techniques, to access 
U.S.-based microblogging service provider Twitter (which has been 
blocked in China since June 2009),27 as well as other social networking 
sites blocked in China.28 In 2012, academics at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Harvard University, Carnegie Mellon University, and the 
University of Hong Kong released separate reports and data on how 
weibo censors work and on official trends in weibo censorship.29 In the 
Harvard study, for instance, researchers found that ‘‘criticism of the 
state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored’’; 
however, the censors focused on ‘‘curtailing collective action by silencing 
comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regard-
less of content.’’ 30 
With the rising popularity of microblogging services, Chinese authori-
ties announced calls for restrictions over microblog service providers and 
users, citing official concerns over the dissemination of ‘‘online rumors’’ 
(wangluo yaoyan).31 While China’s central government news agency 
Xinhua reported ‘‘surging numbers of online rumors,’’ the calls also ap-
peared to target citizens’ legitimate rights to free expression.32 In recent 
years, microblog users have used online services to publicize controver-
sial incidents or news—including the 2011 Wenzhou train collision,33 
the 2011 Gansu school bus crash,34 and information related to the inves-
tigation of former Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central 
Committee (Politburo) member and former Party Secretary of 
Chongqing municipality Bo Xilai 35—despite strict directives censoring 
the topics in state-run news media. The widespread dissemination of 
sensitive microblog posts appeared to have influenced official reactions 
in high-profile cases, such as the investigation of Wang Lijun, former 
vice-mayor and head of the public security bureau in Chongqing.36 
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Microblogging and Free Expression—Continued 
Government agencies and departments also used social media Web 
sites and microblogging tools for official purposes. In August 2012, Sina, 
a leading Chinese Web site, released its first report on microblogs oper-
ated by ministry-level departments.37 According to the report, the Chi-
nese government, at all levels, manages more than 50,000 microblog ac-
counts.38 Official statements on microblogging have consistently empha-
sized using social media technology ‘‘to promote social harmony and sta-
bility.’’ 39 On October 18, 2011, a document circulated at the Sixth Ple-
nary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party advocated ‘‘strengthening the guidance and management of social 
networks and instant communication tools.’’ 40 In December 2011, Bei-
jing municipality and other cities issued microblog regulations that re-
quire users to provide real-name registration information to their 
microblogging service provider in order to verify identities of users.41 In 
June 2012, the State Internet Information Office announced plans to ex-
pand these pilots nationally by amending national measures that over-
see the administration of Internet sites, including blogs and microblog 
service providers.42 In addition to requiring real-name registration, the 
new regulations would also strengthen legal enforcement by requiring 
Internet companies to cooperate with public security bureau branches 
and by threatening criminal and administrative punishments for failing 
to comply.43 
In line with official actions, Chinese officials also appeared to pressure 
domestic social media companies to enforce stricter guidelines and con-
trols over user content. In an August 2011 visit to the Beijing head-
quarters of Sina Corporation, which operates Sina Weibo, Politburo 
member Liu Qi reportedly told Internet companies to ‘‘step up the appli-
cation and management of new technology, and absolutely put an end to 
fake and misleading information.’’ 44 In May 2012, in line with increased 
sensitivity surrounding high-profile incidents, Sina Weibo introduced 
new user guidelines covering what users can post online and instituting 
a points-based self-censorship structure.45 
EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS, WHILE MAINTAINING CONTROL 
According to the China Internet Network Information Center, the 
administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs, there were 
over 538 million Internet users in China by the end of June 2012— 
an increase of 53 million users since June 2011.46 By April 2012, 
statistics indicated there were 1.02 billion mobile phone accounts, 
according to information from three of the country’s leading tele-
communications operators.47 
The Chinese government has pledged to expand access to mobile 
technologies and the Internet to promote economic development 
and increase government propaganda.48 According to the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology’s ‘‘Internet Industry ‘12th 
Five-Year Development Plan,’’’ Chinese officials expect the number 
of Internet users to grow to more than 800 million people by 2015, 
including more than 200 million rural Internet users.49 In the 
2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan, the Chinese gov-
ernment also sets its target of increasing Internet penetration in 
the country to more than 45 percent by 2015.50 
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Official statements and actions continue to emphasize control 
rather than freedom on the Internet.51 Nevertheless, international 
observers and foreign media continue to note the difficulties offi-
cials have in controlling this emerging and vibrant space for ex-
pression, including expression of criticism of the government and 
discussion of some politically sensitive topics.52 
Abuse of Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression 
Officials continued to use vague criminal charges to imprison 
rights advocates, writers, Internet essayists, democracy advocates, 
and citizen journalists who engaged in peaceful expression and as-
sembly.53 In late 2011 and early 2012, Chinese officials sentenced 
numerous rights advocates and writers in connection with the 
crackdown that followed protests in the Middle East and North Af-
rica and calls for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests domestically.54 For instance, 
the Hangzhou City Intermediate People’s Court in Zhejiang prov-
ince sentenced writer and democracy rights advocate Zhu Yufu to 
seven years’ imprisonment for ‘‘inciting subversion of state 
power.’’ 55 The prosecutor’s indictment reportedly included a poem 
Zhu wrote as evidence, as well as ‘‘other writings he had published 
online, his calls for monetary donations for prisoners of conscience, 
and interviews that he had given.’’ 56 The harsh sentence against 
Zhu followed other severe sentences imposed by Chinese courts in 
December and January, including sentences against writers and 
democracy advocates Chen Wei, Chen Xi, and Li Tie.57 
Officials also sentenced rights advocates on charges of ‘‘creating 
disturbances,’’ a crime under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal 
Law.58 In April 2012, for example, the Xicheng District People’s 
Court in Beijing municipality sentenced housing rights advocate 
and lawyer Ni Yulan to two years and eight months’ imprisonment 
on charges that included ‘‘creating a disturbance’’ by hanging a 
banner outside her residence.59 The same court sentenced her hus-
band to two years’ imprisonment for ‘‘creating a disturbance.’’ 60 
The actual threat these citizens posed to state security and public 
order—or the motivation for official action—is unclear, as details 
regarding many of these cases remain limited. Available informa-
tion suggests that officials targeted the citizens to suppress polit-
ical expression and dissent.61 
Many of those targeted during the year had records of criticizing 
the government and Communist Party and advocating for democ-
racy and human rights.62 In addition, Chinese criminal defense 
lawyers and suspects in free speech cases continued to face sub-
stantial obstacles in ensuring procedural safeguards and compli-
ance with the right to a fair trial.63 
Extralegal Harassment 
Chinese officials continued to physically harm, restrict the travel 
of, and otherwise extralegally harass citizens to control information 
and stifle expression.64 In suppressing free speech rights, Chinese 
security authorities not only targeted Chinese citizens who sought 
to express their opinions peacefully, but also targeted their family 
members and acquaintances. In March 2012, officials forced the 
closure of democracy rights advocate Yao Lifa’s blog. According to 
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the non-governmental organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, authorities had subjected Yao and his family members 
to a range of abuses since 2011, including repeated arbitrary deten-
tion and harassment.65 In January 2012, author and former vice 
president of the Independent Chinese PEN Center, Yu Jie, left 
China for the United States with his family, after reportedly being 
subjected to years of official harassment.66 At a January 18, 2012, 
press conference in Washington, D.C., Yu detailed how police har-
assed and tortured him while he was detained in December 2010.67 
Beijing authorities continued to harass well-known artist and 
rights advocate Ai Weiwei, who was charged with tax evasion while 
detained at an undisclosed location for 81 days under ‘‘residential 
surveillance’’ in 2010.68 According to a March 2012 New York 
Times article, officials reportedly held Ai in harsh conditions and 
threatened him with a range of criminal charges, including subver-
sion, during his off-site detention:69 
In two different centers, Mr. Ai was confined to a 
cramped room with guards watching him around the clock. 
The second site, a military compound, was harsher, he 
said: lights remained on 24 hours, a loud fan whirred and 
two men in green uniforms stared silently from less than 
three feet away. Mr. Ai got two to five hours of sleep each 
night. He stuck to a minute-by-minute schedule dictating 
when he would eat, go to the toilet and take a shower. Mr. 
Ai . . . lost 28 pounds.70 
Although authorities released Ai on bail in June 2011, ongoing 
surveillance and a tax evasion case against Ai led the artist and 
his supporters to claim that this official harassment was politically 
motivated, amounting to retribution for his outspoken criticism of 
official actions and government policies.71 In a June 2012 online 
video, Ai claimed that officials continued to hold him under ‘‘soft 
detention’’ (ruan jin), an illegal form of limited home confinement, 
to ‘‘punish [him] because [of his] activities in criticizing the viola-
tion of . . . very essential human rights . . . .’’ 72 
Chinese Authorities React to the ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Incident’’ 
Following the high-profile escape of legal advocate Chen Guangcheng 
from illegal home confinement in Linyi city, Shandong province, Chinese 
authorities strictly controlled information about Chen and censored key-
words related to Chen and his escape.73 According to international news 
reports, Chinese search engines removed a number of keywords that 
could directly or indirectly refer to Chen, including variations of Chen’s 
name (in Chinese and English), Chaoyang Hospital, U.S. Embassy, 
‘‘blind man,’’ and ‘‘UA898.’’ 74 Internet users searching censored terms 
on Sina Weibo received the message: ‘‘According to relevant laws and 
policies, results are not displayed.’’ 75 
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Chinese Authorities React to the ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Incident’’— 
Continued 
Despite the tight controls, some Chinese Internet users were able to 
post and circulate information about the case using coded language to 
circumvent restrictions. Some users, for instance, referred to Chen as ‘‘A 
Bing,’’ a well-known Chinese blind folk singer.76 (Chen is also blind.) 
One online user reportedly discussed the escape through a story of ‘‘a 
mole who was surrounded by a pack of wolves, but with the help of 
some mice he managed to escape.’’ 77 Other Internet users reportedly re- 
posted popular quotes and images related to the rights advocate.78 
Freedom of the Press 
Chinese government and Communist Party control over the press 
continued to violate international standards. International experts 
have identified media serving ‘‘as government mouthpieces instead 
of as independent bodies operating in the public interest’’ as a 
major challenge to free expression.79 In its annual press freedom 
index, for instance, NGO Reporters Without Borders ranked China 
174th out of 179 countries in terms of press freedoms, citing var-
ious concerns including those over official actions to prevent critical 
news reporting and efforts to increase ‘‘censorship and propa-
ganda.’’ 80 
In China, officials expect the media to serve as the Party and 
government’s ‘‘mouthpiece.’’ 81 In December 2011, some Chinese 
Internet users reacted critically to comments reportedly made by 
Hu Zhanfan—then chief editor of the Guangming Daily and current 
president of state-run broadcaster China Central Television 
(CCTV)—in January of the same year.82 In his public remarks, Hu 
condemned journalists for failing to view ‘‘their own role in terms 
of the propaganda work of the Party’’ and reportedly said that ‘‘the 
first and foremost social responsibility [of journalists] is to serve 
well as a mouthpiece tool.’’ 83 Officials and state-run media agen-
cies frequently criticized journalists who undertook ‘‘negative’’ 
(fumian) news reporting.84 In May 2012, for instance, the Beijing 
Daily, official newspaper of the Beijing Municipality Communist 
Party Committee, published an editorial criticizing the ‘‘poison’’ of 
Western-style journalism and negative press reports on topics such 
as food safety and official corruption.85 The editorial censured 
media workers who ‘‘indiscreetly criticize under the banner of ‘ob-
jective reporting,’’’ claiming that China needed media professionals 
who ‘‘are responsible and reliable, [who] truly protect the funda-
mental interests of the nation, the public and the Chinese peo-
ples.’’ 86 
PUNISHMENT OF JOURNALISTS 
While the 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan of 
China announced official intentions to safeguard ‘‘the legitimate 
rights and interests of news agencies, journalists, editors and other 
persons concerned,’’ Chinese authorities continued to punish jour-
nalists, news anchors, and news media outlets that publish sen-
sitive or independent news reports.87 
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The Commission observed numerous reports of Chinese press 
companies taking actions to punish, suspend, or remove outspoken 
and independent journalists and newspaper staff. In October 2011, 
for example, popular news magazine Caijing reportedly forced 
Shanghai municipality-based reporter Yang Haipeng to resign after 
he publicized apparent procedural abuses in the Shanghai Mihang 
District People’s Court case against his wife.88 (Yang’s wife was 
sentenced to four years imprisonment on corruption charges the 
week following his resignation.) 89 In November, Yang claimed the 
resignation followed pressure on the magazine from Shanghai au-
thorities and warnings to ‘‘remain silent’’ on the matter.90 In some 
cases, state-run media responded with disciplinary actions against 
journalists and news anchors who exercised free speech. In April 
2012, authorities reportedly suspended CCTV news anchor Zhao Pu 
after he posted a microblog message warning people, especially 
children, to avoid consuming yogurt in apparent connection to con-
cerns that yogurt and jelly products contained industrial gelatin 
made from discarded leather shoes.91 In July 2012, the Xi’an 
Evening News terminated the contract of journalist Shi Junrong 
after Shi reported on a local Communist Party meeting at which 
attendees smoked a costly brand of luxury cigarettes.92 Also in 
July, Chinese officials reportedly ordered the reshuffling of staff po-
sitions at a newspaper in Shanghai and a newspaper in Guangzhou 
municipality, Guangdong province, to remove top editorial staff in 
a move that the International Federation of Journalists character-
ized as a political shakeup.93 
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH REGULATION OF EDITORS 
AND JOURNALISTS 
All media organizations in China are subject to an extensive li-
censing system and government supervision.94 In order to report 
the news legally, domestic newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and 
individual journalists must obtain a license or accreditation from 
the government.95 Radio and television broadcast journalists must 
pass a government-sponsored exam that tests them on basic knowl-
edge of Marxist views of news and Communist Party principles.96 
In order to address official concerns over ‘‘false information’’ in 
news reports, the General Administration of Press and Publication 
(GAPP) released regulations in mid-October 2011 that aim to con-
trol journalists’ use of ‘‘unverified information’’ and to regulate 
news agencies’ review procedures.97 The regulations prohibit Chi-
nese journalists from directly including ‘‘unverified information’’ ob-
tained from the Internet or mobile text messages in their report-
ing.98 In addition, the regulations require that news agencies im-
prove the system of accountability for ‘‘fake’’ or ‘‘false’’ news re-
ports, terms which are not defined in the regulations.99 Some 
mainland Chinese journalists decried the regulations as ‘‘another 
move to step up censorship,’’ and one Oriental Morning Post jour-
nalist claimed the regulations could endanger cross-regional report-
ing—which refers to instances when media in one region reports on 
sensitive events or local governments in another region.100 
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FOREIGN JOURNALISTS 
This past year the Commission continued to monitor official har-
assment of foreign journalists as they attempted to report on news 
and events considered sensitive by Chinese officials. In February 
2012, journalists with French broadcaster France 24 and the Neth-
erlands Press Association reported being assaulted by what ap-
peared to be plainclothes police or ‘‘hired thugs’’ while investigating 
illegal land seizures in Panhe village, Cangnan county, Wenzhou 
municipality, Zhejiang province.101 The Foreign Correspondents 
Club in China (FCCC) issued a statement on these assaults and a 
separate incident involving a Dutch journalist who was reportedly 
attacked by men ‘‘who appeared to be plain-clothes police.’’ 102 The 
FCCC also warned members to be ‘‘especially alert’’ while reporting 
in Panhe village.103 In August 2012, the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club, Hong Kong released a statement on a series of incidents in 
which international news reporters working in China were threat-
ened, harassed, and beaten.104 The statement, co-signed by the Bei-
jing-based FCCC and its sister organization in Shanghai, expressed 
alarm over the frequency of abuses and said the incidents rep-
resented ‘‘a clear risk of serious physical harm to journalists merely 
carrying out their professional duties in China.’’ 105 
Chinese authorities also reportedly took action against at least 
one foreign news agency. In May 2012, Chinese officials forced the 
closure of Al Jazeera English’s Beijing bureau office after authori-
ties ‘‘refused to renew its correspondent’s press credentials and 
visa, or allow a replacement journalist,’’ according to an Al Jazeera 
report.106 The FCCC released a statement following the decision 
addressing officials’ lack of transparency: ‘‘[Chinese officials] ex-
pressed unhappiness with the general editorial content on Al 
Jazeera English and accused [its English-language reporter] of vio-
lating rules and regulations that they [did] not [specify].’’ 107 The 
statement called the expulsion ‘‘a grave threat to foreign reporters’ 
ability to work in China.’’ 108 The reporter was the first accredited 




Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in 
practice, full worker rights in accordance with international stand-
ards, including the right to organize into independent unions. Au-
thorities continued to harass, abuse, and detain advocates for work-
er rights. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the 
official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the 
only legal trade union organization in China. All lower level unions 
must be affiliated with the ACFTU. 
During the 2012 reporting year, the Chinese government and 
Communist Party faced the challenge of accommodating an increas-
ingly rights-conscious workforce during a domestic macroeconomic 
slowdown. Worker demonstrations continued in various locations 
and industries, in some instances in response to cost-cutting meas-
ures taken by management that threatened workers’ wages or ben-
efits. 
Following international reports on working conditions at sup-
pliers for Apple, Inc., Apple and Foxconn—a Taiwan-based multi-
national electronics manufacturer, major supplier for Apple, and 
reportedly the largest private employer in China—began imple-
menting a program to improve conditions at Foxconn factories 
across China. Some observers have argued that this plan, if imple-
mented as described, could create incentives for other employers in 
China to improve conditions for workers. 
Freedom of Association 
The Chinese government continued to prevent workers from ex-
ercising their constitutional right to freedom of association 1 this 
past year. Trade union activity can only be organized under the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU),2 an organization 
under the direction of the Communist Party.3 Leading union offi-
cials hold concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party.4 The 
ACFTU Constitution and the PRC Trade Union Law task the 
ACFTU with protecting the legal rights and interests of workers 
while supporting the leadership of the Party and the broader goals 
and interests of the government.5 
Beginning in early 2012, authorities in Shenzhen municipality, 
Guangdong province, reportedly increased pressure on several 
worker services non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to stop 
their work. Between February and May, the landlords of four such 
NGOs terminated their leases early, reportedly under pressure 
from local authorities.6 The landlord of a fifth NGO ordered that 
organization to leave its rented office two years before the end of 
its lease, and officials from a local commerce bureau ordered a 
sixth NGO to stop work or move out because it had not registered 
with the government.7 In August 2012, local fire department offi-
cials inspected another such NGO in Shenzhen, a step that report-
edly had preceded the lease terminations in at least two of the ear-
lier cases.8 According to media sources, since the start of the crack-
down, the total number of NGOs that have been forced to close had 
reached 10 by early September.9 In May 2012, authorities in 
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Guangdong established a coalition of worker services NGOs under 
the leadership of the provincial trade union,10 and at least some of 
the NGOs that experienced harassment reportedly believed that, 
through the coalition, local officials intended to bring NGOs viewed 
as cooperative under their supervision while isolating more inde-
pendent NGOs.11 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Tasked with Party and government loyalty, local-level unions did 
not consistently or uniformly advance the rights of workers this 
past year. ACFTU branches reportedly continued to prioritize ‘‘har-
mony’’ and ‘‘stability’’ in labor relations,12 and in some cases union 
representatives sought to end disputes expediently without nec-
essarily addressing workers’ grievances. For example, after a De-
cember 2011 strike over bonus reductions at an electronics factory 
in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, high-level Nanjing 
Party and union officials reportedly instructed local union officials 
to resolve the dispute quickly and maintain ‘‘stability.’’ 13 Local 
union representatives reportedly did not make demands on behalf 
of workers in negotiations and instead tried to persuade them to 
return to work.14 In other cases, workers lacked knowledge of 
union functions, preventing them from accessing union representa-
tion. For example, out of more than 35,000 Foxconn workers sur-
veyed in a March 2012 Fair Labor Association report, 70 percent 
reported they did not know whether worker representatives partici-
pated in their factory’s decisionmaking processes.15 
COLLECTIVE CONTRACTING 
In May 2012, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Secu-
rity reportedly announced it had begun consulting with other au-
thorities, including the ACFTU, to research options for legislation 
to further promote the use of collective contracts,16 but the Com-
mission observed no further reports on this initiative. Collective 
contracts—contracts produced through consultations between work-
ers and management that regulate issues such as compensation, 
work hours, breaks and vacations, safety and health, and insurance 
and benefits 17—have been part of Chinese labor relations since the 
1990s,18 and the ACFTU has championed collective contracts and 
negotiations as important foundations for trade union work at the 
enterprise level.19 
Direct Union Elections in Shenzhen Municipality 
Authorities in Guangdong province took steps this past year to pro-
mote direct elections of trade union representatives. On May 27, 2012, 
workers at the Omron electronics factory elected a union chair through 
direct, secret ballot elections for the first time, after several hundred 
employees demanded direct elections.20 Wang Tongxin, Vice Chairman 
of the Shenzhen Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, reportedly said 
most enterprises did not have a system of direct union elections but that 
local ACFTU branches in Shenzhen would ‘‘guide’’ 163 Shenzhen-based 




During the past reporting year, workers continued to stage pro-
test demonstrations in various locations in China in response to 
systemic labor-related grievances, such as inadequate pay or bene-
fits,22 excessive overtime demands,23 and abusive management 
practices.24 For example, from late fall 2011 through early 2012, 
workers held a series of demonstrations that some international 
media and worker rights advocates characterized as the most sig-
nificant since the summer of 2010.25 The exact number of worker 
actions that occurred during this period is difficult to determine, 
but they involved multiple industries and occurred in at least 10 
provincial-level areas.26 The demonstrations coincided with a re-
ported slowdown in China’s manufacturing and export sectors,27 
and, in some cases, workers demonstrated in response to cost-cut-
ting measures that threatened workers’ wages or benefits.28 In 
some of those cases, workers said their motivations for dem-
onstrating included management’s failure to consult with them in 
implementing cost-cutting measures.29 
The government and Party continued to express concern over the 
effect of worker actions on ‘‘harmony’’ and ‘‘stability.’’ For example, 
in a February 15, 2012, statement, the Ministry of Human Re-
sources and Social Security (MOHRSS) described ‘‘harmonious 
labor relations’’ as an ‘‘urgent and important political duty that we 
must grasp.’’ 30 In another example, in a July 2012 article in the 
People’s Daily—the official news media of the Communist Party— 
ACFTU Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqi said, ‘‘Currently, China’s 
overall labor relations are harmonious and stable, but at the same 
time, a situation is emerging in which labor disputes, in particular 
collective labor disputes, are happening more easily and in greater 
numbers.’’ 31 Tasked with ‘‘maintaining stability,’’ officials in some 
cases reportedly used force against or detained demonstrating 
workers. For example, in October 2011, public security officials in 
Shaodong county, Shaoyang municipality, Hunan province, report-
edly ordered coal worker Zhao Zuying to serve 10 days of adminis-
trative detention after Zhao and 18 others gathered in a public 
square in Shaoshan city, Xiangtan municipality, Hunan, and ex-
pressed grievances over restructuring of the mines where they 
worked.32 Officials reportedly used force to stop worker demonstra-
tions in locations including Dongguan city, Guangdong province;33 
Shanghai municipality;34 Huzhou municipality, Zhejiang prov-
ince;35 and Chengdu city, Sichuan province.36 
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Labor Rights Advocate Li Wangyang 
Dies Under Police Surveillance 
On June 6, 2012, hospital authorities in Shaoyang city, Hunan prov-
ince, notified the family of labor rights advocate and 1989 Tiananmen 
protester Li Wangyang that Li had committed suicide by hanging him-
self in the hospital while under police surveillance.37 Li previously 
served 11 years in prison for trying to form an independent union and 
10 years for going on a hunger strike to demand compensation for mal-
treatment suffered in prison.38 Li’s family, Hong Kong officials, and 
Hong Kong and international supporters expressed doubts that Li’s 
death was a suicide,39 in part due to his positive demeanor before his 
death and disabilities that hindered his mobility.40 
Authorities at the hospital reportedly prevented access to Li before 
and after his death. Authorities prohibited Li’s sister Li Wangling 41 and 
brother-in-law Zhao Baozhu from approaching the body or taking pic-
tures.42 On June 3, officials took into custody two rights advocates who 
visited Li,43 and, on June 7, officials took Zhao and Li Wangling into 
custody.44 Officials claimed that an autopsy was conducted on June 8 
that ruled the death a suicide, but family members denied ever signing 
off on such report.45 Hong Kong-based and international observers criti-
cized the government’s handling of the case, prompting officials to an-
nounce further investigations.46 Subsequent investigations by officials 
concluded Li killed himself, but Australian forensic experts who exam-
ined the available information raised questions in an August 2012 re-
port regarding the evidence for suicide and whether the investigations 
met international standards.47 
Provisions on Consultation and Mediation for Enterprise Labor 
Disputes 
On November 30, 2011, the MOHRSS issued the Provisions on 
Consultation and Mediation for Enterprise Labor Disputes (Provi-
sions), effective January 1, 2012.48 The PRC Labor Dispute Medi-
ation and Arbitration Law allows workers (or unions acting on be-
half of workers) and management to appoint representatives to 
committees responsible for mediating disputes in the workplace,49 
and the Provisions require all medium and large enterprises to es-
tablish such committees.50 The Provisions also stipulate some addi-
tional, limited protections for worker rights. For example, upon re-
ceiving a complaint from workers about the implementation of a 
contract, collective contract, labor statute, or internal enterprise 
regulation, mediation committees must either coordinate with the 
enterprise to rectify the problem or give workers an explanation.51 
The Provisions also require these committees to publicize labor 
laws, regulations, and policies in the workplace,52 and the Provi-
sions clarify consultations by stipulating that the parties can speci-
fy a length of time for consultations 53 and that agreements reached 
through consultations are binding.54 
The Provisions, however, fail to address the fact that workers in 
China are not guaranteed the right to organize into independent 
unions, leaving the government, Party, and employers with greater 
bargaining power in dispute resolution. The Provisions require en-
terprises to ‘‘guide workers to protect their rights rationally’’ 55 and 
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require local bureaus of the MOHRSS to ‘‘guide enterprises’’ to re-
spect laws, regulations, and policies related to worker rights.56 The 
Provisions also stipulate that state-sanctioned unions ‘‘may take 
the initiative to participate in the handling of labor dispute con-
sultations and protect workers’ lawful rights and interests.’’ 57 
Migrant Workers 
Migrant workers—rural residents who have left their place of 
residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in cities 58—remained par-
ticularly vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace, facing prob-
lems such as wage arrears, ineffective means of redress of griev-
ances, and abuse from managers. Migrant workers typically lack 
urban residency status and have low levels of education, income, 
and perceived social status.59 In one 2012 case, prior to the spring 
festival—a period when many migrant workers return home to 
their families—managers at a construction company in Xiangtan 
municipality, Hunan province, reportedly withheld 1,666,000 yuan 
(US$264,000) in wages from 300 migrant workers.60 Local officials 
reportedly declined to investigate at first, in an effort to ‘‘maintain 
stability,’’ but began investigating after the workers publicly ex-
pressed their grievances.61 In another case, in April 2010, the Qi 
County Human Resources and Social Security Bureau in Kaifeng 
municipality, Henan province, reportedly filed a case with a local 
court on behalf of migrant workers with unpaid wages, but the 
court had not accepted the case as of January 18, 2012.62 The court 
reportedly claimed the bureau never submitted paperwork for the 
case; the bureau reportedly claimed it submitted the paperwork, 
but did not pay the processing fee at the time.63 In another case, 
on January 16, 2012, a construction company manager in Xianyang 
municipality, Shaanxi province, cut a migrant worker’s fingers with 
a knife after the worker asked the manager to pay unpaid wages 
to another migrant worker.64 
Faced with a growing migrant worker population (reportedly over 
250 million in 2011),65 an increasing urbanization rate,66 and a 
new generation of young, more educated, rights-conscious migrant 
workers,67 some local governments took steps to accommodate mi-
grant workers seeking to integrate into urban areas. For example, 
in October 2011, the Beijing Municipal People’s Government issued 
a notice that, for the first time, allowed non-Beijing residents to 
apply for public housing in Beijing.68 In June 2012, authorities in 
Guangdong province launched the 2012 Dream Project, part of an 
ongoing program to help young migrant workers receive a college 
education.69 
Social Insurance 
This past year, workers continued to face challenges to receiving 
social insurance, including employers who delayed registering em-
ployees for insurance and employers who did not pay insurance 
contributions (‘‘social insurance’’ includes old-age insurance, med-
ical insurance, occupational injury insurance, unemployment insur-
ance, and maternity insurance).70 For example, the PRC Law on 
Social Insurance requires employers to register employees with in-
surance providers within 30 days of employment,71 but some fac-
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tories of the Hong Kong-based electronics manufacturer VTech 72 in 
Dongguan municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly waited be-
tween 6 and 10 months,73 while a Dongguan cement factory report-
edly required workers to work at least 1 year before they could pur-
chase social insurance.74 Official Chinese media reported in March 
2012 that a state-owned firm in Ling county, Shandong province, 
owed employees tens of thousands of yuan (10,000 yuan is 
US$1,850) in social insurance contributions.75 The report said the 
unpaid insurance contributions caused ‘‘a wicked incident of work-
ers striking and causing trouble,’’ which in turn ‘‘caused an evil in-
fluence on society.’’ 76 Following a recommendation of the Fair 
Labor Association, Apple Inc.’s supplier Foxconn worked with the 
municipal government in Shenzhen during the reporting year to 
allow migrant workers to claim social insurance benefits locally. 
Shenzhen authorities issued a provision this year to allow all mi-
grant workers in the city to claim unemployment insurance bene-
fits either at their home province or in Shenzhen, effective January 
1, 2013.77 
Wages 
WAGE ARREARS AND NON-PAYMENT OF WAGES 
Wage arrears and non-payment of wages remained serious prob-
lems this past year, especially for migrant workers.78 [See Migrant 
Workers above for more information.] In a January 2012 report, 
Apple, Inc., documented problems with wages at its suppliers in 
China, such as wage arrears, the use of wage deductions as punish-
ment, and overtime pay that did not meet statutory require-
ments.79 A March 2012 Fair Labor Association investigation fur-
ther documented wage problems at Foxconn factories.80 For exam-
ple, some workers did not receive pay for attending work-related 
meetings outside of work hours.81 In some cases, workers received 
pay based on 30-minute increments, so that workers who worked 
an extra 29 minutes would receive no additional pay.82 
MINIMUM WAGE 
As the Commission observed in 2011, the Chinese government 
reportedly has assembled a ‘‘basic framework’’ for a national wage 
regulation, in part to address official concern over wealth dispari-
ties across China.83 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (MOHRSS) began formulating the regulation in 2007, and 
officials reportedly started soliciting comments and suggestions for 
a completed draft in early 2009.84 Some domestic media reports in-
dicated the regulation would be approved sometime in 2010, but 
one MOHRSS official later said that was never the case.85 In a 
July 2011 press conference, MOHRSS spokesperson Yin Chengji 
said the regulation was being ‘‘researched and discussed’’ and that 
there was ‘‘no definite release date.’’ 86 The Commission has not ob-
served any subsequent reports on the draft regulation’s status. 
Local governments continued to increase minimum wages during 
this reporting year. This past year, the Commission observed re-
ports from local governments and Chinese media organizations de-
scribing increases in statutory minimum wages in nine provincial- 
level areas 87 and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.88 
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Other Working Conditions 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
Workers, especially in the mining sector, continued to face sig-
nificant occupational safety risks this past year,89 although offi-
cially reported deaths from mining accidents in early 2012 were 
fewer than those from the same period in 2011. Central govern-
ment news agency Xinhua reported that 185 accidents and 289 
deaths occurred in China’s mining sector in the first quarter of 
2012.90 The reported death total was 16.5 percent lower than the 
first quarter of 2011.91 Chinese media organizations continued to 
report on cases in which mine managers and local officials con-
cealed information about mine accidents.92 In May 2012, the State 
Administration of Work Safety and the Ministry of Finance issued 
the Measures on Rewards for Safe Production Reporting (Meas-
ures), which stipulate cash rewards for workers who report occupa-
tional safety hazards, such as unlicensed construction activity, the 
use of equipment that the government has banned for safety rea-
sons, and coverups of workplace accidents.93 The Measures also 
stipulate protection under the law for whistleblowers who report 
such issues.94 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
Workers’ health continued to face a variety of risks, including in-
adequate government supervision of industry compliance with occu-
pational health standards,95 illegal actions by employers,96 a lack 
of transparency in diagnosing and certifying diseases,97 and a lack 
of knowledge among workers about health in the workplace.98 Offi-
cially reported cases of occupational disease have grown at increas-
ing rates in recent years, especially in the mining sector, although 
the Ministry of Health (MOH) noted in a 2009 report that ‘‘experts 
estimate that the actual number of occupational diseases in China 
every year is larger than the reported number.’’ 99 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DATA REPORTED BY THE PRC MINISTRY OF 
HEALTH, 2007–2010† 
Year New Cases of Occupational Disease (Percent Increase Over Previous Year) 
Percent of Total 
Cases of Occupational 
Disease From the 
Coal Mining Sector 
2010* 100 27,240 ......................................................................................
(50.26) ...................................................................................... 57.75 
2009* 101 18,128 ......................................................................................
(31.90) ...................................................................................... 41.38 
2008** 102 13,744 ......................................................................................
(-3.86) ....................................................................................... 39.81 
2007* 103 14,296 ......................................................................................
(CECC has not observed relevant data) ............................... 45.84 
†The Commission has not observed relevant official data on cases of occupational disease beyond 2010. 
*MOH data for this year does not include the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
**MOH data for this year does not include the Tibet Autonomous Region or Beijing municipality. 
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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Under the PRC Social Insurance Law, effective July 1, 2011, 
workers are entitled to compensation for occupational injury or dis-
ease if they obtain certification that the injury or disease is work- 
related.104 Workers, however, reportedly continued to face obstacles 
in obtaining compensation, such as difficulty obtaining a diagnosis 
or proving a working relationship with their employer,105 steps re-
quired for the certification process under the PRC Regulations on 
Occupational Injury Insurance (Regulations).106 In addition, offi-
cials in some cases have implemented the law in an uneven man-
ner. For example, sanitation worker Zhang Zhijuan suffered a 
brain hemorrhage while working overtime in Harbin municipality, 
Heilongjiang province, but local officials refused to recognize her 
condition as an occupational injury because she did not die,107 cit-
ing a provision in the Regulations that says a worker’s condition 
shall be treated as an occupational injury if the worker contracts 
a disease and ‘‘dies suddenly or, after rescue is ineffective, dies 
within 48 hours.’’ 108 In 2010, however, a case similar to Zhang’s 
reportedly occurred in Beijing, and authorities recognized a work-
er’s brain hemorrhage as an occupational injury under the Regula-
tions.109 
An amendment to the PRC Law on Prevention and Control of Oc-
cupational Diseases (Occupational Disease Law), effective Decem-
ber 31, 2011,110 contains provisions that could help workers obtain 
the certification they need in order to receive compensation for oc-
cupational diseases.111 It also requires the government and employ-
ers to take general measures to protect the health of workers, in-
cluding dedicating sufficient funding to the prevention and control 
of occupational diseases.112 
Working Conditions at Foxconn Factories 
In a March 2012 report, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) documented 
poor working conditions at three factories owned by Foxconn (one in 
Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, and two in Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone),113 a Taiwan-based multinational electronics manufac-
turer,114 major supplier for Apple,115 and reportedly the largest private 
employer in China.116 The report found workers exceeding the legal 
limit for overtime and working without the legally required one-day 
break per week, ‘‘numerous’’ health and safety issues, worker alienation 
from management-appointed health and safety committees, uncompen-
sated overtime, and barriers to insurance access.117 Apple and Foxconn 
agreed to ensure ‘‘elections of worker representatives without manage-
ment interference,’’ reduce overtime to the legal limit by July 2013 while 
protecting workers’ pay, improve recordkeeping of accidents, pay work-
ers fairly for overtime, and explore private options for providing unem-
ployment insurance to migrant workers.118 
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Working Conditions at Foxconn Factories—Continued 
Some observers have argued that these measures, if implemented, 
could create incentives for other employers in China to improve condi-
tions for workers.119 A June 2012 China Labor Watch report docu-
mented similar problems with working conditions in 10 China-based 
Apple supplier factories, including one Foxconn factory, based on inves-
tigations from January to April 2012.120 The same report also found ex-
tensive use of dispatched workers in some factories.121 According to the 
PRC Labor Contract Law, dispatched workers are normally to be used 
for ‘‘temporary, auxiliary, or substitute positions.’’ 122 In May 2012, 
Hong Kong-based non-governmental organization Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) reported ongoing problems 
with working conditions at Foxconn factories.123 For example, SACOM 
reported that workers at two Foxconn factories said the factories re-
duced overtime hours but increased production quotas, in some cases 
leading workers to work unpaid overtime to achieve quotas.124 Other 
problems that SACOM reported included public humiliation of work-
ers,125 unsafe working environments,126 and harsh living conditions in 
factory dormitories.127 In August 2012, the FLA issued a followup report 
on conditions at the three Foxconn factories reviewed in the March 2012 
report, based on investigations from June 25 to July 6, 2012.128 The Au-
gust report noted some changes in policies and procedures that, if imple-
mented, could address problems noted in the March report. For exam-
ple, all three factories established procedures designed to improve work-
er participation in factory policymaking,129 and Foxconn established a 
new requirement that factories conduct worker training during normal 
work hours and pay overtime for any training outside of normal work 
hours.130 The long-term effects of such policies and procedures on condi-
tions for Foxconn workers in practice, however, remain unclear. 
Child Labor 
This past year, illegal child labor continued to be reported in 
China. In a September 2011 report, the U.S. Department of Labor 
reported it had ‘‘reason to believe’’ six categories of goods—elec-
tronics, textiles, bricks, cotton, fireworks, and toys—were being 
produced in China with child labor, in violation of international 
standards.131 Apple’s January 2012 supplier report noted cases of 
child labor in five of Apple’s supplier facilities,132 and in February 
2012, Chinese authorities reportedly discovered over 10 child labor-
ers at an electronics factory in Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu prov-
ince.133 
As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
China has ratified the two core conventions on the elimination of 
child labor.134 The PRC Labor Law and related legislation prohibit 
the employment of minors under 16 years old.135 Both national and 
local legal provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate punishments 
for employing children.136 The PRC Criminal Law stipulates a pun-
ishment of up to 10 years in prison for anyone who ‘‘forces any 
other person to work by violence, threat or restriction of personal 
freedom,’’ although the eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal 
Law—which took effect on May 1, 2011—removed language that 
specifically mentioned the employment of minors under 16 years of 
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age.137 In May 2012, the Dongguan Municipal People’s Government 
in Guangdong province offered incentives to whistleblowers when 
it issued municipal regulations authorizing cash awards to those 
who report cases of child labor.138 Monitoring the extent of child 
labor in practice, however, is difficult, in part because the Chinese 
government does not release data on child labor despite frequent 
requests by the U.S. Government, other foreign governments, and 
international organizations. In 2011, the ILO’s Committee of Ex-
perts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations ex-
pressed concern over this lack of transparency and urged the Chi-
nese government to ‘‘take the necessary measures to ensure that 
sufficient up-to-date data on the situation of working children is 
made available. . . .’’ 139 A 2010 report by a global risks advisory 
firm rated China ‘‘amongst those with the most widespread abuses 
of child workers’’ and estimated there were ‘‘between 10 to 20 mil-
lion underage workers.’’ 140 
The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of child 
labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat it,141 con-
tinued to permit ‘‘work-study’’ programs and activities that in prac-
tical terms perpetuated the practice of child labor and were tanta-
mount to official endorsement of it. National provisions prohibiting 
child labor provide that ‘‘education practice labor’’ and vocational 
skills training labor organized by schools and other educational and 
vocational institutions do not constitute use of child labor when 
such activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the 
students.142 The PRC Education Law supports schools that estab-
lish work-study and other related programs, provided that the pro-
grams do not negatively affect normal studies.143 China has rati-
fied the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,144 but in 
a 2011 report on China’s compliance with this convention, the 
ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and 
Recommendations noted ‘‘serious concern at the compulsory nature 
of the work performed . . . by schoolchildren under the age of 18 
within the context of work-study programmes.’’ 145 The Committee 
cited reports of students performing labor-intensive tasks in fac-
tories and fields for extended periods of time, including cotton pick-
ing in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).146 The 
Commission continued to note similar reports this past year.147 In 
September 2011, for example, a school in the XUAR reportedly 
postponed classes for 15 days so that students as young as third 





During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s intention to ‘‘maintain social stability’’ (weihu shehui 
wending, or wei wen) and the Communist Party’s determination to 
maintain its monopoly on power guided developments in criminal 
law and justice. At a conference held in November 2011, Zhang 
Jun, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court, reminded offi-
cials, legal practitioners, and scholars that criminal punishment 
plays a critical role in managing society and resolving social con-
flict.1 The transformation of criminal punishment into a social 
management tool has helped pave the way for continued growth of 
the domestic security establishment, which has in turn facilitated 
ongoing abuses of police power in the name of ‘‘stability.’’ 
While numerous repressive policies remained in place during the 
past year, some statements from high-ranking officials were crafted 
to acknowledge the priorities and expectations set forth under 
international law. Leaders promised to strike a balance between 
crime control and the protection of individual rights,2 releasing a 
new National Human Rights Action Plan for the period from 2012 
to 2015,3 and the revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that 
will take effect on January 1, 2013.4 The CPL revision was her-
alded by officials as a sort of ‘‘mini-Constitution’’ that would serve 
to constrain the power of the state 5 by providing greater protec-
tions for the mentally ill,6 better guarantees for access to legal de-
fense,7 exclusion of evidence obtained through torture,8 and more 
rigorous review of death penalty convictions,9 among other things. 
Recent criminal justice reforms remain at risk of being under-
mined in practice by the authorities responsible for their imple-
mentation. This is particularly apparent in actions taken against 
some of China’s citizen activists. At multiple stages throughout the 
criminal process, authorities appeared to take advantage of recent 
reforms to establish a dual track for criminal punishment: one that 
applied by default to the vast majority of suspects and defendants 
and one that applied to writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, 
reform advocates, and other citizens who engage in advocacy on 
issues that authorities deem politically sensitive. 
Abuse of Police Power 
Chinese government domestic security entities, including public 
security, state security, and People’s Armed Police (PAP) forces, 
have grown in stature and influence since the 17th Communist 
Party Congress in October 2007. The rise of Zhou Yongkang from 
Minister of Public Security and Politburo member to Secretary of 
the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Af-
fairs Commission (zhengfawei, or PLAC) and member of the Polit-
buro Standing Committee helped to strengthen the Party’s long-
standing emphasis on ‘‘maintaining social stability.’’ 10 Under 
Zhou’s guidance and with the PLAC responsible for the oversight 
of China’s public security, procuratorate, and court systems, law 
enforcement agencies’ budgets, staff, and exercise of authority have 
grown substantially since 2008.11 
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Much of this expansion has taken place at the local level.12 This 
past year, citizens who lodged complaints or sought to defend their 
rights or the rights of others found themselves at risk of harass-
ment, assault, kidnapping, and illegal detention by or at the behest 
of local authorities. The use of arbitrary detention and torture by 
local authorities against rights activists spiked in 2011, with Chi-
nese Human Rights Defenders documenting a total of 3,833 
incidences of individuals arbitrarily detained for their rights activ-
ism 13 and 159 incidences of torture during such detentions.14 Of 
the 3,833 cases that were documented, 3,289 cases reportedly had 
no basis in Chinese law.15 
Authorities use vague provisions to crack down on those they 
view as a potential threat to their authority. For example, in Feb-
ruary 2012, a Chinese court sentenced democracy advocate Zhu 
Yufu to seven years in prison for ‘‘inciting subversion of state 
power.’’ 16 Zhu’s conviction came in the wake of online calls for 
‘‘Jasmine’’ protest rallies and was based, in part, on a poem he had 
posted online. Democracy advocate Chen Wei was convicted in De-
cember 2011 and sentenced to nine years in prison for authoring 
essays discussing democracy, equality, and human rights that were 
posted on overseas Web sites.17 Western analysts who monitor 
criminal justice developments in China maintain that charges such 
as ‘‘subversion’’ and ‘‘inciting subversion of state power,’’ along with 
‘‘splittism’’ and ‘‘leaking state secrets,’’ are characterized as ‘‘endan-
gering state security’’ 18 and are used to silence citizen activists.19 
A March 2012 article published in the Chinese press asserts that 
‘‘the accusation of endangering state security is really a way of say-
ing [an individual is] endangering the regime’s security.’’ 20 Since 
2008, state security-related indictments have been at a historic 
high.21 
At a May 2012 symposium on the newly revised PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law, Zhou Yongkang called on law enforcement agencies 
to place equal emphasis on the dual goals of punishing crime and 
safeguarding human rights.22 With Zhou expected to retire after 
the 18th Party Congress this fall,23 domestic commentators have 
grown increasingly vocal in criticizing the high level of power that 
law enforcement agencies amassed under his leadership. In an 
open letter dated May 4, 2012, 16 retired Party officials condemned 
the allegedly lawless campaign against organized crime that was 
instituted in Chongqing municipality by Bo Xilai, the former 
Chongqing Party Secretary and former member of the Political Bu-
reau of the Communist Party Central Committee. Calling the cam-
paign a ‘‘guise’’ for the torture and persecution of critics and rights 
defenders,24 the letter claimed that Zhou not only took part in, but 
also helped to advocate for, some of the allegedly heavy-handed tac-
tics used.25 A number of officials have called for an inquiry into re-
lated complaints, including accusations that Bo’s crackdown in-
volved abuses such as torture.26 
Arbitrary Detention 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention defines the dep-
rivation of personal liberty to be ‘‘arbitrary’’ if it meets one of the 
following criteria: (1) There is clearly no basis in law for such dep-
rivation; (2) an individual is deprived of his or her liberty for hav-
71 
ing exercised rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is grave noncompliance with 
fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international 
human rights instruments.27 The ICCPR sets forth the additional 
requirement that an individual must be promptly informed of the 
reasons for his or her detention and the charges against him or her 
in order for such deprivation of liberty to be considered permis-
sible.28 
Arbitrary detention takes several different forms in China, in-
cluding: 
• ‘‘Soft detention’’ (ruanjin), a range of extralegal controls 
under which an individual may be subjected to home confine-
ment, surveillance, restricted movement, and limitations on 
contact with others; 
• ‘‘Enforced disappearances’’; 
• Detention in secret ‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu); 
• Reeducation through labor (laojiao), an administrative, rath-
er than criminal, punishment of up to three years with the pos-
sibility of a one-year extension for alleged minor offenses; 
• Forced commitment to a psychiatric hospital for the crimi-
nally insane (ankang); and 
• Shuanggui (‘‘double regulation’’ or ‘‘double designation’’), a 
disciplinary measure used by the Party to investigate its own 
members, most often in cases of suspected corruption. 
Many forms of arbitrary detention violate China’s own laws.29 
SOFT DETENTION AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 
Prior to the March 2012 revision of the PRC Criminal Procedure 
Law (CPL), Article 60 established ‘‘residential surveillance’’ as a 
compulsory measure (qiangzhi cuoshi) 30 to be used principally for 
specific categories of individuals, such as those who are gravely ill, 
pregnant, or breastfeeding.31 In recent years, however, authorities 
have used residential surveillance to place high-profile rights activ-
ists such as Chen Guangcheng under close watch. Chen, a self- 
trained legal advocate who helped bring international news media 
attention to local population planning abuses in Linyi city, 
Shandong province, completed his four-year-and-three-month pris-
on sentence for allegedly disturbing public order and destroying 
public property on September 10, 2010.32 Upon his release, local 
authorities immediately confined Chen and his family to detention 
at their home in Dongshigu village.33 Chen escaped one year and 
seven months later, on April 22, 2012, and was granted permission 
to travel along with his wife and their children to the United 
States.34 Despite his initial confidence in the central government’s 
agreement to investigate local authorities for the abuses per-
petrated against him,35 Chen has since expressed frustration with 
the government’s failure to act, and concern regarding the contin-
ued harsh treatment of family members and supporters who re-
main in Shandong.36 Chen, his family, and his supporters ex-
pressed concern that Chen’s nephew Chen Kegui—who faces 
charges of intentional homicide for allegedly wounding several gov-
ernment-appointed personnel—may have been subjected to tor-
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ture,37 and that authorities had forced Chen Kegui to accept gov-
ernment-appointed lawyers.38 An August 2012 Radio Free Asia re-
port noted that the case against Chen Kegui was marred with pro-
cedural irregularities and violations.39 
Authorities have continued to resort to ‘‘soft detention’’ to keep 
writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, and reform advocates 
out of the public eye.40 During the 2012 reporting year, as in the 
previous reporting year,41 the Commission observed numerous in-
stances of Chinese citizens who had gone ‘‘missing’’ or ‘‘dis-
appeared’’ into official custody, with little or no information avail-
able about their whereabouts or the potential charges against 
them. According to an international media report, more than 
10,000 Chinese citizens were secretly held in government custody 
during the first three months of 2012.42 In one case, Chinese offi-
cials held prominent human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng incommu-
nicado on numerous occasions after he was sentenced in December 
2006 to three years in prison, suspended for five years, for ‘‘inciting 
subversion of state power.’’ 43 Less than one week before Gao’s pe-
riod of suspension was set to expire, Chinese state media reported 
that he had violated applicable probation rules and would serve his 
original three-year sentence effective as of December 2011.44 In 
January 2012, relatives received notice that Gao was undergoing a 
three-month ‘‘education period’’ and that he would be denied visi-
tors for at least that length of time.45 
The Chinese government has given the extralegal practices out-
lined above the imprimatur of law under the revised CPL. Article 
73 authorizes the secret detention of an individual suspected of en-
dangering state security, terrorism, or major instances of bribery at 
a fixed place of residence other than his or her own home. The only 
limitations on this authority are that it may be exercised only with 
approval from an upper level law enforcement agency and only in 
cases in which authorities maintain that keeping the individual at 
his or her home would likely ‘‘hinder the investigation.’’ 46 Inves-
tigators do not need to notify the individual’s family if they assert 
that notification is impossible.47 Notification to family members 
need not disclose the reason or location of the individual’s deten-
tion, details that Articles 83 (relating to detention) and 91 (relating 
to arrest) were also revised to leave out.48 While a citizen under 
residential surveillance is allowed to appoint and speak with a de-
fense lawyer while under investigation, those suspected of endan-
gering state security, terrorism, or bribery must first seek and ob-
tain approval from the investigating authority.49 
When the draft of CPL Article 73 was released for public com-
ment in August 2011, it drew widespread attention and criticism 
in China.50 The earlier version of the clause was eventually aban-
doned, but the version that remains continues to raise concern 
among legal analysts and rights activists both inside and outside 
of China. On the eve of the final vote to approve the revised CPL, 
Chinese lawyers argued that granting investigators broader exer-
cise of power in cases alleged to involve endangering state security, 
terrorism, and bribery would help pave the way for the arbitrary 
detention of activists 51 and serve the interests of national security 
and anti-corruption enforcement agencies more than the public.52 
Human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong cautioned that the decision 
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to allow otherwise illegal official use of power under Article 73 sig-
naled China’s shift toward becoming more of a police state, under 
which the leadership’s intention to ‘‘maintain social stability’’ is 
paramount.53 After the National People’s Congress passed the revi-
sion, an article on the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) Web 
site acknowledged that vague, undefined phrases such as ‘‘hinder 
the investigation’’ and ‘‘impossible to notify’’ provide so much dis-
cretion as to lend themselves to abuse by authorities.54 The SPP 
is in the process of revising its Criminal Procedure Rules of the 
People’s Procuratorates in order to clarify the specific scenarios 
that might constitute ‘‘hindering the investigation.’’ 55 These rules 
would guide procuratorates in their investigation of major cases of 
bribery, but they would not apply to public security bureaus, which 
possess investigative jurisdiction over state security and terrorism 
cases.56 
‘‘BLACK JAILS’’ 
‘‘Black jails’’ operate outside of China’s official criminal justice 
system.57 The Chinese government has repeatedly denied their ex-
istence,58 but anecdotal accounts indicate that private security 
firms run numerous such sites as ‘‘ad-hoc prisons’’ 59 to detain and 
punish petitioners seeking redress for their grievances against the 
government.60 In August 2011, public security officials shut down 
a ‘‘black jail’’ in Changping district, Beijing municipality, which re-
portedly held petitioners who had been intercepted en route to Bei-
jing from five other provinces and municipalities.61 Beijing’s public 
security bureau launched a six-month crackdown effective Decem-
ber 2011, which targeted firms that illegally operated ‘‘black jails’’ 
at the behest of local officials in other parts of China.62 In addition 
to imposing fines of 20,000 to 100,000 yuan, public security au-
thorities threatened violating individuals and firms with criminal 
investigation.63 
Professor Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
praised Beijing’s crackdown but also pointed out that the cases of 
illegal detention that were exposed were ‘‘merely the tip of the ice-
berg.’’ 64 At least one critic has questioned whether, despite the 
threat of criminal investigation, local authorities who use illegal 
means to suppress petitioners actually receive their due punish-
ment.65 In one case reported by state media in September 2011, a 
tourist named Zhao Zhifei traveled from Luoyang city, Henan prov-
ince, to Beijing and was mistakenly beaten because he shared a 
guestroom with several petitioners while there.66 The Luoyang gov-
ernment later investigated six individuals for allegedly authorizing 
the beating and imposed punishments that ranged from an order 
to apologize to the dismissal of the head of the local petitioning of-
fice.67 
REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR 
Human rights advocates and legal experts in China have long de-
bated the merits of reeducation through labor (RTL, also known as 
laojiao), which empowers public security authorities to hold indi-
viduals in custody without judicial review.68 The case of Tang Hui, 
the mother of a young victim of rape and forced prostitution whose 
efforts to petition the government about her daughter’s case re-
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sulted in her confinement to an RTL center in August 2012, helped 
bring this debate back into the spotlight.69 On August 14, 2012, a 
group of 10 Chinese lawyers sent an open letter to the Ministry of 
Public Security and the Ministry of Justice, calling for greater 
transparency and legal protections in the RTL decisionmaking 
process.70 State media have since criticized the RTL system as a 
tool that has been abused by local authorities to retaliate against 
petitioners.71 Previous attempts to reform the RTL system stalled 
in 2005 and 2010, and media sources attribute the ongoing impasse 
to disagreements between public security and judicial agencies over 
who should hold decisionmaking power.72 
FORCED PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT 
The PRC Criminal Law authorizes compulsory medical treatment 
for those who commit crimes but suffer from mental illness.73 The 
Ministry of Public Security directly administers 22 psychiatric hos-
pitals for such purposes (also known as ankang facilities), but regu-
lations governing who may or may not be committed lack clarity.74 
Without a clearly delineated diagnostic and determination process, 
officials have broad discretion to classify a person as in need of psy-
chiatric treatment.75 In an August 2012 report on the abuse of in-
voluntary psychiatric commitment in China, Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders asserted that ‘‘[t]hose who have the means— 
power and money—to either compel or pay psychiatric hospitals to 
detain individuals out of a desire to punish and silence them have 
been able to do so with impunity.’’ 76 Civil Rights and Livelihood 
Watch, a Chinese monitoring group, maintains a database of over 
900 cases in which an individual was misdiagnosed as mentally ill 
(bei jingshenbing) and forced into psychiatric care—a number that 
the group claims is a mere ‘‘drop in the bucket of total cases.’’ 77 
According to a U.S. Department of State report, petitioners and 
rights defenders are sometimes reportedly confined along with the 
mentally ill.78 In 2010, a native of Shiyan city, Hubei province, was 
forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for taking photos of pe-
titioners who had gathered on the street, according to a March 
2012 report.79 His case and subsequent lawsuits against the rel-
evant public security bureau and hospital attracted national atten-
tion and renewed discussion of the draft Mental Health Law.80 
Currently under review by the National People’s Congress Stand-
ing Committee, the draft law seeks to constrain official abuse by 
limiting the power to diagnose and forcibly commit individuals to 
psychiatric care.81 Critics remain concerned about the draft’s fail-
ure to make independent reviews of an initial diagnosis mandatory, 
the lack of provision for the appointment of legal counsel, and the 
absence of time limits on involuntary commitment.82 [For more in-
formation on the progress of the draft Mental Health Law, see Sec-
tion II—Public Health.] 
Barriers to Adequate Defense and a Fair Trial 
Most defendants in China face significant bias 83 in the criminal 
justice system and do without adequate legal assistance. According 
to Yu Ning, former president of the All China Lawyers Association, 
the participation rate of lawyers in criminal cases is reportedly no 
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more than 30 percent.84 Even when a lawyer is involved, mounting 
a defense can prove challenging.85 The abuse of Article 306 of the 
Criminal Law (the so-called ‘‘lawyer perjury’’ clause) has worsened 
in recent years,86 and experts estimate that hundreds of defense 
lawyers may have been prosecuted under it.87 In March 2012, 
criminal defense lawyer Li Zhuang submitted a petition to have his 
case retried by the Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court 
after new evidence emerged to indicate that police in Chongqing 
municipality may have prevented a witness from testifying on his 
behalf at trial.88 A Chongqing court convicted Li under Article 306 
of the Criminal Law 89 and sentenced him to one year and six 
months in prison after a client claimed that Li had encouraged him 
to lie in court.90 Some legal scholars and practitioners assert that 
the same law enforcement authorities who prosecute a case should 
not also have the authority to investigate the lawyer defending 
that case.91 The newly revised Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) con-
tains a provision remedying this problem,92 but critics argue that 
it still falls short of what is needed to guard against potential con-
flicts of interest.93 
The revised CPL includes a number of provisions that could help 
strengthen criminal defense, if faithfully implemented. One recent 
study found that approximately 95 percent of the criminal cases 
surveyed relied on defendant confessions,94 and that the vast ma-
jority of defense efforts failed to challenge confessions.95 Article 50 
of the CPL now guards against self-incrimination, as well as the 
use of torture or threats to gather evidence.96 Article 53 prohibits 
conviction based on a confession alone, without additional corrobo-
ration.97 Illegally obtained evidence must be excluded from trial 
under Article 54,98 and investigators are authorized to record the 
interrogation process (and must do so as a matter of course in more 
serious cases) under Article 121.99 Tian Wenchang, Chair of the 
Criminal Affairs Committee of the All China Lawyers Association, 
has questioned how effective these new provisions will prove in 
practice.100 Tian argues that stronger protections, such as the right 
to remain silent, remain necessary to eliminate reliance on an indi-
vidual’s confession as the primary basis for conviction.101 
Torture and Abuse in Custody 
Chinese law prohibits the torture and abuse of individuals in 
custody.102 Despite the central government’s efforts to address this 
longstanding problem,103 abusive practices remain widespread.104 
Li Wangyang, a labor rights advocate and 1989 Tiananmen pro-
tester, reported that successive beatings during his imprisonment 
left him nearly deaf and blind.105 In June 2012, Li’s body was 
found hanging in the hospital room where he had been receiving 
medical treatment since his release from prison in 2011.106 Offi-
cials authorized an autopsy, which was conducted in the absence 
of his family members by the same coroner who ruled the Decem-
ber 2011 death of a man in police custody during anticorruption 
and land and election rights protests in Wukan village, Lufeng city, 
Guangdong province, to be of natural causes.107 The suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding Li’s death, much like those in the Wukan 
death, prompted domestic calls for an investigation.108 Hong Kong 
legislator Lee Cheuk-yan called Li’s death a ‘‘political murder’’ and 
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cautioned that ‘‘[i]f the case is not properly investigated, it shows 
that China now is more oppressive—that [officials] can even take 
away the life of a person without responsibility, without justice.’’ 109 
On July 30, 2012, the Supreme People’s Court circulated for feed-
back a judicial interpretation that seeks to further identify acts 
prohibited as torture and require the recording of interrogations 
taking place outside a detention center.110 The Chinese govern-
ment has also issued two new regulations to govern the conduct of 
those responsible for prison and detention oversight.111 The State 
Council stepped in for the first time to release a Detention Center 
Regulation, which took effect on April 1, 2012.112 The new regula-
tion prohibits the humiliation, corporal punishment, or abuse of 
those in administrative detention or detained by a court.113 Be-
cause it applies only to persons in custody for minor offenses, its 
scope is limited.114 Moreover, earlier provisions, specifying the pun-
ishment of detention guards who violate the regulation and requir-
ing notification of family members within 12 hours of detention, 
are absent from the final version, according to a media report.115 
By contrast, regulations jointly issued by the Ministry of Super-
vision, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, and Min-
istry of Justice, which went into effect on July 1, 2012, include spe-
cific punishments for the illegal behavior of guards in prisons and 
reeducation through labor centers. If faithfully implemented, these 
regulations would subject those directly responsible, as well as 
their supervisors, to criminal liability and disciplinary action (in-
cluding demerits, demotion, and dismissal) for the extended con-
finement, beating, corporal punishment, and abuse of prisoners.116 
Sentencing, Punishment, and Execution 
According to a February 2011 report by the Dui Hua Foundation 
(Dui Hua), in ‘‘recent years’’ more than 25 percent of Chinese pris-
oners have been granted sentence reductions, parole, or medical pa-
role.117 Chinese courts granted sentence reductions for over 1 mil-
lion prison inmates and released another 68,000 on parole in 2009 
and 2010.118 According to the same report, these privileges appear 
to no longer extend to political prisoners.119 In a video released in 
February 2011, self-taught legal advocate Chen Guangcheng al-
leged that despite his accumulation of enough good behavior 
‘‘points’’ to qualify for a sentence reduction, authorities failed to 
take action on his application for early release.120 Dui Hua noted 
that local regulations applicable in Chen’s case prohibit the grant-
ing of parole to prisoners found guilty of ‘‘endangering state secu-
rity’’ and name such prisoners among groups to be ‘‘strictly han-
dled’’ for sentence reductions.121 New regulations issued by the Su-
preme People’s Court (SPC) in November 2011 and effective on 
July 1, 2012, help to clarify the type of behavior that qualifies a 
prisoner for early release,122 but leave it to the discretion of the 
court to determine whether there is adequate risk that a prisoner 
might commit another crime to warrant denial of parole, regardless 
of other circumstances in his or her favor.123 
The SPC has taken steps toward increasing transparency and 
improving standards of review in death penalty cases. Since taking 
back the power of review over the death penalty in 2007,124 it has 
overturned 10 percent of all death sentences 125 and has pushed for 
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the adoption of more stringent guidelines for the examination and 
judgment of evidence in death penalty trials.126 The newly revised 
Criminal Procedure Law now provides for expanded access to legal 
defense,127 recorded interrogations,128 longer trial deliberations,129 
mandatory appellate hearings,130 and more rigorous judicial re-
view.131 
The Chinese government still maintains its policy of not releas-
ing information about the thousands of prisoners reportedly exe-
cuted each year and continues to keep data on such executions a 
state secret.132 Experts estimate that 4,000 people were likely exe-
cuted in China in 2011, more than the number of executions in the 
rest of the world combined.133 Vice Minister of Health Huang Jiefu 
confirmed in 2012 that the harvesting of organs from executed pris-
oners provides up to two-thirds of China’s limited supply of livers, 
kidneys, hearts, lungs, and corneas for transplantation.134 Huang 
has promised new regulations to impose greater supervision over 
the transplant process and to ‘‘strike hard’’ against illegal trade in 
human organs.135 [For more information on organ transplants, see 
box titled Organ Transplants in China: Developments and Con-
troversies in Section II—Public Health.] 
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment and Communist Party continued to restrict Chinese citi-
zens’ freedom of religion. China’s Constitution provides for ‘‘free-
dom of religious belief,’’ but protects only ‘‘normal religious activi-
ties.’’ 1 In its 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan, the 
government reiterated protection only for what it deems to be ‘‘nor-
mal religious activities.’’ 2 The narrow protections for religious ac-
tivity in China contravene international human rights standards. 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights recognizes not only the right to ‘‘freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion’’ but also the right to manifest religion or be-
lief through ‘‘worship, observance, practice and teaching.’’ 3 The 
government continued to legally recognize only five religions: Bud-
dhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism.4 Groups 
wishing to practice these religions must register with the govern-
ment and are subject to ongoing state controls.5 Some unregistered 
religious groups had limited space to practice their religions,6 but 
such tolerance did not constitute official recognition of these 
groups’ rights. Authorities maintained bans on other religious or 
spiritual communities, including Falun Gong.7 Members of both un-
registered groups and registered groups deemed to run afoul of 
state-set parameters for religion continued to face risk of harass-
ment, detention, and other abuses.8 
The Chinese Government, Communist Party, and Five Associations 
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to 
view religion as an instrument for state policy and to emphasize 
state control over it. The government imposes control over religion 
through the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) 
under the State Council.9 SARA’s aim is to ‘‘guide religions to fit 
into socialist society,’’ including ‘‘[t]hrough intensive ideological and 
political work.’’ 10 SARA’s guiding principles for 2012 include ‘‘thor-
ough implementation’’ of regulations, ‘‘positive guidance’’ of reli-
gious affairs, and advancement of ‘‘harmony and stability.’’ 11 SARA 
Director Wang Zuo’an continued to note what officials describe as 
the ‘‘positive’’ role religion can play in aiding government and Party 
policy objectives.12 In a December 2011 People’s Daily article, 
Wang wrote, ‘‘We cannot snuff out religious culture, but instead 
must guide it.’’ 13 Government control of the five state-recognized 
religions is exercised through five ‘‘patriotic’’ associations: The Bud-
dhist Association of China (BAC), the Catholic Patriotic Association 
(CPA), the Islamic Association of China (IAC), the Three-Self Patri-
otic Movement of Protestant Churches in China (TSPM), and the 
Chinese Taoist Association (CTA).14 According to a Chinese legal 
academic, ‘‘The agencies for religious administration provide super-
vision and guidance on the political orientation, personnel matters, 
finance, religious activities, training of clergymen, foreign affairs, 
conversion of believers and other aspects of the religious organiza-
tions.’’ 15 
The United Front Work Department (UFWD), directly subordi-
nate to the Communist Party Central Committee, is the key orga-
nization through which the Party implements control of religion.16 
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In September 2011, Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Com-
mittee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central 
Committee and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consult-
ative Conference, speaking to the IAC, reiterated the Party’s policy 
that religious leaders should ‘‘unswervingly support the Communist 
Party’s leadership.’’ 17 In April 2012, then UFWD Head Du Qinglin 
wrote: ‘‘We must dig deeply into the essence of religious culture 
and remove the chaff,’’ ‘‘guide people in the religious world and the 
masses of the faithful,’’ and ‘‘better adapt religion to socialist soci-
ety.’’ 18 The Party also uses its control over the media to restrict 
the freedom of religion. A May 2012 article by a Norwegian human 
rights organization found ‘‘a link between the state media’s encour-
agement of popular indifference or hostility towards religious mat-
ters and the state’s repression of religious freedom.’’ 19 Two Chinese 
scholars noted in February 2012 that ‘‘publicity concerning impor-
tant events involving ethnicities and religion . . . must be cautious 
and follow the reporting guidelines of the Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee.’’ 20 
The government continued to use law, regulation, and policy to 
control religious practice in China. This past year, SARA issued or 
amended numerous legal and policy measures 21 to implement the 
2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs.22 While potentially providing 
greater uniformity and some safeguards, the recent regulatory 
measures appeared to codify and enhance already tight state con-
trols of religious activities.23 For example, in February 2012, SARA 
and five other government agencies issued an opinion on public in-
terest charitable activities by religious groups. While appearing to 
encourage greater participation in charitable activities by religious 
organizations, language in the opinion continued to emphasize 
‘‘standardization’’ (guifan), ‘‘supervision’’ (jiandu), and ‘‘manage-
ment’’ (guanli) of organizations and activities, as well as ‘‘guiding 
religion and socialist society to mutually adapt’’ (yindao zongjiao yu 
shehuizhuyi xiang shiying) and promoting ‘‘unity of thinking’’ 
(tongyi sixiang) among officials.24 According to the International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, it is difficult for religious groups in 
China to obtain government approval to establish a charity, and 
they are ‘‘often much more closely monitored’’ than some other 
groups.25 SARA’s 2011 work report and 2012 work plan outlined 
strengthened management in such areas as administration, fi-
nances, information and statistics, media relations, personnel, reli-
gious sites, religious bases for patriotic education, and doctrine.26 
One Chinese scholar characterized China’s regulation of religion as 
‘‘rule by law’’ rather than the ‘‘rule of law.’’ 27 
Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) 
During this reporting year, the Chinese government and Com-
munist Party continued to ensure that Buddhist doctrines and 
practices conformed to Party and government objectives. For exam-
ple, at meetings convened by local branches of SARA and the Bud-
dhist Association of China (BAC), government officials urged the 
local BAC to ‘‘study and implement’’ the ‘‘spirit’’ of the recent na-
tional and local Party Congresses.28 In January 2012, the People’s 
Daily reported that SARA had ‘‘performed activities to interpret 
and exchange Buddhist . . . scriptures.’’ 29 SARA’s 2012 work plan 
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included Buddhist exchange activities, speaking tours, and defini-
tion of themes.30 The SARA-approved Henan Buddhist Institute of-
ficially opened in April 2012.31 At the World Fellowship of Bud-
dhists conference in South Korea in June, China’s Buddhist rep-
resentatives expressed displeasure at the presence of Tibetan Bud-
dhists, echoing Chinese government authorities’ policy toward Ti-
betan Buddhists. The delegation of 17 Chinese ‘‘monks and offi-
cials’’ reportedly walked out of the conference after the organizers 
failed to disinvite three attendees from the Tibetan government-in- 
exile.32 [For information on Tibetan Buddhists, see Section V— 
Tibet.] 
Catholicism 
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to re-
press the freedom of religion for Catholics in China. Tension be-
tween the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and ‘‘underground’’ 
Catholics continued, and some Catholic bishops and priests contin-
ued to serve reeducation through labor or imprisonment.33 
INTERFERENCE WITH RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES 
The government and Party do not recognize the authority of the 
Holy See to name or approve bishops in China, but in recent years 
tolerated discreet papal involvement in the selection of some 
bishops. According to a Catholic news agency, however, in 2011 the 
Chinese government ‘‘broke an unspoken arrangement with Rome 
by ordering the ordination of several bishops without papal ap-
proval.’’ 34 This past year authorities reportedly pressured Holy 
See-recognized bishops to join CPA public ceremonies to provide 
what they deemed to be a sense of unity and legitimacy.35 On July 
6, 2012, the CPA ordained a bishop it selected for Harbin, located 
in Heilongjiang province, without Holy See concurrence.36 Ahead of 
the ceremony, authorities took into custody the Holy See-recognized 
apostolic administrator of Harbin and another priest who opposed 
the consecration.37 Though officials released them after the cere-
mony, the two were reportedly ‘‘forced to stay away from their 
church.’’ 38 When the Holy See issued a statement that it had not 
approved the ordination and had excommunicated the new bishop, 
the State Administration for Religious Affairs called the response 
‘‘unreasonable,’’ ‘‘shocking,’’ and ‘‘rude.’’ 39 In the case of the July 
2012 ordination of Ma Daqin, the Holy See and the CPA had both 
approved Ma’s ordination as a bishop in Shanghai municipality, 
but at the ordination ceremony Ma reportedly refused to allow the 
participation of a CPA bishop.40 Ma publicly resigned from the 
CPA as the ceremony concluded; officials immediately sequestered 
him at a Catholic seminary while the CPA investigated whether he 
had violated its regulations.41 
HARASSMENT AND DETENTION 
Pressures on Catholic clergy to affiliate with the CPA and recog-
nize its leaders continued during the Commission’s 2012 reporting 
period. The Commission observed reports of priests, seminarians, 
and lay Catholics being forced to attend political indoctrination ses-
sions.42 In January 2012, for example, authorities in the Inner 
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Mongolia Autonomous Region reportedly took six Catholic priests 
into custody. Four were released within several days, but the 
whereabouts of the two other priests were reportedly not known. 
The released priests said they were forced to attend indoctrination 
classes and to celebrate a mass with government-approved bishops 
and priests.43 As of May 2012, authorities continued to restrict ac-
cess to Donglu village, Qingyuan county, Baoding municipality, 
Hebei province, the site of a Marian shrine. Officials checked vehi-
cles entering the area, set up tents in locations likely to be gath-
ering places, put up banners with slogans such as ‘‘independently 
self-managed church’’ and ‘‘resist foreign infiltration, fight crimes,’’ 
and monitored the homes of leading worshippers.44 
Falun Gong 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment and Communist Party continued to carry out a cam-
paign—initiated in 1999—of extensive, systematic, and in some 
cases violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong practitioners to re-
nounce their belief in and practice of Falun Gong.45 The govern-
ment and Party refer to this process as ‘‘transformation through re-
education,’’ or simply ‘‘transformation.’’ The three-year campaign to 
‘‘transform’’ Falun Gong practitioners that the Commission re-
ported on last year 46 entered its third year, and local reports indi-
cate ‘‘transformation’’ work will continue into subsequent years.47 
In its 2012 report on China, Amnesty International described the 
campaign as ‘‘a process through which individuals were pressured, 
often through mental and physical torture, to renounce their be-
lief.’’ 48 In January 2012, New Tang Dynasty Television reported 
that ‘‘rights groups documented dozens of deaths’’ of practitioners 
from torture and mistreatment.49 A Web site ‘‘dedicated to report-
ing on the Falun Gong community worldwide’’ counted 3,553 
deaths since the persecution of the movement began in 1999 
through June 2012.50 The Falun Dafa Information Center reported 
more than 55 deaths in 2011.51 
Concurrent with the three-year campaign, the Commission ob-
served this past year official Web sites providing education and 
training materials for local officials.52 Words such as ‘‘battle,’’ 
‘‘struggle,’’ and ‘‘attack’’ 53 indicate the nature of the campaign and 
the priority that government and Party continue to place on the 
suppression of Falun Gong. Authorities labeled practitioners as 
‘‘obsessives’’ (chimi) 54 affected by ‘‘superstition’’ (mixin),55 in ‘‘ideo-
logical shackles’’ (sixiang zhigu).56 An article on anti-cult work in 
Xinzhou district, Wuhan municipality, Henan province, said that, 
‘‘for stubborn, obsessed persons and those who have committed 
criminal activities, the public security organs will force them into 
classes to learn.’’ 57 A public security Web site article about a re-
education through labor (RTL) center in Ge’ermu (Golmud or 
Kermo) city, Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 
Qinghai province, lauded its work with ‘‘inmates, drug addicts, and 
Falun Gong cult personnel.’’ 58 
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HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND ‘‘TRANSFORMATION’’ 
This past year, government authorities and the 6–10 Office—an 
extralegal, Party-run security apparatus created in June 1999 to 
eliminate the Falun Gong movement—continued to take measures 
to ‘‘transform’’ Falun Gong practitioners 59 in prisons, RTL centers, 
and ‘‘transformation through reeducation centers.’’ 60 Authorities 
committed some practitioners to psychiatric hospitals (ankang).61 
Reports continued to document the involuntary administration of 
drugs, use of electric shock, beatings, and cruel treatment in these 
hospitals.62 Local authorities conducted ‘‘anti-cult’’ campaigns, 
which can include public ‘‘cult awareness’’ meetings and the signing 
of ‘‘anti-cult’’ pledge cards.63 Web pages and SMS (text) messages 
were also used.64 
On June 18, 2012, Bruce Chung, a Falun Gong practitioner from 
Taiwan who visited relatives in Jiangxi province, was detained for 
54 days and interrogated regarding his earlier efforts to introduce 
Falun Gong materials to the mainland, circumventing the Chinese 
government’s Internet and broadcast controls. He reported that se-
curity personnel monitored him in his cell around the clock, sub-
jected him to long hours of questioning without access to counsel, 
and conditioned his release on a signed and videotaped confession 
‘‘not of my own volition.’’ 65 In addition to detaining Falun Gong 
practitioners,66 the government and Party continued to harass and 
detain persons who attempted to assist them, including lawyers 
such as Wei Liangyue and Wang Yonghang.67 In December 2011, 
less than a week before missing human rights lawyer Gao 
Zhisheng’s five-year suspended sentence was set to expire, Chinese 
officials claimed he had violated the conditions of his parole and or-
dered him to begin serving his original three-year criminal sen-
tence. Gao had drawn the attention of authorities for his defense 
of persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and Christians.68 
Islam 
Officials continued to repress religious freedom for Muslims in 
China. In a September 2011 speech, Jia Qinglin, a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, described the Islamic Association 
of China (IAC) as ‘‘an important bridge linking the [P]arty and the 
government’’ to Muslims in China.69 The president of the IAC 
called on Muslims in China to promote ‘‘harmony, stability, unity 
and development.’’ 70 In a May 2012 article on ‘‘Ethnic Solidarity,’’ 
the Party Secretary and the Chairman of the People’s Government 
of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) stated that the Party 
and the government manage religious matters; protect ‘‘orderly 
conduct’’ of ‘‘normal religious activities’’; resist ‘‘foreign use of reli-
gion to conduct infiltration activities’’; and ‘‘strike down pursuant 
to law the use of religion to conduct illegal criminal activities.’’ 71 
Government authorities continued to regulate the confirmation of 
religious leaders and overseas pilgrimages to accord with Chinese 
government and Communist Party objectives. The Chinese govern-
ment controlled the education of imams through certification and 
supervision of the curriculum at 10 state-run Muslim univer-
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sities.72 The first requirement for government recognition of imams 
is that they ‘‘love the motherland, support the socialist system and 
the leadership of the Communist Party of China, comply with na-
tional laws, [and] safeguard national unity, ethnic unity, and social 
stability.’’ 73 The government conducts regular training courses for 
clerics and mosque managers 74 and provides support for ‘‘harmo-
nious mosques.’’ 75 The IAC organizes the authorized Hajj pilgrim-
ages to Mecca; many included ‘‘patriotic education.’’ 76 In its 2012 
annual work plan, SARA said it would formulate and strengthen 
measures on the ‘‘management of pilgrimage work.’’ 77 
Authorities also continued to control the content of sermons and 
the ability of Muslims to share their religion with others. According 
to an article on its work in the People’s Daily, SARA has inter-
preted Islamic scripture.78 Through its China Islamic Affairs Steer-
ing Committee, SARA aims to adapt Islam to ‘‘socialist society,’’ to 
‘‘safeguard the principle of national unity,’’ and to combat what au-
thorities deem to be ‘‘extremism.’’ The IAC deliberated the ‘‘selec-
tion and compilation of state-prescribed teachings of Islam,’’ 79 and 
it reportedly distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of a lec-
ture series providing scriptural interpretations to Islamic groups 
throughout China.80 Some local governments issued bans against 
dawa (missionary) preaching. According to a report from Changde 
municipality in Hunan province, authorities ‘‘promptly stopped the 
multiple occurrences of people with a ‘dawa preaching group’ back-
ground coming to our city and carrying out illegal proselytizing ac-
tivities.’’ 81 Public security officers in Menyuan Hui Autonomous 
County, Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, 
described educating religious believers to ‘‘vigorously resist the in-
filtration activities of dawa preaching.’’ 82 
Government control of religious venues continued to limit Mus-
lims’ freedom to practice their faith. In late December, for example, 
villagers in the NHAR clashed with police after authorities report-
edly declared a mosque ‘‘illegal’’ and demolished it.83 The Organiza-
tion for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) ‘‘expresse[d] its concern at the 
destruction of a place of worship and the loss of life’’ and stated it 
expects ‘‘the authorities in China to fully accord the rights of Mus-
lims to construct and maintain their places of worship and to also 
observe their basic rights of conducting congregational rituals free-
ly.’’ 84 After local courts sentenced 14 individuals to prison terms 
for opposing the demolition, a Beijing-based Chinese lawyer told 
Radio Free Asia, ‘‘[L]ocal lawyers don’t dare to offer their services’’ 
to file an appeal.85 [See Section IV—Xinjiang for information on 
conditions in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region.] 
Protestantism 
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to re-
strict the freedom of religion for Protestants in China. The Three- 
Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches in China (TSPM) 
and the China Christian Council (CCC) are the Protestant associa-
tions recognized and controlled by the government. Tension be-
tween these ‘‘official’’ organizations and house churches continued. 
The Chinese government used positive and negative incentives to 
pressure house churches to submit to government control by joining 
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the TSPM in order to register and obtain legal status.86 Without 
legal status, congregations face difficulty in obtaining fixed sites for 
worship, attracting pastors with formal theological education, and 
establishing charities.87 The Shandong province January 2012 im-
plementing regulations for the national Regulation on Religious Af-
fairs, for example, recognize religious believers’ right to worship in 
their own homes and in designated places of worship, but make no 
reference to group gatherings that are characteristic of house 
churches.88 
Cases since late 2010 suggest that authorities’ sensitivities inten-
sified toward members of unregistered Protestant congregations.89 
In April 2012, ChinaAid reported that, in 2011, SARA and the Min-
istries of Public Security and Civil Affairs issued a planning docu-
ment on handling house churches in three phases over 10 years, 
which ChinaAid characterized as an investigation phase to develop 
comprehensive files, a ‘‘cleaning up’’ phase, and eventually 
‘‘wip[ing] out’’ house churches in a third phase.90 According to 
ChinaAid, a senior SARA official, Jiang Jianyong, told the January 
2012 National Work Conference on Religious Affairs that SARA is 
‘‘certifying and creating files on clergy.’’ 91 An article that described 
work to develop files on religious personnel in Yuhuan county, 
Taizhou municipality, Zhejiang province, noted it will ‘‘ensure that 
the sites for religious activities are in accordance with the law and 
conduct orderly religious activities.’’ 92 A Chinese scholar recently 
reviewed province and city plans to ‘‘manage privately set-up 
Christian meeting sites according to law.’’ 93 The plans emphasize 
dealing individually with unregistered congregations after study of 
their circumstances, registering those willing to register, combining 
some with registered congregations, asking clergy of registered 
churches to guide unregistered groups toward registration, and, if 
these measures fail, ‘‘forcefully’’ banning those congregations that 
are ‘‘subordinate to unlawful organizations,’’ or ‘‘influenced or con-
trolled by overseas infiltrating organizations’’ or by ‘‘cult organiza-
tions.’’ The author noted that government management campaigns 
have ‘‘required enormous manpower, material resources, and en-
ergy.’’ 94 
HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND INTERFERENCE WITH PLACES OF 
WORSHIP 
The Chinese government continued to harass, detain, and im-
prison Protestants who worship outside of state-approved param-
eters, and interfered with their religious activities.95 Protestants 
arrested in previous crackdowns continued to serve sentences in 
prisons or reeducation through labor centers, though some were re-
leased early.96 According to reports, even when individuals were 
detained for only a few hours or a few days for questioning about 
house church activities, authorities often did not return Bibles, 
hymnals, books, computers, audiovisual equipment, or money.97 
• Conflict between the authorities and Shouwang Church in 
Beijing continued during this reporting year. Dozens of church 
members were detained for questioning. The congregation met 
outdoors because of government pressure against any building 
owner who would provide a worship space.98 
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• In Xilinhot city, Xilingol league, Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region, local authorities demanded that the New Canaan 
Church affiliate with the TSPM. In January 2012, public secu-
rity officials raided the house church, confiscated Bibles and 
hymnals, installed new locks, pressured the landlord to termi-
nate the lease, and interrogated the pastor and two members 
of the congregation for several hours before releasing them.99 
• In April 2012, a church in Feixi county, Hefei municipality, 
Anhui province, which had agreed to move to new premises to 
make way for a development, was still discussing details with 
local authorities when a demolition crew bulldozed the church 
building.100 
• In May 2012, services at house churches in Shijiazhuang 
city, Hebei province, and Langzhong city, Nanchong munici-
pality, Sichuan province, were interrupted by police who told 
parishioners to worship only at a TSPM church.101 
GOVERNMENT AND PARTY SEEK TO CONTROL PROTESTANT DOCTRINE 
AND PRACTICES 
In 2011, SARA reported that it ‘‘continued to develop the theo-
logical trends of Christianity,’’ and in its 2012 work plan it aimed 
to ‘‘guide the Christian community,’’ ‘‘deepen the construction of 
theological thought, use theological thought propaganda teams,’’ 
‘‘establish Chinese church ministry showrooms,’’ ‘‘and show the new 
achievements of the healthy development of the Chinese 
church.’’ 102 The publication of religious materials remained subject 
to national printing regulations that restrict publication and dis-
tribution of materials with religious content.103 Sale of Bibles was 
limited to TSPM and CCC book outlets in churches and seminaries. 
Individuals could not order Bibles directly from publishers, and the 
government-run Xinhua bookshops throughout China do not sell 
Bibles.104 Chinese law criminalizes ‘‘evil cults,’’ judicially defined in 
1999 as ‘‘those illegal organizations that have been established 
under the guise of religion, Qigong or other forms, deifying their 
leading members, enchanting and deceiving others by concocting 
and spreading superstitious fallacies, recruiting and controlling 
their members and endangering the society.’’ 105 A 2012 academic 
study included a partial list of 16 banned ‘‘Christian-related’’ 
groups and ‘‘cults.’’ 106 The Commission has not observed any public 
criteria for determining, or procedures for challenging, such a des-
ignation. A crackdown on Christian ‘‘cults’’ reportedly began in the 
run-up to the 18th Party Congress.107 
Taoism 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s control over Taoism and Taoist activities paralleled re-
strictions on other religious communities, including on doctrine, 
clergy, religious activity, and sites of worship. As in the past, the 
Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) maintains organizational meas-
ures to achieve objectives including ‘‘upholding the leadership of 
the Communist Party and the socialist system’’; ‘‘active participa-
tion in socialist material, political, spiritual, and ecological civiliza-
tion’’; and ‘‘making a contribution to the protection of religious har-
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mony, national unity, social harmony, unity of the motherland, and 
world peace.’’ 108 In addition to interpreting Taoist doctrine and 
urging Taoists to accept government and Party goals, the CTA pro-
vides ‘‘educational guidance’’ to organizations and temples and ‘‘or-
ganizes and guides . . . educational activities.’’ 109 According to its 
report on work completed during the ‘‘11th Five-Year Program’’ pe-
riod, SARA ‘‘performed activities to interpret . . . Taoist scrip-
tures.’’ 110 A former vice chairman of the National People’s Con-
gress Standing Committee said that ‘‘discussion, selection and 
elimination’’ of concepts in Taoist scriptures are necessary to de-
velop a Taoist philosophy for the 21st century.111 
In October 2011, Xinhua paraphrased remarks by the president 
of the CTA that ‘‘China has mapped out a strategy this month to 
reform and develop its culture, and Taoism should be seen as a 
kind of soft power of the country.’’ 112 An article in the New York 
Review of Books by a non-Chinese journalist who attended an 
international Taoist studies conference in China in June 2011, 
however, noted that the Chinese authorities ‘‘not only shunned it 
but put up roadblocks. It was almost canceled at the last moment 
and was eventually curtailed from five to three days, with many 
panels cut or abbreviated.’’ 113 With regard to plans for a 2012 
international conference in Germany, the journalist reported, ‘‘One 
[Chinese] official later said to me that it should be up to the Chi-
nese government, not a non-government organization of scholars, to 
determine when an important Daoist conference should be 
held.’’ 114 The journalist noted, ‘‘Despite the rebuilding of temples, 
religious life is still tightly limited.’’ 115 
Other Religious Communities 
The Chinese government’s recognition of only five religions ex-
cludes, for example, Judaism, the Eastern Orthodox Church, the 
Baha’i faith, the Unification Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, and folk religions among others. A January 2011 
report from SARA’s Religious Research Center said that other reli-
gions were ‘‘vying’’ for religious believers in China and ‘‘assaulting’’ 
China’s ‘‘traditional religious structures.’’ 116 The 2012 SARA work 
plan includes research on religions other than the officially ac-
knowledged five.117 Foreign expatriate members and a small num-
ber of Chinese citizen members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints living in China continue to be permitted to as-
semble for weekly worship services.118 Orthodox Christian con-
gregations exist in a few areas of China—including the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, and 
Guangdong provinces. When Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, 
head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department of External Church 
Relations, visited China in June 2012, he met with a CPA-approved 
Catholic bishop, Ma Yinglin, whose ordination was not approved by 
the Holy See. AsiaNews reported that, although ‘‘for years, the 
Russian Orthodox have tried to have their small community recog-
nized, . . . there has been no movement in the issue so far.’’ 119 
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ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS 
Introduction 
Ethnic minorities in China continued to face challenges in up-
holding their rights, including the right to maintain their unique 
languages, cultures, and religions as provided in Chinese and inter-
national law.1 The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law allows for 
regional autonomy in designated areas with ethnic minority popu-
lations,2 but limits in both the substance and implementation of 
this law and various related policies have prevented meaningful 
autonomy in practice. A 2012 article by a high-level official pub-
lished in a Communist Party publication proposed shifts in future 
policy regarding ethnic autonomy and language rights.3 New Ti-
betan protests and a series of self-immolations during the Commis-
sion’s 2012 reporting year highlighted continuing tensions and cit-
izen grievances toward government minority policies. Government 
controls were harshest over groups deemed to challenge state au-
thority, including those in the Tibet Autonomous Region and other 
Tibetan autonomous areas, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
gion, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See Section 
IV—Xinjiang and Section V—Tibet for additional information on 
these areas. See text below for information on broader government 
policies toward ethnic minorities and on conditions in the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region.] 
State Minority Policy 
Government steps to address ethnic minorities’ grievances re-
mained limited in the 2012 reporting year, while authorities em-
phasized the role of top-down development in integrating ‘‘ethnic 
minority’’ populations into Chinese economic and social spheres.4 
The acceleration of top-down development policies 5 has undercut 
the promotion of regional autonomy and limited the rights of ethnic 
minorities to maintain their unique cultures, languages, and liveli-
hoods, while bringing some economic improvement to minority 
areas.6 
In June 2012, the State Council published the 2012–2015 Na-
tional Human Rights Action Plan.7 The plan guarantees a broad 
range of ethnic minority rights, including ‘‘ethnic minorities’ right 
to learn, use and develop their own spoken and written languages,’’ 
but also calls for the promotion of ‘‘bilingual education.’’ 8 Non-Han 
groups have criticized ‘‘bilingual education’’ for prioritizing Man-
darin in schools in minority areas and removing minority lan-
guages from instruction. [See Section IV—Xinjiang and Section V— 
Tibet for more information on bilingual education and related poli-
cies on the use of language in education.] In July 2012, the State 
Council issued a five-year plan for social and economic development 
in ‘‘ethnic minority’’ areas that includes protections for ‘‘traditional 
minority cultures.’’ 9 The plan follows the February issuance of a 
national five-year blueprint for cultural reform and development 
that emphasizes state-defined cultural identity rather than the 
grassroots development of minority culture.10 
Leading Chinese officials and scholars stepped up discussion of 
proposals to scale back ethnic autonomy and promote assimilative 
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policies on language, family planning, and other programs in ethnic 
minority areas.11 Communist Party United Front Work Depart-
ment Executive Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun published an article in 
February that proposes the removal of ethnic identity information 
from household registration (hukou) cards in the interests of ‘‘na-
tional cohesion’’ and ‘‘amalgamation.’’ 12 Zhu suggested that the 
state’s failure to dilute distinct ethnic identities could lead to the 
breakaway of ethnic minority areas from the PRC.13 A new Web 
page hosted by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission featured dis-
cussion among leading scholars regarding a ‘‘second generation’’ of 
state ethnic policies.14 Under ‘‘second generation’’ reforms, regional 
and local autonomy frameworks and corresponding policy provi-
sions would be abandoned in favor of the uniform application of 
policies.15 
Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia 
The Chinese government continued to implement longstanding 
grasslands policies that impose grazing bans and require herders 
to resettle from grasslands and abandon traditional pastoral liveli-
hoods, a development that limits the rights of Mongols, Tibetans, 
Kazakhs, and other minority groups in China to practice their tra-
ditional cultures.16 Regional-level regulations that took effect in the 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) in December 2011 stip-
ulate fines for unauthorized use of grasslands.17 Some inter-
national scholars have questioned the efficacy of state grasslands 
policies in meeting the declared goal of ameliorating grasslands 
degradation,18 while affected communities have reported forced re-
settlement, inadequate compensation, minimal recourse for griev-
ances, and poor living conditions, along with challenges in uphold-
ing traditional pastoral livelihoods and preserving their cultures.19 
[For more information on rights abuses related to grasslands poli-
cies, see Section II—The Environment.] 
The proliferation of mines in the IMAR has reportedly contrib-
uted to the loss of grasslands due to environmental destruction and 
confiscation.20 State-controlled media reported in February that, in 
a regionwide overhaul of the mining sector in the IMAR in 2011, 
authorities suspended operations at 887 mines and shut down 73 
mines.21 In July, a Beijing court sentenced the former IMAR Party 
secretary to life in prison for accepting bribes, especially in return 
for licenses for the requisition of land for mining.22 State efforts to 
place limitations on the mining sector, toward the goal of amelio-
rating grasslands degradation, have occurred as local governments 
continue to mandate an increase in coal output, and unlicensed 
mine operators reportedly use official connections to avoid being 
shut down.23 
Mongols in the IMAR held a series of demonstrations in April, 
June, and July 2012 to protest the confiscation of grasslands for 
government and private development projects.24 The Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center reported that local 
authorities detained and beat a number of herders who took part 
in the protests.25 In October 2011, a herder near Ordos munici-
pality was struck and killed by an oil transport truck while pro-
testing against the damage done to grazing lands and livestock by 
trucks carrying oil and gas.26 The death followed protests that took 
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place in May 2011, after mining workers in Xilingol league, IMAR, 
killed two Mongol protestors in separate incidents.27 
Political Prisoners 
The continued extralegal detention of Mongol rights advocate 
Hada underscores the repercussions Mongols have faced from offi-
cials for promoting their rights and the recent heavy-handed state 
tactics employed to silence rights defenders across China. Through-
out the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Hada remained in offi-
cial custody, without apparent legal basis, despite the expiration of 
his 15-year legal sentence on December 10, 2010. Authorities im-
prisoned Hada after he organized peaceful protests for Mongols’ 
rights in 1995. An overseas rights group, citing a relative of Hada, 
reported in May 2012 that Hada was moved to a ‘‘luxury resort’’ 
in Chifeng city, but that he remained in poor health.28 In April, au-
thorities reportedly released Hada’s wife Xinna, who was arrested 
in December 2011 around the same time as their son Uiles, after 
handing her a three-year suspended prison term.29 However, both 
Xinna and Uiles reportedly remain under home confinement.30 An 
overseas rights group reported in September 2011 that police in 
Tongliao city, IMAR, beat author and rights advocate Govruud 
Huuchinhuu, whose current whereabouts are unknown, multiple 
times while she was being detained by the Horchin district Public 
Security Bureau.31 Police reportedly detained Huuchinhuu in Janu-
ary 2011 in an ‘‘enforced disappearance’’ after she was released 
from a hospital where she was being treated for a serious medical 
condition.32 Authorities originally placed Huuchinhuu under home 
confinement in November 2010 after she published calls on the 
Internet for Mongols to show support for the release of Hada.33 A 
number of ethnic Mongols remain in prison or detention for polit-
ical reasons, including Batzangaa, who was sentenced to three 
years’ imprisonment with a four-year reprieve in 2011; Erden-uul 
(pen name Unaga), who was detained in December 2010; and 




Chinese officials continue to actively promote and implement 
population planning policies which, in both their nature and imple-
mentation, violate international standards. During the Commis-
sion’s 2012 reporting year, central and local authorities continued 
to monitor and control the reproductive lives of Chinese citizens, 
and in some cases inflicted harassment and abuse in violation of 
Chinese law. Under China’s current population planning policies, 
most women in urban areas are limited to bearing one child, while 
slightly more than half of Chinese women—often located in rural 
areas—may bear a second child if their first child is a girl.1 
The Chinese government requires married couples to obtain a 
birth permit before they can lawfully bear a child and forces them 
to employ contraceptive methods at other times. For those who be-
come pregnant but do not meet the necessary requirements to bear 
the child, officials in some cases impose heavy fines, threaten or 
execute eviction or home demolition, or perform forced abortions or 
sterilizations. Officials in some localities experimented this year 
with policy reform, while at least one top-level official publicly 
ruled out national-level reform for at least the next five years.2 
International Standards 
China’s population planning policies in both their nature and im-
plementation constitute human rights violations according to inter-
national standards. The PRC Population and Family Planning Law 
and provincial implementing guidelines limit couples’ freedom of 
reproductive choice by stipulating if, when, and how often they may 
bear children.3 Other domestic policies coerce compliance with pop-
ulation planning targets through heavy fines.4 Controls imposed on 
Chinese women and their families and additional abuses engen-
dered by the system, including forced abortions, violate standards 
in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 5 and the 
1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on 
Population and Development.6 China participated as a state party 
in the negotiations and adoption of both.7 Acts of official violence 
committed in the implementation of population planning policies 8 
and the fact that these acts are not clearly punishable under Chi-
nese law contravene provisions under the Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment,9 which China has signed and ratified.10 Further, discrimi-
natory policies against ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children are in violation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 11 and the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.12 China is a state 
party to these treaties and is bound to uphold their terms. 
Coercive Implementation 
Chinese law prohibits official infringement upon the rights and 
interests of citizens while implementing population planning poli-
cies but does not define what constitutes a citizen’s right or inter-
est.13 Chinese law does not stipulate punishment for officials who 
demand or implement forced abortion.14 Further, provincial-level 
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population planning regulations in at least 18 of China’s 31 provin-
cial-level jurisdictions explicitly endorse the practice, often referred 
to as a ‘‘remedial measure’’ (bujiu cuoshi), as an official policy in-
strument.15 Reports from this year continue to document official 
use of coercive methods—including arbitrary detention, forced abor-
tion, and forced sterilization—to implement population planning 
policies. 
OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS 
During the 2012 reporting year, authorities in a wide range of 
localities implemented population planning enforcement campaigns 
that employed coercive measures to prevent or terminate ‘‘out-of- 
plan’’ pregnancies. In a March 2012 announcement of one such 
campaign, the Luxi town government in Luxi county, Pingxiang 
city, Jiangxi province, outlined ‘‘focal points’’ for population plan-
ning work, including sterilizing couples in ‘‘rural two-daughter 
households,’’ collecting social maintenance fees, and terminating 
‘‘out-of-plan’’ pregnancies.16 Luxi family planning officials were en-
couraged to ‘‘concentrate time, concentrate force, and concentrate 
leadership to fight the family planning battle,’’ to ‘‘ensure the 
prompt implementation of ‘remedial measures’ on ‘out-of-plan’ preg-
nancy targets,’’ and to ensure that ‘‘not a single ‘out-of-plan’ [baby] 
makes it to the ground.’’ 17 
Official speeches and government reports from jurisdictions 
across China continued to reflect an emphasis on strengthening en-
forcement measures with apparent disregard for official restraint. 
Between October 2011 and August 2012, the Commission noted 
township, county, and city government reports from at least eight 
provinces (Jiangxi,18 Hubei,19 Hunan,20 Guangdong,21 Anhui,22 
Guizhou,23 Fujian,24 and Shandong 25) using phrases such as 
‘‘spare no efforts’’ (quanli yifu), ‘‘use all means necessary’’ (qian 
fang bai ji), ‘‘implement man-on-man military tactics’’ (shixing 
‘‘rendingren’’ zhanshu),26 or ‘‘assault and storm the fortifications 
(tuji gongjian)’’ 27 to urge officials to implement family planning 
measures, including ‘‘remedial measures,’’ the ‘‘two inspections’’ 
(intrauterine device (IUD) inspections and pregnancy inspec-
tions),28 and the ‘‘four procedures’’ (IUD implants, first-trimester 
abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and sterilization).29 
Individual Representative Cases of Coercion 
(Arranged by Province) 
• Shandong. In October 2011, local family planning officials forcibly 
brought Ma Jihong, six months pregnant with her third child, to the 
local hospital for a forced abortion.30 Officials reportedly ignored Ma’s 
onset of respiratory difficulties, forced her to provide her fingerprint to 
indicate consent, and performed the procedure.31 After hours of waiting 
with no information, Ma’s family reportedly forcibly entered the oper-
ating room to find that Ma had died during the procedure and the med-
ical team had left.32 
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Individual Representative Cases of Coercion—Continued 
(Arranged by Province) 
• Zhejiang. In November 2011, local officials reportedly ‘‘tricked’’ eight- 
months-pregnant Hu Qiaoqun into going to the family planning com-
mittee office for a pregnancy examination. During the examination, offi-
cials reportedly forcibly injected Hu with a substance that caused the 
abortion. Officials later criminally detained two of Hu’s family members 
for ‘‘assembling a crowd and creating a disturbance’’ when peacefully 
protesting the forced abortion.33 
• Jiangxi. In March 2012, government officials in Huangqiao town, 
Jishui county, reportedly dispatched over ‘‘20 strong men’’ to detain 46- 
year-old Mao Yuanchun, who was no longer able to have children. The 
men brought her to the local family planning office against her will and 
forced her to undergo a tubal ligation. Mao’s husband reported that the 
town government implemented the forced sterilization in retaliation for 
his petitioning efforts related to their daughter’s death.34 
• Fujian. In April 2012, ‘‘men working for a local official’’ in Daji town-
ship, Xianyou county, Putian city, reportedly detained eight-months- 
pregnant Pan Chunyan with two other women. Four days later, they 
brought her to a hospital and forced her to provide her fingerprint to in-
dicate consent to an abortion. Nurses reportedly injected Pan with a 
drug that caused the abortion. According to Pan’s husband, the couple 
had already paid the required fine of US$8,700 for this ‘‘out-of-plan’’ 
birth.35 
• Hunan. In June 2012, local family planning officials in Changsha mu-
nicipality detained five-months-pregnant Cao Ruyi and took her to the 
hospital, threatening to forcibly abort her child unless she paid a fine of 
150,000 yuan (US$23,563). Officials reportedly released Cao after she 
paid a 10,000 yuan (US$1,571) ‘‘deposit,’’ but they required that she still 
return for an abortion to recoup the deposit.36 At the time of the most 
recent reports, Cao and her husband were in hiding.37 
• Shaanxi. In June 2012, local family planning officials in Ankang city 
reportedly detained seven-months-pregnant Feng Jianmei, blindfolded 
her, took her to the hospital against her will, and forced her to sign con-
sent for an abortion. Five men then forcibly injected her with a sub-
stance that caused the abortion, according to Feng’s husband. Feng’s 
family reportedly had not paid the required 40,000 yuan (US$6,284) fine 
to have a second child. Local family planning officials reportedly denied 
holding Feng against her will and claimed the abortion was legal.38 
National- and provincial-level family planning authorities reportedly 
launched an investigation into the case,39 and the Ankang city govern-
ment acknowledged that officials had ‘‘violated regulations by inducing 
labor in advanced months [of pregnancy]’’ and apologized for causing the 
family ‘‘serious harm.’’ 40 The city reportedly later fired two officials, 
gave five officials formal warnings, and agreed to compensate the couple 
US$11,200.41 
Punishments for Non-Compliance 
Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of punish-
ment and reward to manage citizens’ compliance with population 
planning policies. In accordance with national measures,42 local 
governments direct officials to punish non-compliance with heavy 
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fines, termed ‘‘social maintenance fees’’ (shehui fuyang fei), which 
force many couples to choose between undergoing an unwanted 
abortion and incurring a fine much greater than the average an-
nual income.43 Officials in some cases threatened or imposed em-
ployment repercussions, expulsion from the Communist Party, de-
struction of personal property, arbitrary detention, or even violence 
against couples who were pregnant with or gave birth to an unau-
thorized child.44 Often with court approval, family planning offi-
cials are permitted to take ‘‘forcible’’ actions against families who 
are unwilling or unable to pay the fines.45 The PRC Population and 
Family Planning Law, however, prohibits infringements on citizens’ 
personal, property, and other rights.46 
Additionally, some children may go without household registra-
tion (hukou) in China because they are born ‘‘out-of-plan’’ and their 
parents do not pay the necessary fines.47 These children live in a 
legal limbo that may deny them the rights accorded to other citi-
zens. Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to social bene-
fits typically afforded to registered citizens, including health insur-
ance, public education, and pensions.48 [For additional discussion of 
China’s hukou system, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and 
Movement.] 
Focus on Migrant Workers 
Local governments appear to encourage harsher population plan-
ning measures on migrant populations due to the inherent difficul-
ties migrants’ mobility presents for keeping track of birth quotas. 
Chinese officials collect and monitor citizens’ reproductive informa-
tion, including marital history, pregnancy history, contraception 
history, reproductive health information, the results of periodic 
gynecological tests, and information on any children born to them, 
using a nationwide database called the Women of Childbearing Age 
Information System (WIS).49 The National Population and Family 
Planning Commission first issued standards on the WIS in January 
2006,50 specifically guiding officials in rural areas to adhere to the 
standards,51 and hailing the system’s ability to meld the work of 
‘‘management’’ together with ‘‘services.’’ 52 Guidelines for the sys-
tem include a particular focus on migrant women, and specific lan-
guage used in national and provincial WIS directives appears to 
stress the efficiency of the WIS in promoting and enhancing overall 
management of the migrant population.53 Local governments in 
several localities also continued this year to conduct population 
planning campaigns that specifically mentioned or targeted mi-
grants.54 Officials conducted these campaigns during the spring 
festival timeframe, when many migrant workers return to their 
hometowns to be with family. [For additional information on official 
treatment of migrant workers, see Section II—Freedom of Resi-
dence and Movement and Section II—Worker Rights.] 
Prospects for Policy Reform 
Chinese officials have allowed for limited relaxation of local pop-
ulation planning policies during this reporting year, yet continue to 
rule out the near-term possibility of major nationwide population 
planning policy reform or cancellation. In November 2011, Henan 
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province became the last of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions 
to implement a ‘‘two-child policy’’ (shuang du), permitting married 
couples to have two children if both parents were only children 
themselves.55 
Citizens have increased calls this year for population policy re-
form. In July, for example, a group of Chinese scholars issued an 
open letter calling on the National People’s Congress to ‘‘begin the 
important work of comprehensively revising the ‘Population and 
Family Planning Law’ as soon as possible.’’ 56 While the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) led a spe-
cial campaign this year to ‘‘tidy up’’ offensive, and in some cases 
violent, family planning propaganda slogans that have been dis-
played around the country for decades,57 top Communist Party and 
government leaders, as well as state media outlets, continue to 
publicly defend the national-level policy and rule out the possibility 
of its cancellation.58 
Demographic Consequences 
The Chinese government’s population planning policies continue 
to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, which include 
an aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex ratio. 
Affected in recent decades by government restrictions on the num-
ber of births per couple, China’s total fertility rate has dropped 
from 6.1 births per woman in 1949 59 to an estimated 1.55 births 
per woman in 2012,60 resulting in the rapid growth of China’s 
aging population and decline in the working-age population.61 [For 
additional information on China’s projected labor shortage, see Sec-
tion II—Worker Rights.] 
Chinese parents continue the illegal practice of sex-selective 
abortion,62 in response to government-imposed birth limits and in 
keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons.63 China’s male-fe-
male ratio at birth has therefore become severely skewed, and is 
reportedly the highest in the world.64 Some social and political sci-
entists have warned that large numbers of ‘‘surplus males’’ could 
create social conditions that the Chinese government may choose to 
address by expanding military enlistment.65 Reports have also sug-
gested a link between China’s large number of ‘‘surplus males’’ and 
an increase in the trafficking of women and children for forced 
marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.66 In August 2011, the 
State Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of Chil-
dren (2011–2020), urging officials to crack down further on ‘‘non- 
medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abor-
tion,’’ 67 and, in June 2012, the State Council issued its 2012–2015 
National Human Rights Action Plan, reiterating this call.68 A May 
2012 Global Times report, citing Wang Xia, head of the NPFPC, 
stated that, with regard to the progress of the ban, ‘‘authorities 
have investigated 15,000 cases and punished 13,000 people for vio-
lating family planning laws since the launch of the campaign in 
2011.’’ 69 
Chinese and international news media reports continue to indi-
cate that the Chinese government’s restrictive family planning poli-
cies have contributed in part to what a November 2011 Global 
Times article referred to as China’s ‘‘massive and lucrative baby 
market.’’ 70 In some cases, family planning officials reportedly have 
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coerced parents to relinquish their children born in excess of their 
parents’ birth quotas, later making a profit when transferring the 
children into the care of local orphanages.71 In other cases, individ-
uals have abducted or purchased children for the purpose of subse-
quently selling them into domestic or international adoption 72 or 
forced labor situations.73 
Case Update: Chen Guangcheng 
In April 2012, Chen Guangcheng—a self-trained legal advocate who 
drew international news media attention to population planning abuses 
in 2005 74—escaped from his home outside of Linyi city, Shandong prov-
ince, after being subjected to extralegal home confinement (ruanjin) 
with his family for one year and seven months.75 Authorities subjected 
Chen and his wife Yuan Weijing to harsh, and in some cases violent, 
treatment during the period of his home confinement.76 Authorities also 
prohibited them from leaving their home,77 and their daughter was pre-
vented from attending primary school for approximately one year.78 Au-
thorities later permitted her to attend school only with a police escort.79 
International and domestic activists who attempted to visit Chen’s vil-
lage during his confinement were reportedly blocked, sometimes with vi-
olence.80 After escaping, Chen took shelter in the U.S. Embassy in Bei-
jing on April 26, and, on May 2, he left the embassy to seek medical 
care at a nearby hospital for a foot injury and an intestinal illness.81 On 
May 19, Chen, Yuan, and their two children left China for the United 
States, where Chen had secured a fellowship to study at the New York 
University School of Law.82 Despite his initial confidence in the central 
government’s agreement to investigate local authorities for the abuses 
perpetrated against him,83 Chen has since expressed frustration with 
the government’s failure to act, and concern regarding the continued 
harsh treatment of family members who remain in Shandong.84 Chen, 
his family, and his supporters expressed concern that Chen’s nephew 
Chen Kegui—who faces charges of intentional homicide for allegedly 
wounding several government-appointed personnel—may have been sub-
jected to torture,85 and that authorities had forced Chen Kegui to accept 
government-appointed lawyers.86 An August 2012 Radio Free Asia re-
port noted that the case against Chen Kegui was marred with proce-
dural irregularities and violations.87 [See Section III—Access to Justice 
for more information on harassment of lawyers who offered to represent 
Chen Kegui.] 
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FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT 
Freedom of Residence 
The Chinese government continued to enforce the household reg-
istration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s.1 The 
hukou system places limitations on the right of Chinese citizens to 
freely determine their permanent place of residence. Initially used 
to control migration of the rural population to China’s cities, the 
hukou system today has developed into a ‘‘mechanism determining 
one’s eligibility for full citizenship, social welfare, and opportunities 
for social mobility.’’ 2 The hukou system classifies Chinese citizens 
as either rural or urban hukou holders and confers legal rights and 
access to social services based on the classification.3 The implemen-
tation of these regulations discriminates against rural hukou hold-
ers who migrate to urban areas by denying them equal access to 
social security benefits and many public services guaranteed to reg-
istered urban residents.4 The hukou regulations appear to con-
travene the freedoms guaranteed in Article 13 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 12 and 26 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which include ‘‘the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose [one’s] resi-
dence.’’ 5 
The hukou system’s discriminatory effect lies in the unfair divi-
sion of various social benefits and rights to which it is linked and 
through which rural migrants continue to face unequal chances for 
development and social status. Government officials and scholars 
estimate that between 200 and 250 million migrant workers living 
in cities are denied access to social services because they lack 
urban hukou status.6 Statistics and analyses from studies pub-
lished in 2011 on China’s migrant population found migrants living 
in urban areas had lower rates of labor and social welfare protec-
tion coverage.7 The continued use of the hukou system to deny so-
cial benefits to migrant workers in cities exacerbates discord and 
division between rural and urban hukou holders.8 Migrant chil-
dren, for instance, continue to face significant difficulties gaining 
access to urban public schools, while an estimated 58 million chil-
dren left in rural areas by their migrant parents face disadvan-
tages accessing quality schooling and basic nutrition.9 In some 
cases, concerns over access to equal education led to protests and 
violent clashes involving migrants.10 A report published by the Chi-
nese Acacdemy of Social Sciences (CASS) in August 2012 empha-
sized the significant challenges China would face over the next 15 
to 20 years in incorporating an estimated 500 million rural resi-
dents into urban society in part because of the uneven distribution 
of public services in China’s cities.11 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, high-level Chinese 
officials and scholars publicly acknowledged the need for hukou re-
forms, including the need to provide migrant workers equal access 
to social services.12 One Chinese scholar warned that the large gap 
in social services access marginalized migrants and ‘‘ultimately 
poses a challenge to social stability.’’ 13 Central authorities have ad-
vocated a gradual approach to hukou reform that emphasized re-
laxing hukou admission standards for a limited number of areas, 
improving access to social services, and strengthening protection of 
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rural residents’ land rights and interests.14 During the National 
People’s Congress in March, Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that the 
government would ‘‘prudently carry forward the reform of the 
household management system,’’ while also reforming the land req-
uisition system and promoting the equal distribution of public re-
sources in urban and rural areas.15 In July, the State Council 
issued a five-year national plan for basic public services, which 
aims to gradually separate the allocation of social services from the 
hukou system.16 The implications of these latest hukou reform pro-
posals remain unclear. 
In February 2012, the State Council General Office issued a cir-
cular passed in February 2011 outlining a series of new policies in-
tended to reform the hukou system. Some notable reforms include 
relaxing hukou registration standards in county- and prefectural- 
level cities, prohibiting coercive requisition and conversion of rural 
residents’ land in exchange for urban hukous, and barring future 
policies that use hukou status as a precondition for access to social 
services.17 Several Chinese scholars and media outlets have criti-
cized the vague nature and limited scope of these measures, lead-
ing some to question the circular’s potential effectiveness.18 At 
least one Chinese scholar expressed concern that local officials may 
not comply with the measures because the circular has no imple-
mentation date.19 
Local governments continued to relax certain hukou restrictions, 
consistent with earlier reform efforts. While details vary by loca-
tion, the key provisions of these reforms, in some instances, allow 
some rural residents to transfer their hukou status from rural to 
urban status or apply for a residency permit (juzhu zheng), based 
on certain criteria.20 These criteria usually include education and 
income standards aimed at attracting elite rural hukou holders 
with specialized skill sets and wealth. In some cases, reforms re-
quire that rural migrants possess both a stable source of income 
and stable place of residence for a specified period of time as condi-
tions for obtaining local hukou.21 Despite these limited attempts to 
relax hukou criteria, most reforms still exclude the majority of mi-
grants who do not have a college education, specialized skills, or 
stable employment and residence.22 
Freedom of Movement 
Chinese authorities continue to restrict freedom of movement to 
penalize citizens who express views that authorities deem objec-
tionable or sensitive. The Chinese government has placed restric-
tions on movement that are inconsistent with the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which China has signed and expressed an in-
tent to ratify.23 
Chinese authorities continue to arbitrarily prevent rights defend-
ers, advocates, and critics from leaving China. The PRC Passport 
Law and PRC Exit and Entry Control Law give officials the discre-
tion to prevent Chinese citizens from traveling abroad when they 
believe that a citizen’s leaving China might harm ‘‘state security’’ 
or harm or cause ‘‘major loss’’ to national interests.24 The meaning 
and scope of harm or loss to state security or national interests are 
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undefined, however, which has led to official abuse and arbitrary 
enforcement. 
In numerous cases, authorities prevented Chinese citizens from 
leaving China for political reasons: 
• Li Sihua. In June 2012, Chinese authorities in Guangzhou 
city, Guangdong province, prevented rights activist and inde-
pendent provincial People’s Congress candidate Li Sihua from 
traveling to Hong Kong. Border control officers informed Li 
that authorities had suspended his passport two months ear-
lier in his home province of Jiangxi and he would not be per-
mitted to travel to Hong Kong en route to Switzerland.25 
Jiangxi officials said a pending civil case involving Li was the 
pretense for suspending his passport, although they did not 
provide any details regarding the case. Li’s travel ban appears 
to be related to his activities as an independent candidate in 
Jiangxi Province People’s Congress elections.26 Authorities pre-
viously detained Li on February 25 after returning from a 
human rights training program in Thailand.27 
• Chen Yunfei. In June 2012, authorities in Sichuan province 
prevented democracy activist Chen Yunfei from boarding a 
plane to Europe, where he had planned to take part in a 
human rights legal exchange program.28 National security offi-
cers subsequently questioned Chen about his travel itinerary 
before eventually letting him go. Chen has been the target of 
police harassment for many years due to his activism.29 
• Ai Weiwei. In June 2012, authorities informed well-known 
artist and rights advocate Ai Weiwei that he was barred from 
traveling abroad, despite the expiration of a one-year bail im-
posed after his release from detention in 2011. Police informed 
Ai that he still was under investigation for a series of crimes 
and would not be allowed to leave the country.30 As of June 
2012, authorities had not returned his passport.31 Authorities 
detained Ai in April 2011 for 81 days without official confirma-
tion of his whereabouts amid a government crackdown fol-
lowing calls for nonviolent, ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests in various cities 
in China. He was later released on bail and indicted on 
charges of tax evasion. He was ordered to pay 15 million yuan 
(US$2.4 million) in back taxes and fines.32 Under the reported 
terms of his release on bail last year, Ai is barred from leaving 
Beijing and talking with foreign media.33 
Home Confinement, Surveillance, and Harassment of Chinese 
Citizens 
The Chinese government continued to place restrictions on lib-
erty of movement within China to punish and control rights de-
fenders, advocates, and critics in contravention of international 
legal standards.34 
As in previous years, authorities continued to employ a range of 
measures to restrict liberty of movement, including: Stationing 
plainclothes police or hired personnel to monitor the homes of 
rights defenders; 35 forcing them to have informal chats over tea 
(‘‘drink tea’’) with security personnel; 36 removing them to unknown 
locations; 37 and imprisoning them.38 Restrictions on liberty of 
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movement were especially prominent during politically sensitive 
periods, including the annual meetings of the National People’s 
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference in March 2012,39 the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests,40 and the four-year anniversary of the May 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake.41 
The Commission notes that, during this reporting period, au-
thorities employed particularly forceful techniques to punish and 
control family members and supporters of human rights defenders 
and activists. Authorities, for example, continued to confine, har-
ass, and abuse family members and supporters of self-trained legal 
advocate Chen Guangcheng after he left China for the United 
States with his immediate family in May 2012.42 Following the 
death of labor advocate and 1989 Tiananmen protester Li 
Wangyang in June 2012, officials confined, harassed, and removed 
to unknown locations Li’s family members and supporters, includ-
ing arresting Li’s close friend and advocate Zhu Chengzhi on the 
charge of ‘‘inciting subversion of state power,’’ and ordering rights 
activist Xiao Tong to serve 18 months’ reeducation through labor 
apparently for expressing concerns with official accounts of Li’s 
death.43 In April 2012, officials also placed Dong Xuan, the daugh-
ter of housing rights advocate and lawyer Ni Yulan, under ‘‘soft de-
tention’’ (ruanjin) and 24-hour surveillance.44 In January 2012, au-
thorities had prevented Dong from traveling to the Netherlands to 
accept a Dutch government human rights award on behalf of her 
mother.45 Authorities also continued to hold Liu Xia, wife of the 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, under extralegal confine-
ment in her home, where she has been arbitrarily detained since 
October 2010.46 
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STATUS OF WOMEN 
Gender Equality 
Through its international commitments and domestic efforts, the 
Chinese government has agreed to ensure gender-equal political 
participation; however, current official statistics reveal that women 
remain underrepresented. China is a state party to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,1 
and as such has committed to ensuring the right of women, on 
equal terms with men, ‘‘to participate in the formulation of govern-
ment policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public of-
fice and perform all public functions at all levels of government.’’ 2 
In accordance with this commitment, the Chinese government has 
passed several laws 3 and policy initiatives 4 which aim to promote 
gender equality by setting broad goals and minimum standards for 
political positions filled by women. Most recently, China released 
its 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan in June 2012, 
stating plans to increase female representation at national and 
local levels of government, and to ensure rural women’s land 
rights.5 
Against the backdrop of these legislative and policy efforts, fe-
male representation at the highest levels of the central government 
and the Communist Party falls short of international norms 6 and 
remains far from equal to that of males. For example, in 2012, 
women held 1 out of 25 positions in the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party Central Committee,7 13 out of 204 full member-
ships in the Communist Party Central Committee,8 and 4 out of 35 
positions in the State Council.9 In July 2011, official state media 
reported that women made up 21.3 percent of deputies to the Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC).10 This figure has shown little 
growth since the early 1970s.11 This year several NPC deputies 
highlighted the need for increased female political representation.12 
Despite reported increases in women’s participation in govern-
ment in some local jurisdictions during the Commission’s 2012 re-
porting year, the percentage of women in local leadership positions 
across China reportedly remains low.13 Domestic media reports 
this past year noted an increase in female representation in vil-
lage-, city-, county-, and provincial-level governments and Party or-
ganizations, in some cases as a result of scheduled reshuffling of 
government positions in 2011.14 These increases follow national- 
level legislative efforts in late 2010 to increase quotas for female 
representation in village committees and village representative as-
semblies.15 However, women continue to face challenges protecting 
their land rights due to factors including the lack of ‘‘concrete 
means and mechanisms to supervise, control, and manage villagers’ 
decisions and local rules.’’ 16 
Legal Developments 
In August 2011, the Supreme People’s Court issued a new inter-
pretation of the PRC Marriage Law, which, some have argued, 
leaves women’s property rights unprotected. The interpretation 
states that, in the case of divorce, full ownership of property is af-
forded solely to the person in whose name it was purchased and 
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registered.17 Under cultural norms in China, this is traditionally 
the man.18 
In June 2012, the Shenzhen Municipality Fifth People’s Congress 
Standing Committee passed the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
Gender Equality Promotion Regulations (Regulations), the first leg-
islation of its kind in China to focus on gender equality.19 The Reg-
ulations are set to take effect in January 2013.20 If implemented, 
the Regulations could provide greater protections against and pun-
ishment for gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and domes-
tic violence.21 
Employment Discrimination 
Gender-based employment discrimination with respect to issues 
such as wages, recruitment, promotion, and retirement age re-
mains widespread in China, despite government efforts to elimi-
nate it and promote women’s employment. The Chinese govern-
ment has committed under international standards 22 as well as 
with several of its domestic laws 23 and policies 24 to prohibit gen-
der discrimination and promote gender equality in the workplace. 
A number of domestic reports and surveys from the 2012 reporting 
year highlighted challenges that women continue to face in employ-
ment due to their gender, as noted below: 
• Discrimination in hiring, promotion. Several surveys 
noted continued gender discrimination in hiring and pro-
motion. An All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) and Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics (NBS) joint survey released in Octo-
ber 2011 found that approximately one out of four college stu-
dents and one out of five ‘‘female professional respondents’’ re-
ported encountering discrimination in job hiring.25 The survey 
also polled women who held senior positions in education, engi-
neering, government, and enterprises—and found that 31 per-
cent of these respondents reported slower rates of promotion 
than equally qualified male coworkers.26 Results of a China 
University of Political Science and Law Constitutionalism Re-
search Institute survey released in November 2011 showed an 
increase in gender discrimination in civil service hiring since 
2010.27 The survey also pointed out that ‘‘even the All-China 
Women’s Federation had barred women from certain posi-
tions.’’ 28 In a stance against one continued form of gender dis-
crimination in recruiting, in March 2012, non-governmental or-
ganization Beijing Yirenping Center published an open letter 
to the government calling for the revision or elimination of pro-
visions which require women to submit to gynecological tests 
when applying for civil service positions.29 
• Wage disparity. The October 2011 ACWF and NBS joint 
survey, a result of responses from over 105,000 women, found 
that ‘‘[t]he annual income of female urbanites is 67 percent of 
that of their male counterparts, and women laborers earn only 
half of what men do in rural areas.’’ 30 Similarly, in April 2012, 
international non-profit business organization Catalyst re-
ported that ‘‘women [in China] earned on average 31% less 
than men for doing similar work.’’ 31 
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• Discriminatory actions during maternity leave. In 
March 2012, a woman in Guangdong province filed a lawsuit 
against her former employer for terminating her employment 
during her maternity leave.32 This is reportedly the first such 
gender discrimination case in Guangdong to elevate beyond 
labor dispute arbitration committees and reach court.33 Job 
termination on the grounds of maternity leave is prohibited 
under Article 27 of the PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s 
Rights and Interests.34 In April 2012, the State Council issued 
the Special Provisions for the Work Protection of Female Em-
ployees,35 which include such guarantees as protection against 
job termination on the grounds of maternity or nursing 36 and 
more time allotted for maternity leave (extended from 90 37 to 
98 days).38 
• Forced early retirement. Mandatory retirement ages for 
women in China continue to be 5 to 10 years earlier than those 
for men, depending on their position of employment.39 Public 
discussion on retirement age this year continued to reveal 
varying views regarding for whom the retirement age should 
be raised, if at all. In March, China’s top labor official report-
edly announced plans to raise the retirement age for both men 
and women; 40 however, he did not provide a timeline.41 At the 
annual session of the NPC that same month, one NPC deputy 
proposed that the retirement age be raised specifically for 
‘‘highly educated’’ female workers.42 Non-government workers, 
university students, and academics, however, have expressed 
hesitation about a delayed retirement age, noting that such a 
change would push already over-taxed laborers to work ‘‘extra 
years,’’ and that it might limit job opportunities and exacerbate 
existing pressure on China’s pension system.43 
Violence Against Women 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Domestic violence is prohibited and punishable under Chinese 
law,44 yet the problem of domestic violence remains widespread.45 
Current national-level legal provisions regarding domestic violence 
leave many victims unprotected by prohibiting domestic violence 
without defining the term or clarifying the specific responsibilities 
of public and private sector organizations in prevention, punish-
ment, and treatment.46 As in previous years,47 Chinese advocates 
called for clear national-level legislation on domestic violence,48 
and nationwide attention to the issue appears to have increased 
following several high-profile domestic violence cases this year in-
volving women and children.49 State media reported in March 2012 
that ‘‘[d]omestic violence is listed on the 2012 legislative agenda of 
the [NPC],’’ 50 and China’s 2012–2015 National Human Rights Ac-
tion Plan, issued in June, also included goals to ‘‘formulate’’ a do-
mestic violence law.51 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Sexual harassment remains widespread in China, and those who 
are targeted face difficulties in defending their rights under Chi-
nese law. China has committed under international standards to 
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taking ‘‘all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment.’’ 52 Accordingly, Chinese 
law prohibits sexual harassment and allows for legal recourse for 
victims.53 Chinese law does not clearly define sexual harassment or 
provide standards and procedures for prevention and punish-
ment.54 Survey findings in recent years show that many who face 
sexual harassment choose to ‘‘tolerate’’ it.55 Other reports indicate 
that those who decide to take legal action may risk losing their 
lawsuits due to the challenge of supplying adequate evidence.56 
Impact of Population Planning on Women 
In response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping 
with a traditional cultural bias for sons, some Chinese parents 
choose to engage in sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples 
whose first child is a girl 57—a practice that has contributed to Chi-
na’s skewed sex ratio, which some have linked to China’s ongoing 
problem of human trafficking. The male-female ratio of newborns 
in 2008 was greater than 120:1, and in 2011 it was above 117:1.58 
National regulations issued in 2003 banned prenatal gender deter-
mination and sex-selective abortion; 59 however, statistics and anal-
ysis from recent years 60 show that the practice remains common-
place, especially in rural areas, and suggest that implementation of 
the ban on sex-selective abortion remains uneven. In August 2011, 
the State Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of 
Children (2011–2020), urging officials to crack down further on 
‘‘non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abor-
tion,’’ 61 and, in June 2012, the State Council issued its 2012–2015 
National Human Rights Action Plan, reiterating this call.62 Observ-
ers, including Chinese state media, have linked China’s skewed sex 
ratio with an increase in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and 
other forms of human trafficking.63 [For more information regard-
ing China’s skewed sex ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.] 
The international non-governmental organization Human Rights 
Watch reported in January 2012 that ‘‘women’s reproductive rights 
remain severely curtailed in 2011 under China’s family planning 
regulations,’’ citing the pressures of ‘‘administrative sanctions, 
fines, and forced abortions’’ on women in rural areas, female mi-





The Chinese government faces persistent challenges as it con-
tinues to combat human trafficking that occurs both within and 
across Chinese borders. With respect to human trafficking, the Chi-
nese government has taken steps to increase public awareness, ex-
pand social services, and improve international cooperation. Yet, of-
ficials’ focus on the abduction and sale of women and children,1 
while giving proportionally less attention to other forms of traf-
ficking, limits the support rendered to the trafficking victims who 
need it. Despite improvements to the PRC Criminal Law in 2011, 
gaps between domestic legislation and international standards on 
human trafficking remain and limit the scope and effectiveness of 
related efforts. Domestic and international observers have linked 
certain longstanding risk factors to the human trafficking problem 
in China, including the government’s population planning policies 
and their exacerbation of China’s skewed sex ratio; migrant mobil-
ity; uneven enforcement of anti-trafficking laws; lack of anti-traf-
ficking training, education, and resources; and government corrup-
tion. 
Anti-Trafficking Challenges 
The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in December 2009,2 but has not re-
vised domestic legislation to come into full compliance. While the 
PRC Criminal Law prohibits the trafficking of persons,3 Chinese 
law addresses the crime more narrowly, in some ways, than does 
the UN TIP Protocol. For example, provisions in the PRC Criminal 
Law do not appear to cover all forms of trafficking, such as certain 
types of non-physical coercion 4 and the commercial sex trade of mi-
nors.5 Nor does the definition of trafficking provided under Article 
240 clearly include offenses against male victims,6 although other 
articles in the PRC Criminal Law address some aspects of these 
crimes.7 Each of these forms of trafficking are covered under Arti-
cle 3 of the UN TIP Protocol.8 In other ways, the Chinese legal def-
inition of trafficking is overly broad in comparison to that provided 
in the UN TIP Protocol. For example, under Chinese law, the crime 
of ‘‘trafficking’’ includes the purchase or abduction of children for 
subsequent sale without specifying the end purpose of these ac-
tions.9 Several Chinese and international media reports in the past 
year highlighted such cases—referring to them as ‘‘trafficking’’ 
cases—and indicated that a significant amount of anti-trafficking 
work in China is focused on investigating or prosecuting these 
types of cases.10 Under the UN TIP Protocol, the purchase or ab-
duction of children for subsequent sale only constitutes trafficking 
if the end purpose of the sale is exploitation, such as sexual exploi-
tation, labor, or servitude.11 
Chinese officials also continue to conflate human trafficking with 
human smuggling and therefore treat some victims of trafficking as 
criminals.12 According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
main international body responsible for implementing the UN TIP 
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Protocol, ‘‘human trafficking’’ and ‘‘migrant smuggling’’ mainly dif-
fer with respect to consent, exploitation, and transnationality.13 
Commonly, human trafficking involves the exploitation of an indi-
vidual (either domestically or after they have crossed borders) with-
out the individual’s consent, or if the individual initially consented, 
the consent was ‘‘rendered meaningless by the coercive, deceptive, 
or abusive actions of the traffickers,’’ whereas migrant smuggling 
involves the cross-border transport of an individual with the indi-
vidual’s consent and ends when the migrant arrives at his or her 
destination.14 In conflating the two, Chinese officials may consider 
an individual’s illegal entry into China to be a crime of ‘‘human 
smuggling’’ and punish the individual accordingly, while giving less 
consideration to the role exploitation may have played in the bor-
der crossing.15 The Chinese government continues to deport all un-
documented North Koreans as illegal ‘‘economic migrants’’ and does 
not provide legal alternatives to repatriation for foreign victims of 
trafficking.16 [For more information, see Section II—North Korean 
Refugees in China.] 
Prevalence 
China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for 
the trafficking of men, women, and children.17 The majority of traf-
ficking cases are domestic; 18 however, human traffickers continue 
to traffic women and children from China to countries around the 
world.19 Women and girls from countries across Asia, as well as 
some countries in Europe and Africa, are also trafficked into China 
and forced into marriages, employment, and sexual exploitation.20 
Forced labor of men, women, and children continues, and certain 
cases gained media attention during the Commission’s 2012 report-
ing year; 21 however, the full extent of the forced labor problem in 
China is unclear.22 Of note, an internal memo issued in 2012 by 
the Lhasa Public Security Bureau in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) reported a recent spike in the trafficking of women and chil-
dren from the TAR to other areas of China to serve ‘‘as ‘brides’ or 
household servants.’’ 23 [See Section II—Worker Rights for more in-
formation on child labor.] According to the UN TIP Protocol, ‘‘the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt’’ of any 
person under 18 years of age for exploitative purposes constitutes 
trafficking in persons.24 
Risk Factors 
Experts link the reported growth 25 of the trafficking market in 
China to several political, demographic, economic, and social fac-
tors. Reports indicate that China’s sex ratio 26—which has become 
severely skewed against the backdrop of China’s population plan-
ning policies and Chinese families’ preference for sons 27—has in-
creased the demand for trafficking for forced marriage and com-
mercial sexual exploitation.28 In recent years, domestic and inter-
national observers have also linked the growing trafficking problem 
with a continued lack of awareness among potential victims, a con-
tinued lack of education on trafficking prevention for vulnerable 
women and parents,29 and challenging conditions in bordering 
countries such as instability in Burma and poverty in the Demo-
106 
cratic People’s Republic of Korea.30 [For additional information on 
China’s skewed sex ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.] 
Representative Human Trafficking Cases 
from the 2012 Reporting Year 
(Arranged by Province) 
• Henan. In September 2011, officials in Henan province reportedly 
rescued 30 people with mental disabilities from slave labor conditions in 
illegal brick kilns in several locations in the province.31 The case has re-
portedly raised concerns regarding official efforts to prevent forced labor 
of persons with mental disabilities, following a similar case in Shaanxi 
province in 2007.32 
• Jiangsu. According to a December 2011 Xinhua article, a 22-year-old 
Burmese woman was rescued and returned home in July 2011 after a 
year and a half of forced marriage to a farmer who was ‘‘mentally handi-
capped.’’ The woman reportedly had difficulty escaping the abusive situ-
ation because she could not speak Chinese.33 
• Jiangsu. In February 2012, officials in Suzhou city launched an in-
vestigation into a local electronics factory after Suzhou police received 
an online tip reporting child labor there. The police found at least 10 un-
derage workers, including 1 as young as 9 years old, employed at the 
factory. The youths were reportedly forced to work under harsh condi-
tions, including 12-hour daily shifts, and they reportedly suffered from 
poor nutrition.34 
• Yunnan. Eight persons between the ages of 12 and 22 in Pucheng 
town, Puning county, Kunming municipality, have disappeared in a se-
ries of alleged abductions since May 2011. Police launched an investiga-
tion into these cases only after another young person escaped a brick 
kiln on April 25, 2012, and reported to authorities that he had been ab-
ducted off the street and forced into labor. Parents of the disappeared 
reported that when they approached the police about the disappear-
ances, the police accused them of ‘‘starting rumors.’’ 35 
Anti-Trafficking Efforts 
The Chinese government, non-governmental organizations, and 
individuals continued efforts to combat human trafficking. In De-
cember 2009, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC) approved China’s accession to the UN Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol).36 On February 25, 2011, 
the NPCSC revised the PRC Criminal Law, making amendments 
to provisions on forced labor,37 a crime that constitutes human 
trafficking under the UN TIP Protocol.38 The revised legislation 
broadens the scope of activity considered punishable for forced 
labor and strengthens punishments for ‘‘serious’’ crimes of forced 
labor; however, the legislation still does not clearly define what 
constitutes forced labor.39 The Commission did not observe changes 
to other areas in which China’s domestic legislation does not com-
ply with the UN TIP Protocol during the 2012 reporting year.40 
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GOVERNMENT EFFORTS 
Chinese authorities, in cooperation with non-governmental orga-
nizations and international organizations, took limited steps to im-
prove protection, services, and care for victims of trafficking but 
continued to focus such efforts only on women and children identi-
fied as victims through the government’s definition of trafficking. 
The United Nations Interagency Project on Human Trafficking and 
the International Organization for Migration each conducted train-
ing sessions during the Commission’s 2012 reporting year that re-
portedly addressed issues including victim protection and services, 
as well as worker rights.41 The U.S. State Department reported in 
2012 that the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) ‘‘continued to 
allocate an unknown amount of funds to operate ‘women’s 
homes,’ ’’ 42 a network of shelters where women could access refer-
rals for legal aid, report human trafficking violations, and seek as-
sistance from social workers.43 China signed the Mekong River 
Sub-regional Cooperation Anti-Trafficking Memo in 2004, commit-
ting to meet on an annual basis with senior officials from Thailand, 
Burma, Laos, and Cambodia to discuss anti-trafficking work.44 The 
Chinese government has eight border offices with neighboring 
countries to combat cross-border trafficking.45 
Authorities continued outreach and education campaigns in con-
cert with the ACWF and international organizations. The govern-
ment continued trafficking education campaigns in areas with high 
numbers of migrant workers, including train and bus stations, and 
through television, cell phones, and the Internet, informing work-
ers of their rights. The ACWF in conjunction with an international 
organization also reportedly aided in integrating awareness mes-
sages into school curricula.46 Chinese authorities continue to oper-
ate national and local hotlines for reporting suspected trafficking 
cases,47 although there appears to be limited public data on their 
use. 
As Chinese law conflates human smuggling, illegal adoption, and 
child abduction with human trafficking, accurate official statistics 
are not available on the number of trafficking cases the govern-
ment investigated and prosecuted during the past reporting year.48 
In addition to provisions in the newly issued 2012–2015 National 
Human Rights Action Plan calling for continued and improved 
anti-trafficking efforts and provision of victim services,49 the gov-
ernment reportedly is working in conjunction with international or-
ganizations to draft a specific ‘‘National Plan of Action’’ to combat 
human trafficking. The draft is expected to be released in Decem-
ber 2012 and reportedly factored into the U.S. State Department’s 
decision to waive ‘‘an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3’’ in 
its 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report.50 The U.S. State Depart-
ment thus placed China on its Tier 2 Watch List for the eighth con-
secutive year in 2012,51 listing several areas in which China’s anti- 
trafficking efforts remain insufficient.52 
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NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA 
Unlawful Repatriation 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment persisted in detaining and repatriating North Korean ref-
ugees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite 
the severe punishments refugees face once returned.1 The Chinese 
government continues to classify all North Korean refugees in 
China as ‘‘illegal’’ economic migrants and not refugees (nanmin) 2 
and continues its policy of repatriating them based on a 1961 trea-
ty with the DPRK and a subsequent 1986 border protocol, docu-
ments which are still not publicly available.3 A former vice min-
ister in the South Korean Ministry of Unification and South Ko-
rean activists have said that China repatriates 5,000 North Korean 
refugees every year.4 In May, one non-governmental organization 
(NGO) expert estimated that there were between 100,000 and 
200,000 North Korean refugees living in China.5 China’s forced re-
patriation of North Korean refugees, including those who leave the 
DPRK for fear of persecution, contravenes obligations under the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Conven-
tion) and its 1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol), to which China has ac-
ceded.6 
During this reporting year, central and local authorities in-
creased security measures along the North Korean border and im-
plemented new campaigns to crack down on North Korean refu-
gees.7 Sources cited in international media reported in March that 
Chinese authorities had installed silent alarm systems ‘‘in every 
house’’ in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province. 
The silent alarm systems are designed to allow local residents to 
notify police if North Korean refugees sought assistance from 
them.8 In late May, public security authorities in Yanbian 
launched a five-month crackdown on illegal immigrants, targeting 
North Korean refugees as well as international NGOs and religious 
organizations that assist refugees.9 Additional media reports this 
past year indicated increased collaboration between North Korean 
and Chinese security officials in apprehending North Korean refu-
gees, as well as the presence of North Korean security agents oper-
ating in China.10 
In early 2012, international media outlets and advocacy organi-
zations raised human rights concerns about lethal crackdowns on 
North Koreans following the death of North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-il in December 2011. Some news reports claimed that the 
DPRK’s new leader Kim Jong-un threatened to ‘‘exterminate three 
generations’’ of any family with a member caught defecting from 
the DPRK during the 100-day mourning period.11 In February 
2012, Chinese authorities reportedly detained between 24 and 33 
North Korean refugees over a week-long period in separate arrests 
in Liaoning and Jilin provinces.12 In early March 2012, Yonhap 
News Agency and CNN cited activists and a South Korean official 
who indicated that they believed Chinese officials forcibly repatri-
ated the detained North Korean refugees.13 
China’s public security bureau agencies have held detained 
North Korean refugees and asylum seekers in detention centers 
that are not subject to independent monitoring.14 Refugees and 
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asylum seekers cannot challenge their detention in court.15 The 
Chinese government continued to deny the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees permission to work along its northeastern border with 
the DPRK.16 
Another problem that reportedly stems from China’s unlawful re-
patriation policy is the denial of education and other public services 
for the children of North Korean refugees married to Chinese citi-
zens.17 The scope of this problem, however, is unclear due to lim-
ited public information. 
Punishment in the DPRK 
North Koreans repatriated by the Chinese government face the 
threat of imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment in the 
DPRK.18 Under the 2004 revised North Korean Penal Code, border 
crossers can receive sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment in 
a ‘‘labor-training center.’’ 19 North Korean authorities assign harsh-
er punishment, including long sentences and public execution, to 
repatriated North Koreans deemed to have committed ‘‘political’’ 
crimes, which include attempted defection; conversion to Christi-
anity; and having had extensive contact with religious groups, 
South Koreans, or Americans.20 
The North Korean government’s imprisonment and torture of re-
patriated North Koreans renders North Koreans in China refugees 
‘‘sur place,’’ or those who fear persecution upon return to their 
country of origin.21 Under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Pro-
tocol, China is obligated to refrain from repatriating refuges ‘‘sur 
place.’’ 
North Korean Women and Trafficking 
The Chinese government’s policy of forcibly repatriating North 
Korean refugees and denying them legal status increases the likeli-
hood that they will be abused, trafficked, and exploited in China. 
North Korean women are especially vulnerable to inhumane treat-
ment and indentured servitude.22 Although Chinese authorities 
have taken limited steps to combat trafficking and protect traf-
ficking victims,23 traffickers continue to traffic an estimated 80 to 
90 percent of the North Korean women in China,24 and Chinese 
authorities refuse to provide these victims with legal alternatives 
to repatriation.25 NGOs and researchers estimate that as many as 
70 percent of North Korean refugees in China are women.26 In 
March 2012, the director of a South Korean NGO said that be-
tween 20,000 and 30,000 North Korean women were trapped in 
‘‘what many observers see as a form of slavery.’’ 27 Traffickers, 
many of whom operate in organized networks, have used false 
promises to lure North Korean women into China, and have ab-
ducted those entering China on their own.28 Traffickers reportedly 
blackmailed North Korean women in China by warning them that 
if they did not obey, they would be reported to Chinese authorities, 
who would forcibly repatriate them.29 
The trafficking of North Korean women has created a black mar-
ket in which refugees have been ‘‘moved and traded like merchan-
dise, with many sold as ‘brides,’ kept in confinement, and sexually 
assaulted,’’ according to sources cited in a March 2011 Radio Free 
110 
Asia report.30 There has been a high demand for wives in north-
eastern China where severe sex ratio imbalances have spurred the 
Chinese market for trafficked North Korean brides, and where 
poor, disabled, or elderly men have difficulty finding wives.31 In 
other cases, North Korean women have been trafficked into com-
mercial sexual exploitation and forced to work as prostitutes or in 
Internet sex operations.32 Some women reportedly have been sold 
and resold multiple times,33 and trafficked North Korean women 
have testified to being beaten, sexually abused, and locked up to 
prevent escape.34 
The Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Ko-
rean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Pro-
tocol,35 and the Chinese government is obligated under Article 7 of 
the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) to 
‘‘consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that 
permit victims of trafficking to remain in its territory, temporarily 
or permanently . . . giving appropriate consideration to humani-
tarian and compassionate factors.’’ 36 The Chinese government’s 
failure to prevent trafficking of North Korean women and protect 
them from revictimization also contravenes its obligations under 
Article 9 of the UN TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.37 
Foreign Aid Workers in China 
Chinese authorities also forcibly detained, tortured, and deported 
those who attempted to assist North Korean refugees, including 
foreign aid workers and those involved with humanitarian organi-
zations.38 In March 2012, for example, Chinese state security offi-
cials in Dalian municipality, Liaoning province, detained four 
South Korean activists on charges of ‘‘endangering state security,’’ 
after they allegedly interviewed North Korean refugees hiding 
there.39 The four South Korean detainees reportedly had inter-
viewed refugees to collect information about their circumstances 
and the situation in the DPRK.40 After their release in July 2012, 
one of the detainees, Kim Young-hwan, alleged he was tortured 
while in Chinese custody.41 
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PUBLIC HEALTH 
Public Health Advocacy 
Despite official recognition of the positive role non-governmental 
actors have played in raising awareness about health concerns, 
combating stigma, and promoting prevention of diseases,1 some 
Chinese civil society organizations and individual citizens contin-
ued to face government harassment and interference in their public 
health advocacy work during the Commission’s 2012 reporting 
year. Restrictions that central authorities placed on registration 2 
and funding 3 of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 1998 
and 2009, respectively, remain in effect and have reportedly been 
used to monitor, control, and limit NGO activities.4 Nineteen prov-
inces and regions have begun experimenting with direct registra-
tion of NGOs, but a civil affairs official in Guangdong province 
noted that the health sector is not included.5 
Challenges for public health advocates and organizations contin-
ued during this reporting year, as illustrated in the following three 
cases: 
• Hu Jia. Officials have repeatedly subjected Beijing-based 
HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia to harassment and monitoring 
since his June 2011 release from prison upon completion of his 
three-and-a-half-year sentence for ‘‘inciting subversion.’’ Spe-
cific instances of official harassment of Hu Jia during this re-
porting year included police threatening him in October 2011; 6 
officials following and filming him on a visit to the Ministry of 
Health in November 2011; 7 officials searching his home, con-
fiscating his computer, and calling him in for questioning in 
January 2012; 8 and officials briefly detaining him in both 
April and June 2012.9 Hu Jia reportedly has been under con-
stant surveillance by a team of at least 16 people.10 
• Beijing Huiling. In March 2012, the Beijing News profiled 
the experience of Beijing Huiling, an NGO that provides hous-
ing and services to disabled persons. Beijing Huiling has re-
portedly faced several difficulties in trying to secure registra-
tion as a civil society organization and has been unable to do 
so for 12 years.11 Beijing Huiling reported that, if it could not 
successfully register as a ‘‘social organization’’ by May 2012, it 
would have to close due to lack of funding.12 [For additional in-
formation on Beijing Huiling’s situation and the impact of reg-
istration restrictions on NGOs, see Section III—Civil Society.] 
• HIV/AIDS NGOs in Hebei province. Hebei officials report-
edly announced in February 2012 that every social organiza-
tion in the province must register with their local civil affairs 
bureau before May 1, 2012, or else they would be ‘‘banned.’’ 13 
In an interview with Caixin regarding the crackdown, one rep-
resentative from an unregistered Hebei HIV/AIDS NGO com-
municated concern that the organization would have to dis-
continue future activities, noting, ‘‘It is not that we don’t want 
to have legal status. Rather, it is simply impossible for HIV/ 
AIDS organizations to meet civil affairs registration standards. 
Currently the government deems our activities illegal. . . .’’ 14 
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Health-Based Discrimination 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
Health-based employment discrimination is prohibited under 
Chinese law,15 yet the problem remains widespread.16 Reports this 
year have shed light on the unique difficulties that people living 
with HIV/AIDS face when seeking legal recourse for employment 
discrimination based on their HIV status.17 For example, many 
public institutions continue to set physical requirements for job ap-
plicants based on the General Standards for Civil Service Recruit-
ment Examinations (General Standards),18 despite the fact that the 
General Standards are in apparent conflict with other Chinese 
laws and regulations prohibiting discrimination.19 In addition, the 
manual accompanying the General Standards contains outdated 
and incorrect information on the risks of HIV/AIDS,20 posing added 
challenges for people living with HIV/AIDS in securing employ-
ment.21 Health-based employment discrimination with respect to 
other forms of illness such as Hepatitis B virus 22 and diabetes,23 
as well as physical disabilities,24 also remains commonplace, ac-
cording to several reports in this past year. Lawsuits filed to chal-
lenge health-based discrimination in Anhui,25 Sichuan,26 and 
Guizhou 27 provinces in the past year have been unsuccessful, even 
when appealed.28 
DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTHCARE 
Reports from the 2012 reporting year indicate that discrimina-
tion based on HIV status remains a barrier preventing many from 
accessing adequate healthcare.29 In one representative example, an 
HIV-positive burn victim reportedly sought treatment in three hos-
pitals in Guangdong province, but each denied her care due to her 
HIV status.30 In addition to common denial of medical treatment 
due to HIV status,31 concerns regarding lack of patient confiden-
tiality remain a deterrent for those seeking medical attention for 
HIV/AIDS.32 
DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 
Health-based discrimination remains a barrier in access to edu-
cation. For example, in September 2011, Beijing municipal authori-
ties refused radio broadcasting student Dong Lina’s application to 
take certain exams to progress in her media studies due to her vis-
ual impairment.33 In connection with this, the NGO Beijing 
Yirenping launched a campaign to raise awareness of education 
discrimination against the visually impaired.34 
Mental Health 
China has signed and ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in doing so, China has 
committed to ensuring ‘‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’’ 35 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese authorities 
continued to move the country’s first national mental health law 
through the final stages of consideration. In June 2011, a draft was 
released for public comment,36 and in October 2011, the National 
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People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee reviewed a revised 
draft of the proposed legislation.37 The NPC Standing Committee 
conducted a review of an amended draft in August 2012.38 The 
drafts contain revisions that, if faithfully implemented, could fur-
ther constrain officials from abusing psychiatric detention 39 to sti-
fle or punish dissent.40 Despite these potential improvements, the 
drafts raise concerns regarding the law’s compliance with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),41 
which China has signed and ratified.42 Specific concerns include 
the drafts’ failure to make independent reviews of an initial diag-
nosis mandatory, lack of provision for the appointment of legal 
counsel, and lack of safeguards that would place time limits on in-
voluntary commitment.43 In August 2012, Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders submitted a report to the CRPD monitoring body that 
details abuses of involuntary psychiatric commitment in China and 
includes recommendations for provisions to the mental health law 
to stem such violations.44 The Commission has not observed official 
statements providing information on an expected finalization time-
frame for the mental health law.45 
Organ Transplants in China: Developments and Controversies 
On March 22, 2012, a top Chinese health official announced that, 
within three to five years, central authorities would ‘‘abolish’’ the prac-
tice of harvesting organs from death-row prisoners, a group that report-
edly has been the primary source of organs for transplants in China.46 
The announcement follows a trend in recent years of increased govern-
ment regulation surrounding the transfer of human organs, including 
the 2007 Regulations on Human Organ Transplants (2007 Regula-
tions),47 the 2009 establishment of an official national organ donation 
database,48 and the 2011 revision to the PRC Criminal Law, which, for 
the first time, categorized organ trafficking as a crime.49 In 2012, the 
Chinese government prosecuted organ traffickers 50 and conducted a 
multi-province crackdown on organ-trafficking rings,51 and legal experts 
called for amendments to the 2007 Regulations to stop organ traf-
ficking.52 Nevertheless, there continue to be reports of illegal organ 
transplants in recent years 53 and allegations of organ harvesting from 
non-consenting Falun Gong practitioners.54 Dr. Luc Noel, an expert 
from the World Health Organization, reported in May 2012 that, ‘‘while 
commercial [organ] transplantation is now forbidden by law in China, 
that’s difficult to enforce; there’s been a resurgence [in China] in the last 
two or three years.’’ 55 Dr. Noel also noted that China’s military hos-
pitals may be involved in such transplant operations.56 [See Section II— 




Environmental Challenges, Legal Developments, and Enforcement 
Issues 
SEVERE POLLUTION CHALLENGES 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, despite some 
progress,1 pollution problems remain a significant challenge,2 and 
the associated financial costs continue to grow.3 Severe water,4 
air,5 and solid waste 6 problems persist. Pollution in rural areas re-
portedly is surpassing that in urban areas.7 Heavy metal pollution 
remains severe,8 even as officials prioritize closing or cleaning up 
related enterprises.9 Environmental accidents sustained high num-
bers. A China Daily article, citing official statistics, reported 542 
environmental accidents handled in China in 2011.10 Water quan-
tity problems also are prominent.11 In addition, officials in many 
coastal areas tasked with transforming their economies have closed 
many highly polluting enterprises, which reportedly led to two 
main problems: factories leaving behind contaminated sites, or 
‘‘brownfields’’; 12 and some polluting industries migrating to less de-
veloped areas where environmental protection capacity is weaker.13 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT 
Authorities continue to develop a regulatory framework to ad-
dress these environmental problems, although some efforts appear 
stifled. In late August 2012, the National People’s Congress Stand-
ing Committee completed the first reading of the draft amendment 
to the 1989 PRC Environmental Protection Law (EPL) and released 
draft revisions for public comment.14 The draft revisions contained 
some of the incentives for greater transparency and official ac-
countability present in previous drafts,15 although revisions do not 
contain proposed language that specifies stronger support for public 
participation.16 Efforts to pass technical guidelines regarding pub-
lic participation in environmental impact assessments appear to 
have stalled.17 In 2011, in a potentially positive development, the 
revisions to the PRC Criminal Law expanded the scope of behav-
iors affecting the environment that could be considered criminal.18 
In November 2011, the State Council issued the Opinion Regarding 
Strengthening Key Environmental Protection Work, which includes 
provisions intended to improve environmental supervision; 19 and 
in December, it issued the National 12th Five-Year Plan for Envi-
ronmental Protection, which states support for transparency, and 
public participation and supervision.20 Authorities passed several 
other measures regarding water conservation,21 hydroelectric 
dams,22 environmental impact assessments,23 environmental dam-
age assessments,24 and company environmental reporting 25 that 
include provisions relating to accountability, public participation, or 
transparency. In addition, the 2012–2015 National Human Rights 
Action Plan issued in June 2012 included a section on ‘‘environ-
mental rights.’’ 26 
Despite efforts to develop a regulatory framework, significant 
challenges remain for the development of rule of law in the envi-
ronmental sector. These challenges include lax enforcement and 
non-compliance,27 local environmental protection bureau (EPB) de-
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pendence on local governments and lack of authority vis-a-vis other 
departments,28 official evaluation criteria and incentives that over-
emphasize economic development,29 environmental penalties that 
are too low to deter polluting behavior,30 and corruption—which re-
ports say is increasing.31 
Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner 
Environment 
Access to formal legal remedies remains unreliable,32 despite po-
tential advancements in public interest law and growth in the 
number of specialized environmental court pilot projects, which in-
creased from several in 2009 to at least 61 nationally by July 
2012.33 Legal remedies remain unreliable in part because of judges’ 
reluctance to accept some environmental cases.34 For example, a 
group of fishermen filed a case in the United States against 
ConocoPhillips reportedly because a Chinese court would not accept 
a similar suit.35 
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 
In August 2012, Chinese officials passed an amendment to the 
PRC Civil Procedure Law with an article that, for the first time, 
allows ‘‘agencies and relevant organizations stipulated by law’’ to 
initiate lawsuits for ‘‘acts that harm the public interest,’’ including 
environmental pollution.36 According to Chinese media, experts say 
judicial interpretation or additional laws and regulations are need-
ed to determine what constitutes a public interest (PI) suit and 
which organizations have standing to file; 37 currently, the vague-
ness of the article gives considerable discretion to implementing of-
ficials. Local officials have already allowed such suits, including a 
court in Yunnan province, which in October 2011 accepted a law-
suit involving alleged illegal dumping of chromium sludge brought 
in part by two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) not directly 
affiliated with government agencies,38 marking the second time 
independent NGOs have participated in filing a PI lawsuit.39 The 
NGOs involved reportedly faced challenges in gathering evidence 
and preparing for the Yunnan case, including being harassed by se-
curity guards from one of the suspected companies.40 
SUPPRESSION OF OUTSPOKEN ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES 
Officials continue to harass or in some cases detain environ-
mental advocates. Authorities in Hainan province detained former 
forestry official Liu Futang in mid-July on suspicion of ‘‘illegal 
business activities.’’ 41 Liu had reportedly posted critical comments 
about a proposed power plant,42 and his microblog sites were re-
portedly blocked two months after a large-scale protest in April 
2012 over the plant.43 Liu also published a book titled ‘‘Hainan’s 
Tears’’ in Hong Kong, but did not obtain a PRC publication num-
ber.44 He reportedly was critical of other projects and had received 
threatening phone calls from an unnamed source.45 Police in Yixing 
city, Jiangsu province, continue to monitor the activities of environ-
mental advocate Wu Lihong.46 One report indicates officials placed 
security cameras outside of his home, blocked his access to the 
Internet, routinely followed him, and did not allow him to work.47 
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The Commission continues to monitor the case of environmental 
advocate Zhang Changjian in Pingnan county, Fujian province, 
whom local officials accused of conducting ‘‘illegal activities in the 
name of a social organization’’ in July 2011 after he held legal edu-
cation programs for farmers.48 Authorities released him after a 
brief detention but indicated they would continue to investigate his 
activities.49 In February 2012, authorities in Sichuan province re-
portedly detained four environmental advocates including Lubum, 
Dragpa, and Dawa, all of whom belonged to the Tawu Environ-
mental Protection Association, a group that had opposed mining, 
deforestation, fishing in sacred rivers, and smuggling of wildlife 
products.50 In some cases, citizens who complain about pollution 
later face retribution from officials. For example, in November 
2011, officials in Qingshu village, Hunan province, reportedly re-
taliated against people who had been filing complaints about pollu-
tion from a local coal mine for years.51 Media reports noted other 
instances of retribution against people complaining about or pro-
testing pollution in Zhejiang 52 and Fujian 53 provinces. 
LARGE-SCALE PROTESTS: CHANNEL OF LAST RESORT 
Protests regarding pollution are increasing and are often a tool 
of last resort for citizens seeking remedies from environmental 
harms. Official and academic estimates of the annual increase in 
the number of environmental protests range between 20 and 30 
percent, although the actual number reportedly remains a well- 
guarded secret.54 
Citizens took to the streets in large numbers to demonstrate 
against hydroelectric dams and new or expanding sources of pollu-
tion. In mid-December 2011, 10,000 to 50,000 people protested for 
several days regarding expansion of a coal-fired power plant in 
Haimen town, Shantou city, Guangdong province.55 Plant officials 
reportedly partially disregarded orders from environmental au-
thorities to halt construction.56 Some protesters reportedly blocked 
a highway, surrounded government buildings, and burned police 
cars after authorities refused to meet with them.57 Reports suggest 
police beat protesters, injuring dozens, and detained five dem-
onstrators for ‘‘vandalism.’’ 58 Authorities denied entry to and de-
tained Hong Kong journalists, and erased images from their cam-
eras.59 Officials reportedly warned people not to talk to anyone 
about the protests or they may face imprisonment.60 In March and 
April 2012, thousands of people in Yinggehai township, Hainan 
province, demonstrated against a coal-fired power plant.61 In July, 
thousands of citizens clashed with police during a protest against 
a planned molybdenum-copper project in Shifang city, Sichuan 
province.62 Authorities claimed student participants had been ‘‘in-
cited’’ by ‘‘some people’’ with ‘‘ulterior motives,’’ 63 and used tear 
gas to disperse protesters.64 Officials suspended the project, but 
warned they would investigate people who allegedly had ‘‘spread 
rumors.’’ 65 Li Chengpeng, a blogger, reported that authorities de-
manded that he delete his report on the Shifang case.66 
Other protests involved citizens seeking redress for longstanding 
environmental grievances. In September 2011, hundreds of citizens 
in Haining city, Zhejiang province, protested pollution from a pho-
tovoltaic panel producer.67 During the conflict, protesters over-
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turned cars and stormed the factory.68 News reports indicate secu-
rity officials beat protesters and detained at least 20, including 
some for speaking with reporters and 1 for ‘‘dissemination of false 
information.’’ 69 In July 2012, in Qidong city, Jiangsu province, 
thousands protested plans to pipe waste from a paper mill to the 
ocean because of concerns waste would pollute a fishery.70 Authori-
ties abandoned plans for the project after the protest.71 Officials re-
portedly censored news of the protest on microblogs,72 pressured 
students to pledge not to join the ‘‘illegal protest,’’ warned residents 
not to gather or ‘‘spread rumors,’’ 73 and police reportedly beat a 
Japanese reporter.74 In August, police shot and killed a Tibetan 
named Nyima and detained six others during a protest involving 
approximately 1,000 people against a mining site in a township in 
Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region.75 Au-
thorities had suspended the project after residents voiced opposi-
tion, but reportedly now will move forward.76 
Environmental Transparency and Public Participation 
Authorities in various locations took steps to improve some as-
pects of environmental information disclosure, and Premier Wen 
Jiabao voiced support for greater transparency.77 A joint study by 
Chinese and international non-governmental organizations on open 
government information conducted in 113 cities during 2011 noted 
overall improvements in transparency, including advances in re-
leasing information about official enforcement actions. Some loca-
tions, however, have not made much progress and others have fall-
en further behind.78 The report emphasized the widening gap in in-
formation disclosure between more transparent eastern coastal re-
gions and western and central regions.79 
During the reporting year, central environmental authorities 
passed measures to gradually improve air quality information 
transparency. In February 2012, authorities added fine air particu-
lates (PM2.5),80 ozone, and carbon monoxide to the revised air qual-
ity index (AQI).81 The revised AQI will not go into effect until 2016, 
but select pilot cities will implement the index starting in 2012.82 
After an official announcement about impending future revisions to 
the AQI in September 2011, there was a swell of public pressure 
to disclose PM2.5 data.83 People utilized social media,84 submitted 
suggestions to officials regarding legal measures,85 and filed infor-
mation requests for PM2.5 data, which authorities denied in Novem-
ber and December for a variety of reasons.86 Several cities began 
to release PM2.5 data to the public in early and mid-2012.87 
Despite steps toward greater disclosure, news reports highlighted 
non-transparency related to environmental accidents and pollution 
monitoring data. A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
study indicated only 13 of 26 surveyed provincial-level environ-
mental departments released a list of the enterprises involved in 
‘‘serious or major’’ pollution incidents as required by law; 88 and the 
director of a center at CASS noted ‘‘. . . a lot of [pollution] inci-
dents have been concealed.’’ 89 In January 2012, for example, city- 
level officials in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region did not pub-
licly disclose information about a major cadmium spill for nine 
days.90 Authorities maintain control over environmental quality 
data monitoring and publication, and central officials are revising 
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a regulation 91 that, if passed in its current form, may strengthen 
this control. Environmental groups submitted suggestions regard-
ing the draft revisions, including one proposal urging authorities to 
emphasize citizens’ right to access information.92 
Since the passage of the Open Government Information Regula-
tion (OGI) in 2008,93 citizens have become more proactive in mak-
ing requests for environmental data, but barriers to obtaining in-
formation remain. In March 2012, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) issued its annual report on OGI work. According 
to the report, the MEP received 334 requests for information in 
2011, a 48 percent increase over the previous year.94 The MEP re-
ceived 111 administrative reconsideration requests.95 After the Au-
gust 2011 chromium slag dumping case in Yunnan province, a 
Yunnan environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) filed 
open government information requests regarding the source of 
credit for the company implicated in the case.96 The group, along 
with 23 other organizations, also filed requests with 16 banks.97 
Two government ministries and a state-owned bank denied infor-
mation requests from the Yunnan group.98 In the autumn of 2011, 
officials from two environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) denied 
requests by the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF), a 
quasi-governmental NGO affiliated with the MEP, about water pol-
lution from a milk plant in a city in Guizhou province. The ACEF 
filed a lawsuit challenging the denial and won.99 One report notes 
an expert’s opinion that many people cannot obtain the pollution 
emissions data they need to protect their rights.100 During 2011, 
local and provincial environmental authorities in Jiangsu province 
denied resident Xie Yong’s multiple requests for information re-
garding pollution emissions from a waste incineration power plant 
on the grounds that the information was a ‘‘commercial secret,’’ and 
the company involved must approve its disclosure.101 Xie plans to 
sue the provincial EPB for its refusal.102 Xie believes pollution 
from the power plant is associated with his son’s health prob-
lems.103 Reports indicate Xie lost a court case and an appeal 
against the power plant on the grounds that he could not provide 
conclusive data.104 
Climate Change: Rule of Law, Public Participation, Transparency, 
and Rights Infringements 
China’s efforts to address climate change depend on the develop-
ment of the rule of law, the incorporation of public participation in 
policy processes, and transparency. During this reporting year, the 
International Energy Agency said China made the world’s largest 
contribution to the global increase of carbon dioxide emissions.105 
Chinese authorities reported on past actions and outlined future 
plans to mitigate and adapt to climate change in a white paper on 
climate change.106 The State Council also reportedly issued a 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Work Plan (2011 to 2015) that 
mentioned gradual development of a carbon emissions trading mar-
ket and a total emissions control system.107 While citizens, environ-
mental groups, professional associations, and mass organizations 
may participate in activities to address climate change,108 they 
have little influence in setting national policies toward climate 
change.109 Some professional associations directly linked to govern-
119 
ment agencies or the Communist Party, however, purportedly play 
a role in formulating standards and promoting technology linked to 
energy conservation.110 Chinese leaders have pledged to improve 
greenhouse gas data reliability.111 Nevertheless, reports noted 
challenges in this regard, including reported gaps between national 
and provincial-level statistics on carbon dioxide emissions 112 and 
insufficient information provided about data sources used to assess 
energy efficiency gains.113 
Chinese authorities plan to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and 
increase reliance on renewable energy, including constructing nu-
clear power plants and hydroelectric dams.114 Some of the dam 
projects are reported to involve involuntary relocation practices and 
arbitrary detention. In February, authorities in Hanyuan county, 
Sichuan province, detained rights advocate Cao Xianglan, saying 
they would hold her for one month in administrative detention for 
petitioning against the demolition of her home, which officials said 
was necessary to make way for the Pubugou Dam.115 In August 
2011, 39 citizen representatives from Hongjiang city, Hunan prov-
ince, reportedly traveled to Beijing to file complaints about being 
relocated to make way for the Tongwan and other dams.116 Local 
authorities purportedly sentenced or administratively detained the 
representatives upon their return.117 
Grassland herder relocation programs, which authorities report-
edly conducted to address grassland degradation and to modernize 
the animal husbandry industry, have in some cases been non-vol-
untary.118 As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, herder relocation programs in China, sometimes labeled ‘‘en-
vironmental migrations,’’ have involved situations in which herders 
have no choice but to sell their herds, and in some respects have 
not adhered to international standards of grasslands science.119 
Herder relocation programs reportedly also have diminished citi-
zens’ economic independence, resulting in the loss of land and tra-
ditional livelihoods.120 
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III. Development of the Rule of Law 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Government and Party Control 
Chinese civil society organizations continue to grow in number 
and engage in valuable educational work, social welfare service 
provision, and issue advocacy. A restrictive regulatory environ-
ment, however, limits the development of an independent civil soci-
ety. Official policy is to control the development of civil society by 
expanding and bringing under government control groups that pro-
mote Chinese government and Communist Party objectives, while 
marginalizing groups that seek to operate more independently.1 
Chinese law does not provide for a positive right to establish a civil 
society organization, and authorities have considerable discretion 
in determining which groups attain legal recognition.2 This broad 
discretion contravenes Article 22 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which provides that: ‘‘No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of [the freedom of association] other 
than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or pub-
lic safety . . . .’’ 3 
Chinese law recognizes three main types of civil society organiza-
tions—social organizations (SOs), non-governmental and non-com-
mercial enterprises (NGNCEs), and foundations—and requires 
those wishing to establish one of these groups to register with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs or its provincial or local counterpart.4 An 
important prerequisite to registering is securing the backing of a 
sponsor organization.5 Sponsor organizations are government and 
Party departments, or mass organizations (the All-China Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, for example) approved by the government or 
Party.6 Sponsor organizations must agree to assume the burden of 
actively supervising the civil society organizations they sponsor.7 
According to the authors of a comprehensive paper on Chinese non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs), the sponsor organization’s role 
in the establishment and day-to-day running of Chinese civil soci-
ety organizations ‘‘effectively prevents any political activity or other 
activities by [non-profit organizations] which in the view of the Chi-
nese government pose a challenge to its own power or the unity of 
the country.’’ 8 
The government imposes additional restrictions on groups wish-
ing to register. Both the SO and NGNCE regulations prevent the 
establishment of two organizations with similar mandates in the 
same administrative region.9 The SO regulation requires a min-
imum of 50 members and 30,000 yuan (US$4,735) in funds.10 Orga-
nizations that try to carry out activities independently without reg-
istration are considered illegal.11 This past year, the government 
continued to crack down on unregistered groups, including cam-
paigns in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan prov-
ince,12 and Hebei province.13 
Once registered, groups remain subject to numerous restrictions. 
They must undergo an annual inspection,14 which groups that of-
fend authorities reportedly face difficulties passing.15 In recent 
years, authorities have tightened restrictions on foreign funding, 
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which had been a main source of support for some groups.16 A 2009 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange circular requires, among 
other things, that the non-governmental organization (NGO) 
present authorities with a notarized donation agreement stating 
the purpose of the donation, and that the foreign donation goes into 
a special foreign exchange bank account.17 Authorities remain sus-
picious of foreign-funded groups.18 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese officials, 
scholars, state-controlled media, and NGO leaders continued to 
criticize the regulatory environment for NGOs as unnecessarily re-
strictive. A May 2012 China Newsweek article featured proponents 
of reform, including a Tsinghua University professor who singled 
out the sponsorship requirement as the main reason why, accord-
ing to his estimates, 3 to 4 million groups operate without registra-
tion in China (compared to about 460,000 groups that are reg-
istered).19 In the same article, top officials at the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs’ Civil Organization Management Bureau expressed concern 
with the government’s heavy influence over most registered groups 
and the slow pace of growth (2 to 3 percent) of registered groups 
in recent years.20 These officials noted that the system, originally 
designed to ensure that social organizations were ‘‘politically reli-
able,’’ was now ‘‘completely blocking [groups] that should not be 
blocked.’’ 21 In March 2012, the Beijing News profiled the experi-
ence of a group helping disabled persons, Beijing Huiling, which 
had been unable to secure registration for 12 years.22 The report 
highlighted numerous difficulties Beijing Huiling faced, from the 
inability to find a sponsor organization to officials deeming the 
group unnecessary because another organization was already meet-
ing the ‘‘needs of all the disabled’’ in that jurisdiction.23 A member 
of an HIV/AIDS advocacy group, commenting on the crackdown on 
unregistered groups in Hebei province, told Radio Free Asia in 
March that most of the country’s 118 HIV/AIDS organizations were 
unregistered because they could not find a sponsor organization or 
were too small to meet legal requirements.24 
Some civil society organizations choose to register as businesses 
and they, along with unregistered groups, struggle to survive with-
out the advantages afforded to registered civil society organiza-
tions. Unregistered groups and those registered as businesses do 
not enjoy certain tax benefits, are ineligible for government 
projects, and cannot solicit public donations.25 The head of Beijing 
Huiling, which is registered as a business, noted in March 2012 
that the organization was in debt last year and was having dif-
ficulty paying employee salaries. ‘‘Without a legal identity as a 
charity organization, we cannot enjoy tax exemption, and it’s dif-
ficult for us to raise funds from enterprises or the public as we can-
not even provide a formal receipt to our donors,’’ she said.26 In 
April 2012, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued draft regulations in-
tended to improve transparency of foundations 27 but which would 
also bar them from giving funds to for-profit businesses, further 
marginalizing civil society organizations registered as businesses.28 
Chinese foundation leaders criticized this aspect of the draft during 
the public comment period.29 In the officially promulgated regula-
tions released on July 29, 2012, as ‘‘Certain Regulations Con-
cerning Standards of Foundation Behavior,’’ the provision that had 
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barred the funding of for-profit organizations in the draft version 
was revised to ‘‘foundations should not financially support profit- 
seeking activities.’’ 30 
Harassment of NGOs engaged in advocacy on issues the Chinese 
government and Communist Party deem politically sensitive con-
tinued this past year. The government reportedly remains wary of 
advocacy, religious, and policy-oriented groups.31 A crackdown on 
NGOs advocating for workers in the manufacturing center of 
Guangdong province was reported to have started in early 2012 
and has continued throughout the summer. According to media re-
ports, several worker services NGOs encountered surveillance, tax 
audits, inspections from multiple government agencies, and harass-
ment from landlords who evicted them or cut off their water and 
electricity, leading many of the NGOs to close.32 Ten Shenzhen- 
based worker services NGOs reportedly have been targeted.33 In 
the case of the Times Female Workers Service Center, officials re-
portedly ordered it to relocate or stop operations because of its un-
registered status.34 
Regulatory and Legislative Developments 
In recent years, officials have considered limited measures to 
make it simpler for groups to register, including removing the 
sponsor organization requirement and allowing groups to directly 
register with the government. At the national level, such proposals 
reportedly have stalled. In March 2012, Premier Wen Jiabao told 
a national meeting of civil affairs officials to ‘‘speed up reform of 
the registration and management system for social organizations,’’ 
including allowing certain organizations to register directly with 
the government without needing a sponsor organization.35 Civil af-
fairs officials cited in a May 2012 China Newsweek article noted, 
however, that little progress had been made with proposed amend-
ments to the three main national regulations governing social orga-
nizations, non-governmental and non-commercial enterprises, and 
foundations. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) submitted the 
amendments to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office 
(SCLAO) in March 2011.36 According to officials from the MCA So-
cial Organizations Management Department, the SCLAO has not 
yet submitted the draft for review during a State Council executive 
meeting.37 An SCLAO official told China Newsweek that, barring 
special circumstances, he did not expect the ‘‘three regulations’’ to 
appear (on the agenda) in 2012.38 
Limited reforms continue at the provincial and local level but do 
not fundamentally alter the government’s role in approving and 
overseeing all groups. The MCA has entered into cooperative agree-
ments with select localities in recent years, and reportedly will as-
sess local-level experiments for possible national expansion.39 In re-
cent years, the governments of Beijing municipality,40 Shanghai 
municipality,41 and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 42 have 
passed measures aimed at streamlining the registration process, 
including allowing certain categories of groups to register directly 
with civil affairs departments without a sponsor organization. This 
trend continued in the past year. In February, Yunnan province 
announced plans to allow ‘‘philanthropic, social welfare, and social 
service’’ groups to apply directly with civil affairs departments later 
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in 2012 and to ‘‘launch a provincial-level pilot project’’ on shifting 
sponsor organizations to a more advisory role.43 
A social management regulation 44 took effect in March 2012 in 
Shenzhen that reportedly expands the types of organizations that 
can register directly with the civil affairs bureau to include ‘‘cul-
ture, ecology, social service and sports organizations,’’ 45 in addition 
to the ‘‘econom[ic], social welfare, and public welfare’’ groups that 
have been permitted to register directly since 2008.46 A direct reg-
istration program took effect in Guangdong province in July 
2012,47 reportedly leading to an initial marked increase in registra-
tion applications. Moreover, the Guangdong Province Department 
of Finance released in early August a catalogue for government 
procurement of services from social organizations.48 Yet, according 
to a Guangdong NGO worker, the crackdown on worker services 
NGOs ‘‘has raised a lot of questions about whether this is a real 
opening or just a new series of social management policies.’’ 49 A 
prominent activist has warned that government contract work may 
co-opt civil society organizations (CSOs) in that these organizations 
would be less likely to criticize the government (from which they 
aim to win contracts), thus diminishing their ‘‘vitality,’’ ‘‘function,’’ 
and ‘‘mission.’’ 50 CSO leaders in Guangdong and a Tsinghua Uni-
versity scholar also have expressed concern that the government is 
not planning for longer term sustainability, transparency, or the 
fair distribution of resources among social organizations with re-
spect to registration and procurement policies.51 
While removing entry barriers to some groups’ registration, offi-
cials continued to tighten controls over registered groups’ activities. 
In June 2012, an MCA working group issued the Measures for the 
Administration of Seminar and Forum Activities by Social Organi-
zations, which places certain restrictions on civil society organiza-
tions’ hosting of seminars and forums.52 For example, Article 4 of 
the measures requires CSOs to notify their sponsor organizations 
of the purpose, content, and scope of the activity, as well as names 
of participants, time and location of the activity, and its source of 
funding.53 
This past year, authorities also made symbolic gestures to signal 
a more accommodating stance toward human rights, political, and 
religious groups. These gestures were limited, however, and in-
tended not to guarantee the independence of organizations but 
rather to co-opt their usefulness in pursuing overarching state 
aims. In May 2012, Minister of Civil Affairs Li Liguo reportedly 
said that human rights and political organizations would be treated 
equally in the registration and review process.54 He noted, how-
ever, the government’s considerable discretion to approve such 
groups based on vague criteria such as an organization’s ‘‘founding 
conditions, necessity of establishment, activity objective and their 
roles in social and economic development.’’ 55 In February 2012, the 
State Administration for Religious Affairs, MCA, and four other 
government departments issued an opinion to ‘‘encourage and 
standardize’’ religious communities’ participation in public service 
activities.56 The opinion, which notes that ‘‘some localities and de-
partments did not adequately recognize the positive significance of 
religious communities participating in charitable activities,’’ 57 calls 
for, among other things, ‘‘equal treatment’’ of religious groups in es-
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tablishing charitable organizations.58 The opinion emphasizes, 
however, consistency with the Party’s basic policy on religion and 
the potential that religious communities can play in ‘‘promoting 
economic development and social harmony,’’ rather than guaran-
teeing the independence of such groups from government interven-
tion.59 The government’s emphasis on controlling the development 
of civil society to serve state aims was also reflected in the govern-
ment’s 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan, which calls 
for ‘‘encouraging orderly participation by social organizations in so-
cial construction.’’ 60 
Revisions to the PRC Civil Procedure Law that authorities 
passed in August 2012 anticipate a role for environmental protec-
tion and consumer rights groups, among other organizations, in 
public interest litigation.61 Early drafts of an article in the amend-
ment to the law led groups to submit suggestions advocating for re-
vision of language that potentially would limit the kinds of organi-
zations able to act as parties in public interest litigation.62 Fol-
lowing passage of the revised law,63 the Deputy Director of the Na-
tional People’s Congress Legislative Affairs Commission, Wang 
Shengming, stated that the terminology chosen for the final version 
of the article in question substituted ‘‘relevant organizations’’ 
(youguan zuzhi) for ‘‘relevant social groups’’ (youguan shehui 
tuanti) because this would ‘‘expand the scope of those organizations 
eligible to be plaintiffs in public interest litigation.’’ 64 The amend-
ment, however, does not make clear which organizations, including 
non-governmental ones, will be able to file.65 [See Section II—The 
Environment for more information on developments in environ-
mental public interest litigation.] 
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INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Context for Institutions of Democratic Governance: Party Control 
REACH OF THE STATE UNDER ONE-PARTY RULE 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the Chinese Com-
munist Party continued to dominate China’s authoritarian political 
system, and Party authorities stepped up efforts to expand Party 
organizations into and exert influence over every sector of society. 
An August 2012 article noted the Party had more than 82 million 
members and 4 million Party organizations.1 Party organizations 
penetrate every level of society, including villages and urban neigh-
borhoods,2 public service organizations (including hospitals, 
schools, and research institutes),3 government departments, and 
quasi-governmental organizations.4 Chinese leaders continued to 
impose Party leadership over the Internet and through the media 
by limiting the media’s role and by exerting control over content,5 
as well as through the promotion of ‘‘socialist culture with Chinese 
characteristics.’’ 6 In addition, to strengthen the Party’s reach, 
Party officials this year focused Party-building and Party-loyalty 
campaigns on grassroots organizations,7 the legal profession,8 uni-
versities,9 non-state-owned businesses,10 social organizations,11 and 
the military.12 China’s political institutions continue to be out of 
compliance with the standards defined in Article 25 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,13 which China has 
signed and declared an intention to ratify.14 Nor have Chinese offi-
cials complied with the standards outlined in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights.15 The Communist Party continues to 
dominate government and allows only limited independent political 
participation.16 
STRENGTHENING POLITICAL CONTROL BY EXTENDING REACH INTO 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS: PRIORITY TASKS OF ‘‘SOCIAL MANAGEMENT’’ AND 
‘‘SOCIAL STABILITY’’ 
The Party strengthens its legitimacy and control in the political 
realm by intensifying and extending its reach into citizens’ social 
lives through institutions at all levels in the name of ‘‘social man-
agement’’ and maintaining ‘‘social stability.’’ President and Party 
General Secretary Hu Jintao has said that ‘‘social stability’’ is ‘‘an 
important prerequisite for reform and development.’’ 17 In Sep-
tember 2011, the top Party-government body 18 that leads work in 
‘‘maintaining social order,’’ first established in 1991,19 expanded 
from 29 Party organizations and government agencies to 40 agen-
cies, and it changed its name to the Central Committee for Com-
prehensive Administration of Social Management.20 Provincial 
committees have begun to follow suit.21 With the thematic shift 
from ‘‘social order’’ to ‘‘social management,’’ the central-level com-
mittee’s scope of operations reportedly has expanded.22 
Zhou Yongkang, Secretary of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee Political and Legal Affairs Commission and member of the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party Central Committee, has stated that ‘‘social management’’ is 
the ‘‘foremost duty and task’’ of Party and government organiza-
tions.23 ‘‘Social management’’ is a broad term that authorities first 
126 
articulated in 1998 24 and have emphasized in the Party’s agenda 
at least since 2007.25 One scholar explained that ‘‘social manage-
ment’’ is a basic function of government,26 and that it connotes the 
government ‘‘manages and regulates social affairs, social organiza-
tions, and social life.’’ 27 He noted that, in addition to public secu-
rity and ‘‘social stability,’’ ‘‘social management’’ encompasses other 
issues including interest coordination, food safety, and emergency 
management.28 He also explained that the ‘‘ultimate purpose of so-
cial governance reform lies in mitigating the threat of social con-
flicts and safeguarding social order and stability.’’ 29 
Party and government leaders plan to establish ‘‘social manage-
ment structures’’ ‘‘under the leadership of the Party, with respon-
sibilities delegated to the government, with coordination by society, 
and with participation from the public.’’ 30 Some provinces, munici-
palities, and cities have already established ‘‘social management 
work departments’’ or ‘‘social affairs committees.’’ 31 ‘‘Coordination 
by society’’ 32 and ‘‘participation from the public’’ mean that au-
thorities will involve mass organizations,33 residence committees,34 
workplace personnel,35 students,36 and ordinary citizens,37 among 
others, in ‘‘social management’’ work, including monitoring of citi-
zens.38 
During the reporting year, senior Party and government leaders 
emphasized strengthening ‘‘innovations in social management’’ at 
the grassroots level.39 As part of these efforts, central and local 
Party and government leaders initiated campaigns to send tens of 
thousands of Party and government cadres in work teams down to 
rural grassroots areas and into households.40 These campaign ac-
tivities allow officials to monitor and gauge if citizens are a threat 
to ‘‘stability,’’ while simultaneously managing social welfare 
issues.41 In the Tibet Autonomous Region 42 and the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region,43 this year’s campaigns were invasive, 
long term, and tasked with preventing ‘‘incidents.’’ [For more infor-
mation, see Sections IV—Xinjiang and V—Tibet.] 
Under the banner of ‘‘social management’’ and ‘‘social stability,’’ 
authorities expanded the scope of efforts to ‘‘manage’’ ‘‘critical’’ per-
sonnel, including rights defenders, petitioners, former prisoners, 
and labor activists.44 One international rights group reportedly es-
timated that Chinese officials might be targeting 1 in every 1,000 
citizens for control measures, which would equate to ‘‘managing’’ 
1.3 million people nationwide.45 These efforts have been financially 
lucrative for some.46 In addition, some ‘‘management’’ efforts have 
become increasingly repressive, as illustrated in the cases of Chen 
Guangcheng, Yao Lifa, and other democracy and rights advo-
cates.47 
Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates 
Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and impose sentences on 
democracy advocates who exercise their rights to freedoms of as-
sembly, speech, movement, and association. During the reporting 
year, authorities imposed particularly harsh sentences. In Decem-
ber 2011, authorities sentenced democracy advocate Chen Wei to 
nine years in prison for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ in con-
nection with political essays he wrote that were posted on overseas 
Web sites.48 Also in December, authorities in Guiyang city, 
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Guizhou province, sentenced democracy advocate and rights de-
fender Chen Xi to 10 years in prison for ‘‘inciting subversion’’ for 
36 essays he posted online.49 Chen was also involved in the 
‘‘Guizhou Human Rights Forum’’ network and had tried to run for 
a local people’s congress seat.50 In January 2012, authorities sen-
tenced Li Tie to 10 years’ imprisonment for ‘‘subversion of state 
power.’’ 51 Li has written about democracy, constitutional govern-
ment, and direct elections at the local level and organized activities 
to honor Lin Zhao, a well-known activist.52 In February, authori-
ties sentenced Zhu Yufu to seven years in prison for ‘‘inciting sub-
version of state power’’ for his alleged association with the China 
Democracy Party and for his writings, including a poem that alleg-
edly ‘‘incited’’ people to ‘‘subvert state power’’ during the time of on-
line calls for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protest rallies.53 In addition, March reports 
indicate that court officials sentenced democracy advocate Xue 
Mingkai to four years in prison for ‘‘subversion of state power.’’ 54 
Other democracy advocates remained in prison or reeducation 
through labor (RTL) facilities including: Liu Xiaobo (11 years), Liu 
Xianbin (10 years),55 Guo Quan (10 years),56 Zhou Yongjun (9 
years),57 Xie Changfa (13 years),58 and Huang Chengcheng (2 
years).59 Authorities ordered Huang to serve two years of RTL for 
‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ for posting messages on the 
Internet in February and March 2011.60 In addition, authorities in 
Qianjiang city, Hubei province, continued to restrict elections ex-
pert Yao Lifa’s freedoms.61 Local officials and school staff from 
Yao’s place of employment continued to escort him to work and 
back daily and even follow him to the bathroom.62 He reported that 
officials have also not let him teach or interact with other people.63 
Elections and High-Level Debate Regarding Reform 
Some leaders continued to voice support for vaguely defined po-
litical and government reforms, but proposed reforms would only 
take place within the framework of the one-party system.64 In 
March 2012, at the annual meetings of the National People’s Con-
gress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(Two Sessions), Premier Wen Jiabao said, ‘‘We must press ahead 
with both economic structural reform and political structural re-
form in particular reform in the leadership system of our Party and 
country,’’ according to Al Jazeera.65 Wen, however, did not provide 
details regarding reforms and emphasized that China must ‘‘de-
velop our socialist democracy in a step-by-step manner.’’ 66 A 
Caijing report noted Wen said ‘‘[we] need to change the Party sub-
stituting for the government’’ and the ‘‘overconcentration of govern-
ment power.’’ 67 Along these lines, the Beijing municipal govern-
ment issued an opinion noting a plan to reorganize governmental 
authority over the next five years with the two main goals of pre-
venting corruption and decentralizing the concentration of power 
within and among government organizations.68 Echoing Wen’s 
statements, the 2012–2015 National Human Rights Action Plan, 
issued in June 2012, outlined the government’s plans to ‘‘strength-
en restraints on and supervision over the exercise of power, and 
earnestly guarantee citizens’ right of democratic supervision.’’ 69 
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LOCAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS ELECTIONS AND HARASSMENT OF 
‘‘INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES’’ 
During the reporting year, authorities held local people’s con-
gress elections, which began in May 2011 and will be completed 
prior to the end of 2012.70 At the lowest administrative levels, in-
cluding the county and township levels, citizens, in theory, directly 
vote for people’s congress delegates.71 Above this level, people’s con-
gresses elect delegates for congresses at the next highest level.72 
Ten or more citizens may nominate ‘‘independent candidates,’’ oth-
erwise known as ‘‘voter-nominated’’ candidates.73 Reports surfaced, 
however, noting authorities in some locations did not accept the 
nomination of some of these ‘‘voter-nominated’’ candidates.74 In this 
election period, as in past cycles, large numbers of ‘‘independent 
candidates’’ were winnowed out, leaving few to compete in elec-
tions.75 Higher level Party officials exerted influence over elections 
by sending Party investigative groups to lower levels during elec-
tions not only to prevent corruption, but also to complete ‘‘control 
and supervision tasks,’’ 76 including: 
• ‘‘Preventing internal or external hostile forces from having a 
hand in ruining elections, organized crime or evil forces from 
manipulating elections, clans and religious forces from inter-
fering in elections’’; 
• ‘‘Investigating candidates’ qualifications’’ to ‘‘prevent ‘prob-
lem individuals’ from becoming nominees or representa-
tives.’’ 77 
In some locations, authorities ‘‘optimized’’ people’s congresses to 
make sure certain populations, such as workers and farmers, had 
a number of representatives that they deemed appropriate.78 
Prior to and during elections in some locations, local officials re-
portedly arrested,79 detained, and monitored potential ‘‘inde-
pendent candidates,’’ 80 as well as pressured their families, employ-
ers, and nominators.81 Officials also obstructed nomination proc-
esses and campaign or voter education activities.82 Reports indicate 
officials employed censorship tactics to minimize information about 
‘‘independent candidates’’ and elections.83 In addition, in some 
cases, officials detained newly elected deputies,84 ‘‘guided’’ voters at 
the polls,85 hindered secret ballots,86 prevented voters from going 
to the polls,87 removed ballot boxes, or did not count votes in pub-
lic.88 
VILLAGE AUTONOMY AND VILLAGE COMMITTEE ELECTIONS 
Village elections for ‘‘village committees’’ 89 have spread through-
out China; their implementation, however, remains problematic. 
During the reporting period, ongoing problems with village elec-
tions included instances of vote buying, interference from township 
and town officials, stuffing ballot boxes, cancelled elections, and 
higher level officials removing recently elected officials.90 Authori-
ties in some areas reportedly ‘‘optimized’’ the mix of personnel on 
villager committees.91 Some township cadres apparently have cited 
rampant vote buying as a reason to call for dismantling village 
committee elections and allowing township officials to appoint vil-
lage leaders.92 
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During the reporting period, authorities continued to take steps 
to improve ‘‘grassroots autonomy,’’ including village elections, as 
well as promote ‘‘stability’’ and economic development. Authorities 
continued seeking to improve the caliber of village officials. The 
Party Central Organization Department sent over 26,000 univer-
sity students to serve as village committee and village Party com-
mittee officials in a three-year program.93 The trend toward elect-
ing officials with higher education and experience levels contin-
ued.94 There reportedly continues to be an increase in the number 
of women cadres assuming leadership roles.95 To ‘‘maintain sta-
bility’’ and improve transparency of village finances, authorities re-
portedly are also continuing to set up ‘‘supervisory committees’’ or 
similar organizations in villages as stipulated in the revised 2010 
PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees.96 Nationally, 
514,000 villages have established village affairs supervisory mecha-
nisms.97 In some areas, officials claimed that ‘‘supervisory commit-
tees’’ reduced the frequency of complaints villagers lodged at higher 
levels against local officials.98 
The village elections in Wukan village, Lufeng city, Shanwei mu-
nicipality, Guangdong province,99 widely touted as innovative, are 
unlikely to be replicated. The Party Secretary of Guangdong, Wang 
Yang, said the elections were not ‘‘innovations’’ and noted ‘‘[w]hat 
made the Wukan election special was that the Organic Law and 
election rules were fully observed and implemented in detail this 
time, unlike previous pro forma elections.’’ 100 What made the elec-
tions in Wukan unique was that relevant laws 101 did not provide 
for some of the procedures the villagers initiated. For example, au-
thorities allowed Wukan citizens to vote for the election committee 
that oversaw village elections, through modified procedures not 
provided for by law.102 
Party and Government Accountability and Transparency 
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
Central authorities seemed to encourage the strengthening of 
open government information (OGI) institutions 103 and policies at 
the national,104 local, and grassroots levels.105 During 2011, cen-
tral-level government departments issued 81 OGI-related provi-
sions,106 and provincial-level authorities issued 98.107 The Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC) drafted a new measure, opening it for public 
comment in early November 2011,108 which clarifies six conditions 
under which officials should not disclose information, including if 
disclosure would be harmful to national security or ‘‘social sta-
bility.’’ 109 In April 2012, Premier Wen Jiabao called on provincial 
governments to disclose expenditures fully on overseas trips, food 
and entertainment, and vehicles (sangong); he also promoted disclo-
sure of government department budgets within two years.110 In 
May 2012, the State Council issued a circular that emphasized pro-
motion of transparency in eight areas, including food safety, envi-
ronmental protection, government finances, and safe production.111 
Proactive official disclosure of information remained sporadic, de-
spite stated support for transparency from high-level leaders. The 
National People’s Congress’ compliance with the commitment to 
post drafts of all trade and economic rules and regulations for pub-
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lic comment for 30 days deteriorated during the period between 
mid-March 2011 and mid-March 2012; it only released three of 
nine laws passed for public comment during the drafting or revi-
sion process.112 The State Council has complied inconsistently dur-
ing the same period, but compliance has improved since 2008.113 In 
February, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) report-
edly issued the results of a study examining the implementation of 
OGI Regulations,114 which noted some improvement in the 
proactive disclosure of information by government departments.115 
Results also indicated that only 25 out of 59 central departments 
and commissions posted draft regulatory documents online and pro-
vided channels for feedback.116 According to an academic report, 
provincial governments were more willing to disclose information 
than central departments.117 A different academic report noted 
that only 7 out of 81 city governments surveyed met set require-
ments for fiscal transparency.118 The first academic report on judi-
cial transparency found that some provincial- and city-level court 
Web sites lagged ‘‘far behind’’ government department Web sites in 
information disclosure.119 
Citizens continued to be proactive in making open government 
information requests,120 but challenges to accessing information 
and bringing OGI cases to court remained. The CASS transparency 
study reportedly asserted that authorities sometimes refused to 
disclose information for several reasons, including: 
• The information is in ‘‘internal documents’’; 121 
• The ‘‘information requested is not within the scope of the or-
ganization’’; 122 
• The information could be found online (even though it could 
not be found); 123 
• The information ‘‘involved company secrets.’’ 124 
In addition, authorities apparently more often demanded citizens 
provide information about how they would utilize the information 
requested, and denied requests on that basis.125 In some cases 
where government officials declined information requests, citizens 
have taken their cases to court.126 While some citizens have won 
cases, courts reportedly were unwilling to hear or ‘‘refused to han-
dle’’ half of the open government information cases submitted.127 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Central and provincial authorities encouraged policies intended 
to enhance government accountability at the local 128 and grass-
roots 129 levels. In December 2011, the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee announced that they suggested the revision of 
the PRC Administrative Procedure Law be included in the 2012 
legislative plan.130 Many scholars reportedly believe the scope of al-
lowable lawsuits citizens may file against government departments 
is too narrow.131 In February, central authorities announced a deci-
sion to tighten top-down supervision over officials in rural areas 
and investigate social issues that might lead to mass incidents.132 
Despite efforts to improve supervision measures, accountability 
remains elusive. One Chinese scholar reportedly asserted that 50 
to 60 percent of Chinese villages encounter problems with non-ac-
countable officials.133 A Xinhua article noted the prevalence of ‘‘se-
lective governance’’ at the grassroots level in some areas.134 A 
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Human Rights Watch report detailed 150 cases of rights abuses be-
tween July 2010 and March 2012 linked to chengguan, officials who 
enforce urban administrative regulations.135 The abuses include 
disappearances, mistreatment in detention, lack of due process, ar-
bitrary fines for confiscated items, and forced evictions from 
homes.136 Many chengguan engaged in abuses with impunity.137 A 
February People’s Daily editorial quoted in a Xinhua article criti-
cized local leaders for unethical or illegal behaviors: ‘‘[I]n some re-
gions or public organizations, leaders are engaged in lying, empty 
talk, fabricating statistics, or trumping up political achieve-
ments.’’ 138 During the reporting period, the press covered calls to 
reform the official ‘‘responsibility system’’ 139 (wenze zhidu) and 
public dissatisfaction regarding officials resuming public office after 
having been dismissed from former posts.140 One article asserted 
the cadre responsibility system faced a ‘‘crisis of trust’’ because the 
phenomenon of dismissed officials resuming office is so perva-
sive.141 The Chinese media examined numerous specific related 
cases.142 
Wang Lijun, Bo Xilai, and Gu Kailai 
The cases of former Chongqing vice mayor and public security 
chief Wang Lijun, and ousted Party leader Bo Xilai and his wife 
Gu Kailai (also referred to in the Chinese press as Bogu Kailai)— 
who was sentenced for the homicide of British citizen Neil Hey-
wood—raise issues of official lack of accountability, abuse of power, 
and non-transparency. On September 24, 2012, the Chengdu Inter-
mediate People’s Court in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, 
sentenced Wang Lijun to 15 years in prison with deprivation of po-
litical rights for one year for ‘‘bending the law for selfish ends,’’ ‘‘de-
fection,’’ ‘‘abuse of power,’’ and ‘‘accepting bribes.’’ 143 Authorities 
charged Wang in part for allegedly neglecting his duty and bending 
the law to shield Gu Kailai from criminal investigation, for leaving 
his post on his own accord and defecting to the U.S. consulate in 
Chengdu, and for utilizing ‘‘technical reconnaissance measures’’ 
without approval.144 Chinese media reported on Gu’s case and her 
court sentence of death with a two-year reprieve for intentional 
homicide, which a judge handed down on August 20, 2012.145 Inter-
national media, however, noted issues with Internet censorship 146 
and procedural fairness,147 and called the proceedings a ‘‘show 
trial’’ 148 or mentioned questions about the politics behind the 
case.149 On March 14, central Party authorities removed Bo Xilai 
from his posts as Chongqing Party Committee member, secretary, 
and standing committee member.150 In early April, central authori-
ties suspended Bo Xilai from the Party Central Committee and Po-
litburo.151 In late September 2012, Politburo authorities expelled 
Bo Xilai from the Party and dismissed him from his public posts 
in the Party Central Committee and Politburo, indicating his case 
would be transferred to judicial authorities for a number of sus-
pected legal violations including abuse of power, improper affairs 
with women, and bribery.152 After Bo’s removal from office and his 
wife’s detention, central authorities used the occasion to showcase 
‘‘socialist rule of law,’’ 153 asserted that the public supported the de-
cisions,154 and utilized the media to call for stability and unity.155 
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OFFICIAL CORRUPTION 
Official corruption reportedly remains high, despite anti- 
corruption measures. Corruption in state-owned enterprises and 
public institutions increased.156 High levels of corruption continued 
to concern Chinese leaders, and Premier Wen Jiabao said, 
‘‘[C]orruption is the most crucial threat to the ruling party.’’ 157 
Wen asserted that, when authority is overly concentrated in var-
ious departments that are impervious to supervision, corruption oc-
curs easily and often.158 Central-level authorities continued to 
build institutions and issued plans to address growing corruption 
problems. The drive to establish anticorruption bureaus at the pro-
vincial, autonomous prefecture, and municipal levels continued.159 
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate began a two-year anticorruption 
campaign in rural areas.160 Party and government authorities 
jointly issued a regulation seeking to control nepotism and corrup-
tion among civil servants.161 
Protections for whistleblowers remained insufficient, and au-
thorities continued to have little tolerance for non-governmental 
anticorruption efforts. Authorities in Shenzhen city, Guangdong 
province, continued to harass anticorruption advocate Guo 
Yongfeng.162 In June 2012, Hengshui city, Hebei province authori-
ties ordered Liu Ruisheng to serve one year and three months of 
reeducation through labor for petitioning against alleged corruption 
among local officials.163 In April, People’s Armed Police reportedly 
injured approximately 100 Tibetans during a protest against alleg-
edly corrupt officials, and police may have detained some of the 
protesters.164 Nearly 1,000 residents in Ya’an city, Sichuan prov-
ince, protested alleged corruption associated with reconstruction ef-
forts after the Wenquan earthquake, and a news report noted some 
beatings.165 In July, authorities in Xi’an municipality, Shaanxi 
province, suspended journalist Shi Junrong reportedly for writing 
an article about local officials smoking luxury cigarettes.166 
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COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW 
December 11, 2011, marked the 10th anniversary of China’s ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 When it joined 
the WTO, China made numerous promises to reduce trade barriers, 
open its markets, increase transparency, protect intellectual prop-
erty rights, and reform its legal system to make it consistent with 
WTO requirements.2 Proponents of China’s accession were opti-
mistic—one U.S. official commented shortly after China’s accession, 
‘‘The WTO requirements for legal consistency and fairness will help 
further develop the rule of law in China, which will benefit our 
companies as well as the growing private sector in China.’’ 3 How-
ever, China’s WTO accession has not brought about the anticipated 
changes. Indeed, China has developed what some, including the 
U.S. ambassador to the WTO, have called ‘‘state capitalism,’’ with 
the state guiding investment and industrial development, and fa-
voring its state-owned enterprises (SOEs).4 
Continued Role for the State-Owned Sector 
The state-owned sector continues to play a key role under Chi-
na’s ‘‘state capitalism.’’ 5 While the size of the state-owned sector 
has declined since China began to liberalize its economy in 1978, 
according to Chinese government statistics, SOEs control key sec-
tors.6 Chinese policy mandates seven ‘‘strategic’’ industries—civil 
aviation, coal, defense, electric power and grid, oil and petrochemi-
cals, shipping, and telecommunications—where ‘‘state capital must 
play a leading role in every enterprise’’; and requires that compa-
nies in certain ‘‘pillar’’ industries, including, for example, auto-
motive, chemicals, construction, equipment manufacturing, infor-
mation technology, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals, must be 
state-controlled.7 
The benefits and preferential status that the Chinese govern-
ment provides to SOEs raise potential trade issues. SOEs enjoy a 
number of benefits, including direct subsidies, guaranteed market 
share, ability to raise funds in Chinese capital markets, pref-
erential borrowing, and relatively cheap land.8 According to the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), ‘‘In 2011, the preva-
lence of interventionist policies and practices, coupled with the 
large role of state-owned enterprises in China’s economy, continued 
to generate significant concerns among U.S. stakeholders.’’ 9 The 
Chinese government has made some minor commitments to level 
the playing field, such as giving foreign companies fair treatment 
in the ‘‘strategic, newly-emerging industries,’’ providing foreign-in-
vested enterprises the same subsidies and other preferences it 
gives to domestic Chinese manufacturers of new energy vehicles, 
and promoting Chinese enterprises’ use of licensed software.10 In 
addition to these indirect commitments, China committed when it 
joined the WTO that SOEs would make purchase and sale decisions 
strictly on a commercial basis, and that the Chinese government 
would not influence commercial decisions.11 According to USTR, 
however, the Chinese government ‘‘was intent on heavily inter-
vening in the commercial decisions of state-owned enterprises. 
. . .’’ 12 
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During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, two events high-
lighted an ongoing debate in China concerning the role of China’s 
state-owned sector: The publication of ‘‘China 2030: Building a 
Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society,’’ a report 
by the World Bank in collaboration with the Development Research 
Center of the State Council advocating a loosening of state con-
trol,13 and the downfall of Politburo member and Chongqing Com-
munist Party Secretary Bo Xilai, who advocated a greater role for 
the state in industry.14 The resolution of this debate may impact 
China’s WTO obligations.15 The China 2030 report proposes a ‘‘new 
development strategy.’’ 16 This strategy calls for reforming SOEs 
and allowing greater competition in all sectors of the economy, in-
cluding the strategic and pillar industries, and recommends ‘‘break-
ing up state monopolies or oligopolies in key industries. . . .’’ 17 
The release of the report triggered discussions within the Chinese 
Communist Party on the role of SOEs. In March, articles in Party 
journals Red Flag and Seeking Truth argued for maintaining 
SOEs, because they are the foundation of the Party and the Chi-
nese economic system, and because the privatization of SOEs 
would leave the national economy vulnerable to foreign interests.18 
In April, the head of state-owned military and civil aviation com-
pany, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, called the push to 
privatize SOEs a ‘‘foreign plot.’’ 19 Bo Xilai’s ‘‘Chongqing model’’ em-
phasized a greater role for the state.20 In the midst of this debate, 
however, Bo was purged in April 2012.21 According to the Econo-
mist, ‘‘Mr. Bo was much loved by a ‘new left’ force in Chinese poli-
tics which admired his big spending on public welfare, especially 
social housing, and his fondness for state-owned enterprises.’’ 22 
A few developments, however, may indicate some willingness to 
allow challenges to the supremacy of SOEs. In May 2010, the State 
Council issued an opinion on opening up state-dominated sectors to 
private investment, including, for example, railways, public utili-
ties, finance, energy, telecommunications, education, and 
healthcare.23 In February 2012, the State Council set a deadline of 
the end of June 2012 for the relevant Chinese government depart-
ments to draft and publish implementing rules concerning such pri-
vate investment.24 In July 2012, the National Development and Re-
form Commission published on its Web site a compilation of 42 doc-
uments from the relevant departments relating to private invest-
ment.25 According to U.S. government officials, Chinese govern-
ment departments have interpreted ‘‘private investment’’ as mean-
ing domestic investment only.26 In a related development, in Sep-
tember 2012, at the World Economic Forum in Tianjin, Premier 
Wen Jiabao stated that foreign-invested enterprises should receive 
the same treatment as domestic entities.27 In May 2012, the Su-
preme People’s Court issued rules on civil litigation under the PRC 
Antimonopoly Law that may make it easier to sue SOEs for abuse 
of dominance.28 
Foreign Investment in China 
Foreign investment in China is highly regulated, and the Chi-
nese government uses the approval process to ensure that foreign 
investment is in keeping with government policy.29 The two gov-
ernment departments with primary responsibility for foreign in-
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vestment approval are the National Development and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).30 Pol-
icymakers’ goals for economic development are set out in the for-
eign investment catalogue, which lists industries in which foreign 
investment is encouraged, restricted, or forbidden.31 In 1995, Chi-
nese foreign investment approval authorities issued the first for-
eign investment catalogue, which has been amended five times, 
most recently with effect in January 2012.32 For the first time, the 
most recent revised draft was put on the Internet for public com-
ment prior to finalization.33 The revisions implement the Chinese 
government’s policies on development of seven ‘‘strategic emerging 
industries,’’ as outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan on National 
Economic and Social Development.34 Further, in order to ‘‘limit 
overcapacity and improve the strength of domestic automakers,’’ 
the revisions remove vehicle manufacturing from the encouraged 
list, thereby potentially eliminating certain tax breaks for foreign 
automakers in China.35 
During this reporting year, the environment for foreign-invested 
companies has become more difficult. In a recent survey of mem-
bers of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 37 percent 
of respondents indicated that obtaining licenses (needed for doing 
business in China) has become more difficult.36 The chamber also 
noted in its 2012 White Paper that the recent revision to the for-
eign investment guidance catalogue has tightened market access.37 
The chamber recommends that China put in place a ‘‘fair and 
transparent’’ process for foreign investment, ultimately discarding 
the catalogue entirely and replacing the approval requirement with 
notification.38 
The foreign investment approval process is one avenue by which 
the Chinese government can retaliate against foreign companies 
that compete with SOEs.39 As noted in a February 2012 Wall 
Street Journal article, ‘‘[W]hen a U.S. company goes to China to 
compete with a Chinese company, it often finds itself competing in-
stead with the state. And it is the state that has the handy advan-
tage of approving or rejecting the foreigner’s investment, or de-
manding the newcomer transfer technology to China before getting 
access.’’ 40 
Outbound Investment 
Like foreign investment into China, outbound investment is 
highly regulated and must undergo a government approval proc-
ess.41 During this reporting year, Chinese authorities tweaked the 
regulatory framework to stem losses by SOEs,42 ensure the safety 
of Chinese citizens working overseas, and allow residents in the 
eastern city Wenzhou to invest overseas, thereby liberalizing cap-
ital account restrictions.43 In 2011, the State-Owned Assets Super-
vision and Administration Commission (SASAC) issued two sets of 
regulations on the overseas financial activities of central-level 
SOEs,44 and in April 2012, SASAC issued an order that SOEs’ 
overseas investments must be in their core businesses.45 There are 
almost 1.2 million Chinese expatriates overseas, and in February 
2012, MOFCOM issued a guidebook on the safety of Chinese over-
seas investments and personnel.46 Finally, NDRC is preparing a 
law on outbound investment.47 
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China’s outbound investment has been strategic, furthering Chi-
na’s goals for economic growth.48 According to one bank executive 
cited in China Daily, during the past five years, over half of Chi-
nese companies’ mergers and acquisitions overseas have been in 
natural resources.49 Currently, according to Xinhua, there is a shift 
away from investments in resources to investments in technology, 
brands, and distribution.50 This is in keeping with the 12th Five- 
Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development and with 
certain industrial policies.51 Thus, in a move toward ‘‘soft power,’’ 
as supported by China’s cultural industrial policy, China has been 
investing in newspapers and Confucius Institutes overseas, largely 
under Party control.52 According to People’s Daily, under an agree-
ment between China’s Export-Import Bank and the General Ad-
ministration of Press and Publications, the bank will provide fi-
nancing for cultural enterprises’ activities overseas.53 State broad-
caster China Central Television is expanding internationally, and 
the government is supporting the establishment of press operations 
overseas.54 Further, China’s largest cinema chain, Wanda Cinema 
Lines Corp., acquired all or part of U.S. cinema group AMC Enter-
tainment.55 
Chinese companies’ outbound investment has continued to grow 
over the past year. According to China Economic Net, by the end 
of 2011, Chinese investors had established 18,000 entities in 178 
countries. Compared to 2010, investments in Europe and Africa 
grew 57.3 percent and 58.9 percent, respectively.56 Investments in 
the form of mergers and acquisitions tended to be in mining, manu-
facturing, transportation, electric power, and retailing and whole-
saling.57 
Foreign Exchange Control 
Though the value of the yuan rose about 8 percent against the 
U.S. dollar between June 2010 and May 15, 2012, according to the 
U.S. Treasury Department, the yuan is still undervalued.58 While 
experts disagree on the amount of this undervaluation, economists 
from the Peterson Institute found the yuan to be undervalued by 
24 percent against the dollar in a November 2011 report.59 Trade 
lawyer Alan Price argued in a December 2011 Commission hearing 
that China’s currency manipulation is a violation of China’s WTO 
commitments.60 In April 2012, China’s central bank widened the 
yuan’s trading band in what experts cited by Xinhua described as 
a step toward internationalization of the yuan.61 
Chinese authorities have taken measures to loosen controls on 
cross-border capital flows,62 including increasing convertibility of 
the yuan in the capital account, signing currency swap agreements, 
and approving outbound investment.63 During this reporting year, 
Chinese regulators have put in place or announced several meas-
ures to bring offshore yuan back to China. For example, in October 
2011, the Ministry of Commerce issued a circular on use of the 
yuan in foreign direct investment in China, and People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) issued measures on processing yuan settlements for 
such investments.64 According to the Wall Street Journal, in Feb-
ruary, PBOC announced it would allow Chinese companies to use 
yuan when trading with foreign companies, and PBOC and five 
other departments issued a circular on management of yuan settle-
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ment for payment of exported goods.65 Chinese authorities have 
also increased the amount certain foreign investors can invest in 
China in yuan,66 and are considering allowing Chinese companies 
to borrow yuan funds offshore and bring the proceeds back to 
China.67 Shanghai municipality will play a key role in internation-
alization of the yuan, according to the ‘‘Plan for Establishment of 
a Shanghai International Financial Center During the Period of 
the 12th Five-Year Plan.’’ 68 
China has ample foreign currency reserves—roughly US$3.2 tril-
lion as of the end of 2011, according to Chinese state media—to 
fund outbound investment and acquisition of foreign resources.69 
Some investment will be through government-funded investment 
vehicles affiliated with the State Administration of Foreign Ex-
change.70 China’s Minister of Commerce has indicated that China 
would like to use its U.S. debt reserves to invest in American infra-
structure.71 
China in the WTO 
December 2011 marked the 10-year anniversary of China’s acces-
sion to the WTO.72 There is, as former Under Secretary of Com-
merce for International Trade Grant Aldonas testified at a 2002 
Commission hearing on China’s membership in the WTO, ‘‘the in-
escapable link between WTO compliance and the development of 
the rule of law in China.’’ 73 Witness Alan Price at a December 
2011 Commission hearing noted that ‘‘many in the United States 
and around the world believed China’s WTO membership would 
bring it into compliance with an enforceable, rules-based inter-
national trading regime . . . .’’ 74 While the Chinese government 
initially took many steps to implement its WTO commitments and 
has reaped enormous benefits from WTO membership,75 according 
to one analyst, China has ‘‘figured out how to get around the rules 
. . . . The state-capitalist system they have developed is incompat-
ible with much of the WTO structure.’’ 76 In its 2011 report on Chi-
na’s WTO compliance, the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) notes that China has been intensifying state intervention 
in the economy over the past five years, and implementing policies 
to benefit SOEs and domestic industries to the detriment of foreign 
companies.77 China has ‘‘not yet fully embraced the key WTO prin-
ciples of market access, non-discrimination and transparency,’’ ac-
cording to the report.78 
During this reporting year, the United States used WTO tools 
outside the dispute settlement process to address Chinese prac-
tices. For example, in October 2011, USTR requested through the 
WTO information on China’s Internet restrictions.79 The United 
States also requested that China notify all its subsidies to the WTO 
as required.80 
Under China’s regulatory and economic system, the government 
plays an active role in foreign investment, foreign exchange activi-
ties, and purchases by SOEs, providing authorities with ample op-
portunity for retaliation.81 In a statement at the WTO in November 
2011, a U.S. official noted that Chinese regulatory authorities have 
used intimidation against companies that raise concerns with Chi-
na’s WTO compliance, threatening ‘‘to withhold necessary approv-
als or take other retaliatory actions against foreign enterprises if 
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they speak out against problematic Chinese policies or are per-
ceived as responding cooperatively to their government’s efforts to 
challenge them.’’ 82 The official continued, ‘‘This type of conduct is 
at odds with fundamental principles of the WTO’s rules-based sys-
tem.’’ 83 China’s use of intimidation or retaliation also may make it 
difficult for other WTO members to challenge Chinese actions 
through the WTO dispute settlement process.84 The fear of retalia-
tion extends to trade cases outside the WTO. In a U.S. Commerce 
Department antidumping investigation of China’s solar products, 
six U.S. solar panel manufacturers exercised an option to remain 
anonymous.85 According to the New York Times, ‘‘That anonymity 
could help relieve them and their executives from fears of retalia-
tion by the Chinese government, which could come in the form of 
denying them access to the Chinese market or denying them 
visas.’’ 86 
Since joining the WTO in December 2001, China has been a re-
spondent in 28 dispute settlement cases, a complainant in 10, and 
a third-party participant in 91.87 In 2012, the United States 
brought two WTO cases against China concerning the auto indus-
try.88 The first case, initiated in July, challenges China’s imposi-
tion of antidumping and countervailing duties on certain auto-
mobiles from the United States.89 Some saw the duties as retalia-
tion by China for tariffs the United States imposed on certain Chi-
nese tires in 2009,90 an action that China unsuccessfully chal-
lenged at the WTO.91 The United States requested consultations in 
the second case in September 2012, challenging certain of China’s 
export subsidies to auto and auto parts manufacturers.92 In March 
2012, the United States, in coordination with the European Union 
and Japan, requested consultations with China in a case con-
cerning restraints on exports of rare earths, tungsten, and molyb-
denum, and in July, the WTO established a panel to hear the dis-
pute.93 The case followed a 2009 case brought by the United States, 
the European Union, and Mexico challenging similar restraints on 
the export of raw materials,94 in which a WTO panel found against 
China in July 2011.95 China appealed the decision, which the Ap-
pellate Body upheld in January 2012.96 Other active WTO cases 
against China, including those brought by other WTO members, 
concern electronic payment services,97 antidumping and counter-
vailing duties on chicken broiler products, and antidumping and 
countervailing duties on grain-oriented electrical steel (all from the 
United States); 98 and antidumping duties on iron and steel fas-
teners, and antidumping duties on X-ray security inspection equip-
ment (both from the European Union).99 
Intellectual Property Rights and Forced Technology Transfer 
During the 2012 reporting year, China’s weak protection and 
poor enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) has contin-
ued to be a problem and pose risks for the Chinese people and for 
consumers and companies elsewhere.100 The Chinese government 
has taken certain measures to foster IPR protection, though with 
little success.101 American Chamber of Commerce in China’s 2012 
business climate survey found that 66 percent of respondents said 
China’s enforcement of IPR has stayed the same or deteriorated.102 
In order to foster certain key sectors such as Chinese cultural prod-
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ucts, next generation Internet technology, and ‘‘strategic emerging 
industries’’ with ‘‘self-reliant’’ intellectual property (IP), however, 
Chinese authorities are recommending greater IP protection and 
support.103 
According to a 2012 U.S. Customs report, China is the source of 
the majority of counterfeit goods entering the United States.104 As 
noted in a USTR report, many counterfeit products, such as phar-
maceuticals, food, auto parts, and toys, pose a threat to consumers 
in China and elsewhere.105 The Customs report states that, in 
2011, ‘‘The number of consumer safety and critical technology sei-
zures increased by 44% . . .,’’ and ‘‘the domestic value of counter-
feit pharmaceutical seizures rose by . . . almost 200%.’’ 106 In one 
pharmaceuticals case, Chinese police arrested 114 people in a ring 
that used starch, corn powder, iron powder, incitant, and diazepam 
in fake medicines sold under the names of ‘‘reputable pharma-
ceutical companies. . . .’’ 107 
The Chinese government has taken measures directly and indi-
rectly to acquire foreign technology, such as stealing trade secrets, 
or forcing foreign companies to transfer key technology to Chinese 
entities in return for access to the Chinese market. In February 
2012, U.S. prosecutors indicted state-owned Pangang Group for 
conspiring to steal trade secrets from DuPont, and an employee of 
U.S. company American Superconductor Corporation pleaded guilty 
in an Austrian court to selling trade secrets to Chinese wind tur-
bine company Sinovel.108 Reportedly, Chinese spy agencies have 
conducted a ‘‘far-reaching industrial espionage campaign’’ in a 
range of industries, including biotechnology, telecommunications, 
nanotechnology, and clean energy.109 Chinese authorities have also 
used the approval process for foreign investment to force foreign 
companies to transfer technology to China, which is contrary to 
WTO rules.110 Such forced transfer often occurs through require-
ments to enter into joint ventures with Chinese partners, to set up 
research and development centers, or to partner with ‘‘national 
champions and transfer the latest technology in exchange for cur-
rent and future business opportunities.’’ 111 
Food and Drug Safety 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, China continued 
to have serious food safety problems, impacting consumers in 
China and overseas, as Chinese food exports continued to grow. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), from Oc-
tober 2006 through September 2011, shipments of FDA-regulated 
products from China grew from 1.3 to 2.1 million, including drugs 
and medical devices and human food products.112 
Food safety cases in China have ranged from dangerous to gross, 
and covered Chinese staples such as tea and salt.113 A particularly 
noxious product, ‘‘gutter oil,’’ initially was made of restaurants’ 
waste oil but later expanded to include oil from rotten animal 
parts.114 Officials cracked one criminal network for gutter oil oper-
ating across six provinces.115 
At the national level, Chinese authorities have responded to Chi-
na’s food safety problems by issuing a food safety work plan and 
regulations and standards, and publishing a food safety pro-
gram.116 At a February 2012 meeting of the National Food Safety 
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Commission, officials called for continuation of strict punishment 
for food safety crimes, but noted difficulties in controlling China’s 
small and scattered food producers.117 Authorities have also 
brought highly publicized actions for food safety violations against 
foreign companies, such as Coca-Cola, Walmart, and Red Bull.118 
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Introduction 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, the promotion of 
key policies and programs relating to access to justice reflected the 
Communist Party’s ongoing concern with handling social conflicts 
and ‘‘maintaining stability.’’ Authorities continued to promote medi-
ation as a solution to social conflicts and an alternative to litiga-
tion. Chinese officials also promoted legal services through the 
growth of legal aid resources and the continuing standardization of 
legal aid procedures.1 While officials announced measures to im-
prove the petitioning system,2 authorities’ concern with ‘‘maintain-
ing stability’’ at all costs led to numerous reports of human rights 
violations and abuse of petitioners. Many Chinese citizens remain 
unable to access justice through the available channels. Chinese 
government agencies remained unable, in many circumstances, to 
deliver outcomes that were fair and accessible to all, irrespective 
of wealth or status. 
In addition to Chinese legislation guaranteeing access to formal 
and informal legal remedies, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) states that ‘‘[e]veryone has the right to 
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or 
by law.’’ 3 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR) requires states to ensure that persons whose 
rights or freedoms are violated ‘‘have an effective remedy, notwith-
standing that the violation has been committed by persons acting 
in an official capacity.’’ 4 
Judicial Independence 
Party and government officials continue to limit judicial inde-
pendence and exert political control over courts and judges. Al-
though Article 126 of China’s Constitution guarantees judicial inde-
pendence from ‘‘any administrative organ, public organization or 
individual,’’ 5 China’s judiciary continues to be subject to a variety 
of internal and external controls—from political-legal committees to 
official interference—that significantly limit its ability to engage in 
independent decisionmaking. In 2012, for instance, China’s legal 
experts and courts continued to react to influencing factors sur-
rounding the controversial capital case of Li Changkui, a criminal 
defendant who had been found eligible for a death sentence with 
a two-year reprieve before the court reversed its decision, sen-
tencing him to immediate execution, apparently due to public pres-
sure. In the Beijing Municipal High Court 2012 Work Report, 
President Chi Qiang urged that courts systemically prevent lenient 
sentences in homicide cases by making all intermediate courts the 
trial courts of first instance in homicide cases, since lower level 
courts have no jurisdiction to impose life imprisonment or more se-
vere punishments. According to a report by the Dui Hua Founda-
tion, a human rights advocacy organization, the Li Changkui case 
‘‘demonstrates the negative effect of public opinion and official in-
terference on death penalty reform in China.’’ 6 
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Legal experts and scholars both inside and outside of China con-
tinued to criticize China’s lack of judicial independence during the 
reporting year.7 After leaving China, self-trained legal advocate 
Chen Guangcheng criticized the role of political-legal committees in 
a New York Times editorial: ‘‘In real life . . . cases of any signifi-
cance are controlled at every level of the judicial system by a Com-
munist Party political-legal committee. . . . These political-legal 
committees have eroded decades of progress in implementing the 
rule of law.’’ 8 He Weifang, professor of law at Peking University 
Law School, in May 2012 said, ‘‘Unless we resolve the basic prob-
lem of judicial independence, then it will be impossible to improve 
judicial fairness . . .. [T]he legal system itself wants to solve the 
problem of fairness, but this internal force cannot overcome exter-
nal interference.’’ 9 
Chinese officials continued policies that target rights lawyers 
handling sensitive cases and that restrain these lawyers from rep-
resenting their clients fairly or effectively. In recent years, Chinese 
authorities have pressured human rights lawyers who take on sen-
sitive cases (such as those involving pro-democracy advocates, 
house church activists, Falun Gong practitioners, and victims of il-
legal property seizures) or engage in sensitive causes by denying 
professional license renewals during the ‘‘annual inspection and as-
sessment process’’ (niandu jiancha kaohe).10 For instance, by late 
March 2012, the Beijing Bureau of Justice (BBJ) had not issued a 
decision on the annual assessment of Qijian Law Firm, headed by 
prominent human rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan.11 While the BBJ 
eventually renewed professional licenses for Qijian Law Firm’s law-
yers after last year’s assessment in late in summer 2011, judicial 
authorities reportedly delayed processing the law firm’s assess-
ment.12 
In March 2012, the Ministry of Justice issued a notice requiring 
first-time applicants and lawyers seeking to renew their profes-
sional licenses to take an oath that includes pledges to fulfill the 
‘‘sacred mission of socialism with Chinese characteristics’’ and to 
‘‘uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China.’’ 13 Promi-
nent human rights lawyer Mo Shaoping told Reuters that the oath 
was ‘‘inappropriate,’’ stating, ‘‘As a lawyer, you should only pay at-
tention to the law and be faithful to your client.’’ 14 
In August 2012, domestic and international media reports de-
tailed the public controversy over draft provisions within a Su-
preme People’s Court judicial interpretation on the amended PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law that will enter into effect on January 1, 
2013.15 The judicial interpretation would allow judges to prohibit 
legal representatives from participating in litigation for between 
six months to a year, if they ‘‘disrupt the order’’ of hearings.16 In 
some circumstances, the courts could recommend longer term pun-
ishments.17 The restrictions reportedly may extend to emailing 
about hearings or publicizing hearing information through 
microblog (weibo) services.18 Some critics expressed concerns that 
the penalties represented a ‘‘step backward for a modern judicial 
system,’’ according to the Global Times (a publication that operates 
under the official People’s Daily).19 Professor Feng Yujun at 
Renmin University of China Law School said, ‘‘The interpretation 
by the supreme court should be limited within the legitimate 
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sphere of the law, instead of overreaching to create new punish-
ments and clauses to constrain lawyers’ rights.’’ 20 
Citizen Petitioning (Xinfang) 
During the reporting year, Chinese citizens continued to use peti-
tioning as a means to seek redress. The petitioning—or xinfang 
(often translated as ‘‘letters and visits’’)—system 21 exists to provide 
a channel outside of formal legal challenges for citizens to seek to 
appeal government, court, and Party decisions and present their 
grievances.22 China’s Constitution and the 2005 PRC National Reg-
ulations on Letters and Visits, in theory, provide that Chinese citi-
zens have the right to petition without retribution. Because of in-
stitutional weaknesses in the judiciary and limits on citizens’ abil-
ity to seek redress, the petitioning system remains the most pop-
ular form of public appeal. Petitioning cases often involve a range 
of complaints about local corruption, alleged abuses of power, and 
unfair land compensation.23 
Many Chinese citizens still view petitioning to central authorities 
as the last channel for redress against wrongdoing by local officials, 
even though only approximately 0.2 percent of petitioners resolve 
their grievances through petitioning, according to a 2004 study con-
ducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.24 This past 
year, some Chinese articles addressed the phenomenon of ‘‘having 
faith in petitioning and not having faith in the law’’ 25—where citi-
zens prefer petitioning to formal legal channels. According to a 
June 2012 Guangzhou Daily article, more than 80 percent of the 
118,466 petitioning cases handled locally ‘‘should have’’ gone 
through legal channels.26 The source, quoting a sample survey of 
1,000 Guangzhou municipal residents, found that 35.4 percent of 
respondents expressed a preference for court proceedings while 
30.2 percent said that petitioning was more ‘‘convenient and easi-
er.’’ 27 Survey respondents claimed that the time and cost associ-
ated with litigation made petitioning a preferable option.28 
During the reporting year, Chinese officials continued to pub-
licize the government’s intention to improve mechanisms for han-
dling petitions and to broaden petitioning channels within the for-
mal legal system.29 In January 2012, Zhou Yongkang, Secretary of 
the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Af-
fairs Commission and member of the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, 
called on government departments and officials to ‘‘better address 
public grievances through more efforts in handling public petitions 
and resolving disputes.’’ 30 The 2012–2015 National Human Rights 
Action Plan (NHRAP), released in June 2012, followed the 2009– 
2010 NHRAP in calling for improvements to the petitioning sys-
tem: ‘‘The mechanism whereby the masses express their wishes 
will be improved, and the channels for people to make petitions in 
the form of letters and personal visits will remain unblocked and 
be broadened.’’ 31 Chinese authorities reportedly expanded peti-
tioning offices within people’s courts across China and promoted 
‘‘petitioning windows,’’ where petitioners can access consulting 
services, pre-litigation mediation, and other services. In the 2012 
Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court, President Wang 
Shengjun claimed 90 percent of courts across the country had es-
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tablished petition reception offices.32 According to Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court 2011 statistics, Chinese courts, at all levels, handled ap-
proximately 790,000 cases of petitions and complaints, which is 
nearly 25 percent fewer petitions than they handled in 2010.33 
Despite calls for improving petitioning system access, authorities 
appeared to continue to use a range of new and old measures to 
hinder citizens from filing petitions. On January 1, 2012, for in-
stance, Chinese authorities instituted a real-name ticket pur-
chasing system for railway tickets across the country—which could 
potentially impede petitioners’ access to petitioning offices in Bei-
jing.34 According to Yu Jianrong, a professor at the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Sciences, the development may hinder access to peti-
tioning offices at higher administrative levels for some petitioners: 
‘‘There is a network that keeps the information of some petitioners 
deemed risks to social stability. Train stations could simply refuse 
to sell you tickets if you are one of them.’’ 35 
Chinese authorities and private company ‘‘interceptors’’ contin-
ued to intimidate and retaliate against petitioners by detaining 
them in ‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu), psychiatric hospitals, and reedu-
cation through labor (RTL) centers.36 
• In late 2011, RTL authorities in Chongqing municipality or-
dered petitioner and village representative Zhang Dingfen to 
serve two years of RTL after she petitioned in Beijing regard-
ing land rights violations in her village.37 
• In April 2012, unidentified personnel allegedly hired by local 
officials kidnapped and raped Heilongjiang petitioner Zhu 
Guiqin in Beijing municipality, before holding Zhu in a ‘‘black 
jail’’ and at her home in Fushun city.38 Zhu reportedly con-
tacted the local public security bureau to initiate an investiga-
tion but was refused assistance.39 
• In August 2012, the Yongzhou city RTL management com-
mittee ordered Tang Hui, whose daughter was raped and 
forced into prostitution, to serve 18 months of RTL for ‘‘dis-
turbing social order.’’ 40 The order followed Tang’s repeated pe-
titioning over the handling of her daughter’s case and her cam-
paigning for harsher sentences for those involved.41 The case 
created an online outcry, gained national attention, and re-
vived debate over the use of RTL.42 Authorities released Tang 
after reviewing her appeal.43 
Chinese authorities continued to use ‘‘black jails’’—secret deten-
tion sites established by local officials—to detain and punish peti-
tioners who travel to Beijing and provincial capitals to voice com-
plaints and seek redress for injustices.44 Those detained are denied 
access to legal counsel and often denied contact with family mem-
bers or associates.45 In recent years, domestic Chinese media orga-
nizations have reported on ‘‘black jails’’ and on the network of pri-
vate security personnel hired by officials to intercept and detain pe-
titioners.46 In December 2011, Chinese state-run media reported 
that the Beijing Public Security Bureau launched an official six- 
month crackdown on illegal detentions of petitioners by private se-
curity companies.47 The crackdown came after Chinese news media 
exposed instances of abuse by ‘‘private security companies’’ under 
contract by local governments to prevent petitioners from airing 
their grievances to the central government.48 
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Promotion of People’s Mediation System 
During the 2012 reporting year, government and Party officials 
continued to promote ‘‘people’s mediation’’ (renmin tiaojie) as a tool 
in their efforts to maintain social stability.49 In December 2011, 
Minister of Justice Wu Aiying announced that grassroots localities 
had established more than 31,000 grassroots mediation organiza-
tions across China and that these organizations had resolved over 
400,000 disputes in 2011.50 Between January and November 2011, 
all levels of judicial administrative agencies and mediation organi-
zations reportedly resolved more than 7 million mediation cases.51 
In his work report to the National People’s Congress, Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court President Wang Shengjun emphasized the role of medi-
ation in handling disputes and highlighted that 67.3 percent of civil 
cases were handled through mediation or withdrawn.52 In July 
2012, the People’s Daily, the official news media of the Communist 
Party, reported that people’s mediators and people’s mediation 
committees succeeded in handling 97.3 percent of mediated dis-
putes during the first five months of 2012.53 
The PRC People’s Mediation Law became effective in January 
2011,54 and the law stresses the need to resolve civil disputes 
through mediation and to maintain social harmony and stability.55 
The PRC People’s Mediation Law encourages disagreeing parties to 
reach a voluntary resolution through people’s mediation commit-
tees.56 While mediation is an effective tool in some types of cases, 
concerns about mediation center on three main issues: Curtailed 
access to courts for Chinese citizens, adequate resolution of dis-
putes without coercion, and effective enforcement.57 In addition, 
people’s mediators’ lack of professional qualifications may also im-
pact potential outcomes and oversight.58 In terms of mediated labor 
disputes, China Labour Bulletin, a Hong Kong-based non-govern-
mental organization, reported in March 2012 that workers in labor 
dispute cases almost invariably received less through mediation 
than they would have in court. The cost of legal representation, 
however, remained prohibitively high for most workers.59 
Expansion of Legal Aid 
During the reporting year, Chinese official sources announced in-
creased funding for legal aid and the expansion of access. In Feb-
ruary 2012, the Ministry of Justice reported a substantial increase 
in the number of cases handled by local legal aid agencies. In 2011, 
local legal aid agencies handled a total of 844,624 cases, up 16.1 
percent from 2010 statistics, with 946,690 people receiving legal as-
sistance, including 313,427 migrant workers.60 More than 726,000 
of the total were civil cases, reportedly often related to ‘‘payment 
and employment cases, marriage and domestic affairs, as well as 
traffic accidents.’’ 61 Xinhua, the central government news agency, 
reported that the Ministry of Justice expected legal aid agencies to 
handle more than 1 million cases in 2012.62 According to official 
sources, funding for China’s legal aid system also increased mark-
edly in 2011. The central government allocated 200 million yuan 
during the year to help with legal aid, up from the 100 million 
yuan in the previous year, and central special lottery funds for 
legal aid programs increased to 100 million yuan in 2011 from 50 
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million yuan in 2010. The total allocation for legal aid in China in 
2011 amounted to 1.277 billion yuan, an increase of 24.9 percent 
over the previous year’s allocation.63 
The right to counsel is necessary to guarantee the right to a fair 
trial and to ensure that all citizens have equal access to justice. 
Currently, Chinese law grants criminal defendants the right to hire 
an attorney but guarantees pro bono legal defense only if the de-
fendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is blind, 
deaf, or mute.64 In other cases in which defendants cannot afford 
legal representation, courts may appoint defense counsel 65 or de-
fendants may apply for legal aid, in theory as early as the inves-
tigative stage of their cases.66 Amendments to the PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law (CPL) passed in February 2012, however, changed 
requirements for legal aid in capital cases, expanding legal aid ac-
cess for those criminal suspects and defendants who may be sen-
tenced to capital punishment or life imprisonment.67 Under the 
1997 CPL, the people’s court was solely responsible for appointing 
an attorney; 68 under Article 34 of the new CPL (which will enter 
into effect January 1, 2013), public security and procuratorate in-
vestigators also will be required to notify the legal aid agency re-
sponsible if criminal suspects do not retain attorneys on their 
own.69 
Since 2003, when the State Council promulgated the ‘‘Legal Aid 
Regulations,’’ officials have expanded the legal aid system dramati-
cally and also have standardized certain procedures.70 To address 
standardization concerns, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Su-
preme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the 
Ministry of Public Security, in recent years, have formulated var-
ious regulations on legal aid work to guide and standardize legal 
aid case procedures.71 In May 2012, the MOJ passed the ‘‘Provi-
sions on Handling Legal Aid Cases and Procedural Requirements,’’ 
which will reportedly bring current legal aid practices in line with 
the newly revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the PRC Lawyers 
Law, the Regulations of Legal Aid, and other laws, regulations, 
basic provisions, and requirements of legal aid.72 
Harassment and Intimidation of Human Rights Lawyers and 
Defenders 
The Commission observed continued efforts by Chinese authori-
ties to discourage, intimidate, and physically harm human rights 
lawyers and defenders—as well as their families and associates 
who took on ‘‘sensitive’’ causes. Local government agencies contin-
ued to employ a spectrum of harsh measures—from stationing po-
lice personnel outside of homes to monitoring the whereabouts of 
rights defenders 73—forcing rights defenders to ‘‘travel’’ to remote 
or unknown locations,74 inviting them to ‘‘drink tea’’ (bei hecha) 
with security personnel,75 and detaining them.76 
The following examples demonstrate official actions taken 
against human rights lawyers and defenders during 2011 and 
2012. 
• In May 2012, Chinese authorities subjected human rights 
lawyer Jiang Tianyong to harassment and physical abuse—in-
cluding interrogation and beatings—after Jiang attempted to 
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visit his former client, self-trained legal advocate Chen 
Guangcheng.77 
• In May 2012, Chinese authorities blocked prominent human 
rights lawyers from representing Chen Kegui, the nephew of 
Chen Guangcheng. Authorities criminally charged Chen Kegui 
with intentional homicide in connection to an altercation with 
local officials. Criminal defense lawyers who offered to rep-
resent the nephew were reportedly threatened or unable to 
renew their lawyer licenses.78 One of the lawyers, Song Ze, 
was criminally detained and authorities reportedly refused to 
disclose his location.79 
• In June 2012, Beijing authorities repeatedly detained promi-
nent activist and human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong following 
his online publication of an essay calling for a ‘‘New Citizens’ 
Movement.’’ 80 
In addition, during this reporting year, the Chinese government 
continued to target family members and acquaintances of human 
rights defenders.81 [See Section II—Freedom of Residence and 
Movement for more information on authorities’ targeting of family 




During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Chinese govern-
ment and Communist Party authorities used repressive security 
policies to stifle peaceful expression and dissent, especially among 
Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Chi-
nese officials continued to commit serious human rights abuses in 
the XUAR. Central government-led development projects, which 
authorities have strengthened in recent years, undercut the rights 
of Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, 
languages, and livelihoods. Government officials continued steps to 
demolish and ‘‘reconstruct’’ the Old City section of Kashgar city 
and relocate residents. Authorities strengthened campaigns against 
‘‘illegal religious activities’’ and enforced policies to restrict the 
freedom of religion. Officials continued to obscure information on 
criminal trials deemed sensitive, while unofficial sources reported 
in 2012 on long prison terms and life sentences for asylum seekers 
forcibly returned from Cambodia in 2009. 
Security Measures 
Official XUAR security campaigns to promote ‘‘social stability’’ 
resulted in the continued and systematic repression of human 
rights. The XUAR Communist Party Congress annual report, deliv-
ered in late October 2011, stressed that the ‘‘stability situation is 
still grave’’ and described ‘‘opposing ethnic separatism and pro-
tecting national unity and security’’ as ‘‘the main mission in pro-
tecting social stability.’’ 1 The report called for continuing measures 
to ‘‘strike hard’’ against the ‘‘three forces’’ of terrorism, separatism, 
and religious extremism.2 Authorities have applied the ‘‘three 
forces’’ label to include peaceful political dissent and religious activ-
ity outside of state control,3 while providing limited and conflicting 
information to support claims of terrorist or separatist threats.4 Of-
ficial media reported in December 2011 that a clash occurred be-
tween police forces and a group of ‘‘violent terrorists’’ allegedly 
headed to Central Asia for terrorist training.5 Local sources cited 
by Radio Free Asia (RFA), however, confirmed the clash but said 
the group consisted of men, women, and children fleeing curbs on 
their religion.6 The differing accounts follow other incidents in re-
cent years in which reports by independent sources have conflicted 
with official accounts.7 In June 2012, police in Hoten city, Hoten 
prefecture, conducted house-to-house searches of the Gujiangbage 
(Gujanbagh) neighborhood as part of a campaign against Islamic 
schools that authorities deemed to be illegal.8 
Officials called for further ‘‘normalization’’ of work to ‘‘uphold sta-
bility’’ 9 and took steps to strengthen police capacity in the region. 
In January 2012, state media reported that XUAR authorities 
would deploy 8,000 public security forces to rural areas to ensure 
each XUAR village had one officer present.10 The officers’ tasks 
‘‘will mainly include security patrols, management of the migrant 
population and cracking down on illegal religious activities,’’ ac-
cording to a Party spokesperson paraphrased by state media.11 [See 
Freedom of Religion in this section for more information on controls 
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over religious activity.] Official media reported in November 2011 
that the XUAR Party Committee transferred ‘‘thousands’’ of officers 
from the region’s Special Weapons and Tactics teams to the XUAR 
capital of Urumqi and placed them under the municipality’s public 
security bureau, with a top XUAR Party official describing the 
transfer as a ‘‘major decision’’ taken to ensure the stability of the 
social situation in the capital and throughout the XUAR.12 
Xinjiang Work Forum 
During this reporting period, XUAR authorities intensified re-
gional development objectives announced at the Xinjiang Work 
Forum (Forum), convened in Beijing in May 2010 by central gov-
ernment and Party leaders. The Forum’s strategies for economic 
and political development prioritize state economic and political 
goals over the promotion of regional autonomy and broader protec-
tion of XUAR residents’ rights.13 Government and Party officials in 
2012 strengthened ‘‘counterpart support’’ programs that bring fund-
ing and personnel assistance to the XUAR from provinces and cit-
ies outside of the region, placing an emphasis on promoting ethnic 
unity alongside regional economic development.14 
The implementation of initiatives announced during and after 
the Forum has deepened existing policies that have made it dif-
ficult for Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cul-
tures, languages, and livelihoods. In 2012, XUAR authorities bol-
stered efforts to relocate and resettle farmers and herders away 
from grasslands, as part of programs launched at the Forum and 
existing policies and programs that XUAR authorities have said 
were aimed at combating degradation of grasslands.15 These poli-
cies and programs have affected groups with livelihoods that are 
based on traditional nomadic herding practices.16 
The post-Forum acceleration of urban development throughout 
the XUAR has raised concerns about the resettlement of residents, 
equitable distribution of resources, and cultural preservation. In 
2012, XUAR and Urumqi authorities continued to increase over-
sight of migrants that began in the wake of July 2009 demonstra-
tions and riots in Urumqi, in line with official claims that Uyghur 
migrants staying in unregulated rental housing had ‘‘incited’’ dem-
onstrations and riots on July 5, 2009.17 The mayor of Urumqi told 
local lawmakers in February 2012 that the Urumqi government 
would relocate 60,000 families living in the city’s ‘‘shantytowns’’ by 
2015 after demolishing their old houses,18 as part of ‘‘slum trans-
formation’’ projects that were initiated soon after the Forum.19 [See 
Preservation of Cultural Heritage in this section for more informa-
tion.] 
Criminal Law and Access to Justice 
Legal developments at the national level in 2012 bolstered XUAR 
authorities’ capability to use criminal measures to silence dissent. 
In March, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Com-
mittee passed changes to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 
forbidding those involved in collecting evidence for a criminal case 
from using torture to extract confessions.20 However, legal scholars 
and human rights advocates have criticized the amendments to the 
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CPL for upholding the power of law enforcement agencies to detain 
those suspected of crimes related to national security or terrorism 
without disclosing the location of detention or providing the suspect 
with access to a lawyer for up to six months.21 In October 2011, 
the NPC Standing Committee issued a decision (jueding) on 
‘‘strengthening anti-terrorism work.’’ 22 The decision includes defi-
nitions of terrorist activities and groups, designates a national 
counterterrorism organization, establishes a terrorist watchlist and 
process for freezing the assets of suspected terrorist groups, and 
promotes international cooperation in fighting terrorism.23 Chinese 
officials and scholars said the definitions in the decision would re-
move ambiguities in Chinese law and reinforce Chinese govern-
ment aims to rule through legal means.24 The extent to which au-
thorities will prioritize adhering to legal guidelines rather than ful-
filling policy objectives remains unclear; moreover, critics have ob-
served that, even if faithfully implemented, the definitions appear 
to be sufficiently vague to encompass acts of (non-violent) dissent.25 
Information remained limited on trials connected to the July 
2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi. The first annual work 
report of the XUAR High People’s Court, issued in January 2012, 
included no information on trials connected to the July 2009 
events,26 though Rozi Ismail, president of the court, made a brief 
reference in January 2011 to ongoing cases connected to the 
events.27 XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri reported in 
March 2010 that courts had tried 198 people in 97 cases in connec-
tion to the July 2009 events.28 
The number of criminal trials concluded in the XUAR in 2011 for 
crimes of endangering state security (ESS)—a category of criminal 
offenses that authorities in China have used to punish citizen ac-
tivism and dissent 29—increased over 2010. In 2011, courts in the 
XUAR tried and completed 414 cases, an increase of 38 cases over 
the previous year.30 In contrast, authorities completed 268 ESS 
cases in the region in 2008 and 437 cases in 2009.31 In 2012, West-
ern media and advocacy groups highlighted cases of continued po-
litical imprisonment connected to the July 2009 events that have 
involved ESS charges, including the cases of Gulmira Imin, 
Gheyret Niyaz, Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli Obul.32 
Controls Over Free Expression 
Local governments in the XUAR continued to implement censor-
ship campaigns focused on religious and political publications dur-
ing the reporting period. The campaigns have targeted pirated and 
pornographic items in addition to publications deemed ‘‘illegal’’ 
solely because of their religious or political content.33 In March 
2012, Western media reported that authorities in Aksu prefecture 
destroyed more than 13,000 ‘‘illegal propaganda materials’’ as part 
of a campaign to ‘‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Ille-
gal Publications.’’ 34 More than 1,600 students and teachers from 
local schools reportedly observed the destruction of the materials, 
which, according to Western media, included electronic versions of 
the Quran and other religious items.35 In November, the XUAR 
Transportation Department published a statement indicating that, 
through the end of October, regional transportation officials had in-
vestigated and prosecuted 20 cases of ‘‘illegal publications,’’ includ-
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ing 4,386 copies of ‘‘illegal religious publications’’ as part of a simi-
lar campaign.36 Other localities within the XUAR also reported tar-
geting or confiscating religious and political items.37 
Uyghurs continued to serve prison sentences as a result of exer-
cising their right to free speech or for expressing dissent. 
Webmasters Dilshat Perhat and Nijat Azat, who were tried in 2010 
on charges related to endangering state security, continued to serve 
5- and 10-year prison sentences, respectively.38 Family members 
connected the cases to the Webmasters’ not deleting postings about 
hardships in the XUAR and, in one instance, permitting posting of 
announcements for the July 2009 demonstrations in Urumqi.39 The 
three-year prison sentence of Nureli Obul, the Webmaster of the 
Uyghur Web site Selkin, was due to expire in early August 2012.40 
Nureli Obul was detained in the aftermath of the July 2009 pro-
tests and riots and sentenced in 2010 at the same trial as 
Webmasters Dilshat Perhat and Nijat Azat. 
Freedom of Religion 
XUAR authorities used the specter of ‘‘religious extremism’’ to 
justify the continuing enforcement of controls over religion, espe-
cially Islam, and maintained harsh legal restrictions over reli-
gion.41 Authorities continued to identify ‘‘religious extremism’’ as 
one of the ‘‘three forces’’ threatening stability in the region and tar-
geted religious practice in security campaigns.42 A new plan to de-
ploy 8,000 public security officers to XUAR villages included ‘‘crack-
ing down on illegal religious activities’’ among its aims.43 In addi-
tion, central government officials in charge of religious affairs em-
phasized the need to strengthen the ‘‘management’’ of Hajj pilgrim-
ages and ‘‘train’’ religious figures and cadres doing religious 
work.44 
Some Muslims continued to serve prison sentences as a result of 
exercising their faith. Courts in Kashgar prefecture in May 2012 
sentenced nine Uyghurs to prison sentences ranging from 6 to 15 
years on charges related to their participation in ‘‘illegal religious 
activities.’’ 45 Western media reported that in February 2012, in 
Hoten prefecture, public security officials detained 129 people and 
authorities fined nearly 3,000 people and shut down more than 200 
religious sites in conjunction with a ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign against 
‘‘illegal religious activities.’’ 46 
In June in Hoten, 12 children, 2 school staff, and 3 policemen 
were injured when police raided an ‘‘illegal’’ religious school where 
Communist Party-affiliated and state-run media said teachers had 
confined students.47 According to official media reports, suspects at 
the school set off explosives during the raid, causing a blaze that 
injured the children.48 Uyghur human rights advocates reported, 
however, that tear gas used by police in the raid injured the chil-
dren.49 Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that in June in Korla city, 
Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture (BMAP), an 11-year-old 
Uyghur child named Mirzahid died while in police custody after 
being detained for engaging in Islamic prayer studies at an 
unsanctioned school.50 Official Chinese media said Mirzahid’s 
death was the result of a beating he received from his religious in-
structor prior to his detention.51 However, unnamed sources cited 
by RFA claimed he had been tortured to death in detention.52 
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Reports of official campaigns to prevent men from wearing ‘‘large 
beards’’ 53 and women from wearing veils or clothing perceived to 
have religious connotations appeared to increase during the report-
ing year, based on Commission monitoring. In Hejing county, 
BMAP, an official reported at a September 2011 meeting of 550 
households receiving minimum social welfare guarantees (dibao 
jiating) that women wearing veils, men with ‘‘large beards,’’ and 
guardians of minors who illegally enter mosques would be cut off 
from this social welfare support.54 RFA reported in July 2012 that 
officials required recipients of monthly welfare stipends in areas 
such as Hoten, Aksu, and Kashgar to sign a pledge promising not 
to cover their faces for religious reasons, and promising to report 
to local authorities if they witnessed women covering their faces.55 
Local governments in 2012 also continued steps to bring women re-
ligious specialists known as bu¨wi under tighter government regula-
tion, following an official proposal in 2008 to place these religious 
figures under stricter state control.56 
Local governments throughout the XUAR continued to place con-
trols over the observance of the Islamic holiday of Ramadan, forbid-
ding some people from fasting, ordering restaurants to stay open, 
and emphasizing the need for Islamic clergy to promote ethnic 
unity and combat separatism.57 RFA reported that authorities 
fined nearly 100 Uyghurs in Kuchar county, Aksu prefecture, for 
studying the Quran in ‘‘unauthorized sessions’’ during Ramadan in 
July and August 2012, and that there was an increased security 
presence at mosques in Urumqi during this period.58 In addition, 
RFA reported that authorities had banned tourists from visiting 
mosques in Urumqi during Ramadan.59 Western media agencies re-
ported that municipalities throughout the XUAR implemented ‘‘se-
curity and stability work plans’’ for Ramadan that mandated 
schools and local governments to ensure that students and officials 
did not fast or visit mosques.60 RFA reported that security officials 
questioned Beijing-based Uyghur professor and Webmaster Ilham 
Tohti on August 8 and told him not to publish any more articles 
on religion or Ramadan, and not to speak with foreign journal-
ists.61 The Web site Tohti founded, Uyghur Online, published an 
article discussing increased restrictions during this year’s Rama-
dan,62 and Tohti spoke with Western news agencies in August 
about increasing restrictions on the practice of Islam in the 
XUAR.63 [See Section II—Freedom of Religion for additional infor-
mation on religion in China, including cases from the XUAR.] 
Language Policy and Bilingual Education 
The XUAR government continued to expand implementation of 
‘‘bilingual education,’’ a policy that has drawn objections from non- 
Han groups for prioritizing Mandarin Chinese in XUAR schools at 
the expense of other languages spoken in the region. The policy 
contravenes legal protections for non-Han groups to maintain and 
use their own languages, as provided in Chinese and international 
law,64 and underscores government failure to maintain the use of 
Uyghur and other languages as lingua franca within the XUAR in 
line with the promotion of regional autonomy. Official media re-
ported in October 2011 that 1.2 million students from preschool to 
high school were enrolled in ‘‘bilingual education’’ classes, making 
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up 48 percent of the ethnic minority student population.65 The 
number appears to be an increase of more than 446,000 students 
since 2009, based on figures from that year.66 Education officials 
have said that 1.8 million ethnic minority students, comprising 
about 75 percent of the ethnic minority student population at pri-
mary and secondary schools, would receive ‘‘bilingual education’’ by 
2015,67 and that ‘‘bilingual education’’ would be implemented in 90 
percent of XUAR schools by 2020.68 
In addition to the ‘‘bilingual education’’ policy, since 1997, XUAR 
authorities have implemented a program of sending Uyghur and 
other non-Han students from the XUAR to high schools in eastern 
Chinese cities, where they attend classes taught exclusively in 
Mandarin Chinese. Authorities accelerated the program, known as 
‘‘Xinjiang classes’’ (xinjiang ban or xinjiang neidi gaozhong ban), 
following the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum. Human rights 
groups have criticized the program over concerns regarding its 
strict adherence to a Mandarin-only language policy, both in and 
out of the classroom, as well as concerns over the placement of 
young Uyghur and other non-Han students into an unfamiliar cul-
tural landscape.69 According to the XUAR Education Department, 
authorities planned to enroll a total of 27,000 students in ‘‘Xinjiang 
classes’’ in fall 2012, at 85 schools in 44 cities.70 These numbers 
represent an increase of 5,000 students, 19 schools, and 8 cities 
since November 2010,71 at which time figures had already signifi-
cantly increased since the Xinjiang Work Forum.72 
Population Planning Policies 
The XUAR government continued to implement a ‘‘special re-
wards system’’ for non-Han households (‘‘ethnic minority’’ house-
holds) that have been ‘‘certified’’ as having fewer children than al-
lowed under the region’s population and family planning regula-
tions.73 The system is one of the reward mechanisms present 
throughout China’s population planning system, though with spe-
cial focus on ethnic minority households. Authorities started the 
program in three southern XUAR prefectural-level areas in 2007 74 
and announced plans in 2009 to extend it to an additional 26 ‘‘poor 
and border counties.’’ 75 A December 2011 report from the Xinjiang 
Academy of Social Sciences reported that over 268,000 people were 
receiving rewards under the program.76 Authorities expanded the 
program in 2011 to any XUAR county or city where rural ethnic 
minorities comprise over 50 percent of the population.77 
During the reporting period, authorities in the XUAR and some 
other regions of China with Muslim populations reported on the 
implementation of a program entitled ‘‘Muslim Reproductive 
Health Project’’ (musilin shengzhi jiankang shangmu).78 According 
to official media, the project aims to provide reproductive health in-
formation and health checks for Muslim women of reproductive 
age, while ‘‘creating a harmonious happy family.’’ 79 XUAR authori-
ties decided on regional implementation of the program in July 
2011, and set aside 10 million yuan (US$1.5 million) each year for 
the next two years to carry it out.80 State media reports empha-





Some government and private employers in the XUAR continued 
to discriminate against non-Han job candidates. As in past years, 
some job announcements reserved positions exclusively for Han 
Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs, in contraven-
tion of provisions in Chinese law that forbid discrimination.82 
On February 1, 2012, the Standing Committee of the XUAR 
Party Committee announced that new legal measures on employ-
ment promotion were taking effect on the same day. The new 
measures stipulate procedures to prevent discrimination and pro-
mote the hiring of non-Han (‘‘ethnic minority’’) groups in the re-
gion.83 Some provisions of the measures mirror those in the na-
tional PRC Employment Promotion Law, but the measures also 
stipulate subsidies, absent in the national law,84 for employers that 
hire ethnic minorities.85 The potential impact of the measures re-
mains unclear, however, as extant laws and directives promoting 
equal employment and the hiring of non-Han groups appear to 
have had limited impact to date in stemming discriminatory hiring 
policies.86 
LABOR TRANSFERS 
XUAR authorities continued programs to ‘‘transfer the excess 
rural labor force’’ 87 to jobs in other parts of the XUAR and other 
provinces, a practice that has focused on young non-Han men and 
women. In March 2012, the central government published statistics 
indicating that, in 2011, more than 2.58 million people had been 
transferred to jobs outside of their home area or outside of the re-
gion.88 As documented by the Commission in recent years, some 
participants and their family members have reported coercion to 
participate in the programs, the use of underage workers, and ex-
ploitative working conditions.89 In 2012, XUAR authorities de-
scribed the programs as a way for XUAR workers to gain income, 
build job skills, and ‘‘liberate’’ participants’ ‘‘thinking.’’ 90 
Preservation of Cultural Heritage 
Chinese government development policies continued to prevent 
Uyghurs from preserving their cultural heritage. Authorities con-
tinued to demolish and rebuild the Old City section of Kashgar 
city, as part of a five-year project launched in 2009 that has drawn 
opposition from Uyghur residents and other observers for requiring 
the resettlement of the Old City’s 220,000 residents and for under-
mining cultural heritage protection.91 Official media reported that, 
as of November 2011, 18,818 homes in the Old City had been 
‘‘transformed,’’ comprising 38.3 percent of ‘‘transformation’’ work.92 
A blogger using Google Earth technology estimated, based on an 
overlay of satellite images taken over several years, that approxi-
mately two-thirds of the Old City had been demolished up to No-
vember 2011.93 According to official media reports, government au-
thorities consulted the Old City’s residents regarding their opinions 
about how demolition, reconstruction, and compensation would be 
carried out.94 Reports from the New York Times and other inter-
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national media outlets, however, have described instances of offi-
cials allegedly ignoring Uyghur grievances regarding the way 
demolitions were being carried out.95 
A report issued by a Uyghur human rights organization in April 
detailed concerns regarding the demolition of Kashgar’s Old City, 
as well as demolitions and the resettlement of residents in tradi-
tionally Uyghur communities in other areas of Kashgar prefecture; 
Turpan prefecture; the Heijiashan (Tashbulaq) area of Tianshan 
district, Urumqi city; the cities of Hoten, Ghulja (city under Ili 
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture), Kumul, Aksu, and Korla (city 
under Bayangol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture); and other local-
ities in the XUAR.96 In March, according to official media reports, 
XUAR authorities stated that 1.5 million homes would be ‘‘recon-
structed’’ regionwide by 2015.97 
Prison Sentences of Uyghur Asylum Seekers 
In January 2012, Western media reported on prison sentences 
given in September 2011 to 16 of the 20 Uyghur asylum seekers 
who were forcibly returned from Cambodia to China in 2009. Pre-
vious information on the legal status of the 20 asylum seekers was 
limited to June 2010 reports from Chinese authorities that 17 of 
the Uyghur asylum seekers had links to terrorism. According to 
Radio Free Asia in January 2012, local sources reported that a 
court in the XUAR tried 16 of the men on December 24, 2010, and 
sentenced them in September 2011 to prison terms ranging from 
16 years to life imprisonment.98 Information from family members 
and lawyers indicated that lawyers were prevented from presenting 
a full defense of their clients.99 The charges against the men are 
not known, but the Chinese government asserted in June 2010 that 
they were suspected of terrorist-related activity.100 The 16 men 
sentenced were among a group of 22 Uyghurs who were in the 
process of applying for refugee status at the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Phnom Penh. Cambodian authori-
ties forcibly returned 20 of the 22 asylum seekers in December 
2009, before the UNHCR could make a determination of their ref-
ugee status.101 Even if made at the time of extradition, the Chinese 
government’s assertions regarding the asylum seekers’ links to ter-
rorism would not have precluded an assessment of the asylum 
cases by UN officers.102 Most group members had fled China after 
the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the XUAR,103 and one 
group member said in his statement to the UNHCR that he fled 
China after learning of ‘‘mass detentions’’ of Uyghurs following the 
July 2009 events.104 
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V. Tibet 
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the 
Dalai Lama or His Representatives 
Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and 
Chinese Communist Party and government officials has stalled 
since the January 2010 ninth round,1 the longest interval since 
such contacts resumed in 2002.2 Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy 
Head of the Party’s United Front Work Department,3 Director of 
the Party’s General Office of the Central Coordinating Group for 
Tibet Affairs,4 and principal interlocutor for the Dalai Lama’s en-
voys,5 reiterated Party positions seeking to prevent Tibetans from 
securing protection for their culture, language, religion, and envi-
ronment, and instead pressure the Dalai Lama to support Party po-
sitions on Tibetan history and China’s relationship with Taiwan.6 
In return for compliance, officials offered to discuss the Dalai 
Lama’s ‘‘personal future’’ in China 7—a basis for negotiation he re-
jects.8 
In January 2012, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, 
Democracy, and Human Rights Maria Otero reiterated grave con-
cern over Tibetan self-immolations in Tibetan areas of China 9 and 
called on the Chinese government ‘‘to resume substantive, results- 
oriented dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives to ad-
dress the underlying grievances of China’s Tibetan population.’’ 10 
Effective June 1, 2012, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy, Lodi 
Gyari, and Envoy, Kelsang Gyaltsen, resigned citing ‘‘the deterio-
rating situation inside Tibet since 2008 leading to the increasing 
cases of self-immolations by Tibetans.’’ 11 Their resignation letter 
reportedly pointed out that a principal interlocutor in the dialogue 
had ‘‘advocated abrogation of minority status as stipulated in the 
Chinese Constitution thereby seeming to remove the basis of auton-
omy.’’ 12 The referenced interlocutor is Zhu Weiqun. [See Party Of-
ficial Favors Ethnic Assimilation in this section.] 
Tibetan Self-Immolation 
The incidence of Tibetans resorting to self-immolation acceler-
ated sharply during the Commission’s 2012 reporting year and 
spread from Sichuan province into Qinghai and Gansu provinces 
and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).13 [See table below show-
ing 50 self-immolations as of August 27, 2012.] Of these, 45 Ti-
betan self-immolations (39 reported fatal) reportedly took place 
from October 2011—the start of the Commission’s 2012 reporting 
year—through August 27, 2012.14 In comparison, five self-immola-
tions (two reported fatal) occurred from February 2009 through 
September 2011; all of these five took place in Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures in Sichuan.15 During the period from October 2011 to 
August 27, 2012, 31 self-immolations occurred in Sichuan, and 14 
took place in Tibetan autonomous areas located in Qinghai,16 
Gansu,17 and the TAR.18 Of the 50 self-immolations as of August 
27, 2012, 33 occurred in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autono-
mous Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan; 21 Aba self-immolators were 
current or former monks at Kirti Monastery in Aba county, the site 
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of an ongoing security and political crackdown following protests 
(and some rioting) in March 2008.19 
Reports of self-immolators’ anti-government slogans and calls for 
Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama’s return 20 are concurrent 
with increasing Chinese government and Party use of legal meas-
ures to repress and control core elements of Tibetan culture, in-
cluding the Tibetan Buddhist religion and monastic institutions,21 
and with the China-Dalai Lama dialogue’s failure to achieve any 
sign of progress.22 An Oxford University sociologist described the 
Tibetan self-immolations as ‘‘one of the biggest waves of self-immo-
lation in the last six decades’’ and noted that within a ‘‘small ethnic 
group’’ it indicates ‘‘intensity.’’ 23 
The Party and government have not indicated any willingness to 
consider Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner and to hold 
themselves accountable for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies, 
and handled the crisis as a threat to state security and social sta-
bility instead of as a policy failure.24 Government and Party offi-
cials blamed self-immolations on the Dalai Lama and organizations 
and individuals the Party associates with him (‘‘the Dalai 
Clique’’).25 Officials attempted to discredit self-immolators by de-
scribing them or their actions in pejorative terms (e.g., terrorist,26 
criminal,27 copycat 28). Zhu Weiqun 29 blamed the Dalai Lama di-
rectly: 
The Dalai Lama wants to turn Tibetan Buddhism into 
a religion of suiciders and self-immolators in order to serve 
his own political purpose; this is the fundamental reason 
that these incidents occurred.30 
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23 February 19 Nangdrol 
(Nyadrol) 
M/18 




















26 March 5 Dorje 
M/18 
Layman Sichuan/ Aba/ 
Aba 
Deceased 53 
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42 July 7 Tsewang Dorje 
M/22 





























46 August 10 Choepa 
M/24 
Nomad Sichuan/ Aba/ 
Aba 
Deceased 70 






















In January 2012, Tibetan protests in three Sichuan counties 73 
resulted in official use of gunfire and were linked to posters sympa-
thetic with self-immolators or warning of additional self-immola-
tion.74 Security personnel reportedly opened fire and killed a total 
of at least six protesters.75 State-run media implied that in two lo-
cations security forces fired in self-defense.76 Some media reports 
indicated that protesters became violent after security officials 
opened fire.77 
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Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists 
The status of religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists declined 
steeply this past year. Commission analysis demonstrated an ap-
parent correlation between monastic self-immolation and increas-
ing Chinese Communist Party and government repression of free-
dom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.78 
Thirty-one of the 45 self-immolators from October 2011 through 
August 27, 2012, were current or former monks or nuns.79 [See 
table above.] 
UNPRECEDENTED MEASURES STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL 
The Chinese Communist Party and government initiated two un-
precedented measures 80 to further strengthen control over the Ti-
betan Buddhist religion and monastic institutions 81 and transform 
them into entities prioritizing loyalty to the Party and patriotism 
toward China,82 while seeking to bring to an end the Dalai Lama’s 
influence on Tibetans.83 The first development was the October 20, 
2011, opening of the Tibetan Buddhism Theological Institute 
(TBTI)—the TAR’s ‘‘first high-level comprehensive school for Ti-
betan Buddhism.’’ 84 Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the 
Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), and 
Director of the Party’s General Office of the Central Coordinating 
Group for Tibet Affairs,85 said the TBTI is necessary ‘‘to establish 
a normal order for Tibetan Buddhism, to conform with the develop-
ment of our times, and to resist the Dalai clique’s religious infiltra-
tion.’’ Zhu’s reference to ‘‘our times’’ apparently signifies Party in-
tent to establish an updated ‘‘normal order’’ that conforms to cur-
rent Party and government objectives. Zhu stated that ‘‘under the 
new situation’’ Tibetan Buddhism, among other things, should: 86 
• ‘‘Make the correct historical choice’’; 
• ‘‘Struggle against the Dalai clique’’; 
• ‘‘Safeguard the motherland’s reunification and ethnic unity’’; 
• ‘‘Accept the government’s management according to law’’; 
• ‘‘Remove the crude customs and habits that are not in line 
with social progress’’; 
• ‘‘Actively adapt to socialist society’’; and 
• ‘‘Maintain the correct direction of Tibetan Buddhism’s devel-
opment.’’ 
The second unprecedented measure, initiated in November 2011 
and completed in February 2012,87 was the establishment of a 
Monastery Management Committee (MMC) headed by Party cad-
res 88 and government officials 89 in all 1,787 TAR monasteries.90 
TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo told Party members on Feb-
ruary 2 that ‘‘the broad ranks of cadres stationed in monasteries’’ 
should ensure that monks and nuns ‘‘become an important force in 
loving their country, loving their religion, observing regulations, 
abiding by laws, safeguarding stability, and building harmony.’’ 91 
A Party newspaper reported that cadres must seek to befriend 
monks and nuns and compile information on them and their family 
members.92 In turn, cadres must incentivize family members to 
‘‘guide’’ monks and nuns to be ‘‘patriotic and progressive.’’ 93 Chen 
called on MMCs to ‘‘guide’’ monks and nuns ‘‘to actively vie with 
one another’’ to attain recognition for themselves and their monas-
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tic institutions.94 In May 2012, the same Party newspaper pub-
lished a list of 59 ‘‘harmonious model monasteries’’ and 6,774 ‘‘pa-
triotic law-abiding advanced monks and nuns’’ 95 (out of approxi-
mately 46,000 in the TAR 96). The citations were the first of their 
kind.97 
MMCs, in terms of status and function, are more intrusive and 
repressive than Masses Supervision and Appraisal Committees 
(MSACs) established in Qinghai province by prefectural-level Ti-
betan Buddhist affairs regulations.98 MSACs are not headed en-
tirely by Party and government officials,99 members do not directly 
manage monastic affairs,100 and they do not all reside within a mo-
nastic institution.101 
THE DALAI LAMA’S STATEMENT ON REINCARNATION 
In a September 24, 2011, signed statement,102 the Dalai Lama 
rejected Party attempts to use historical misrepresentation 103 and 
government regulation 104 to impose unprecedented control over 
one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most important features 105—lineages of 
teachers (trulkus) who Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarna-
tions and can span centuries. The Dalai Lama denounced as ‘‘out-
rageous and disgraceful’’ 106 the PRC Measures on the Management 
of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism.107 
He concluded with a ‘‘declaration’’ summing up his basis for reject-
ing Party interference with identifying trulkus and outlined meas-
ures he would take to protect the legitimacy of a possible subse-
quent Dalai Lama.108 The declaration’s main points included: 
• Trulkus guide their own reincarnations, not the Party.109 
• Tibetan Buddhists will not accept continued Party inter-
ference.110 
• Around 2025, when the Dalai Lama is about 90,111 he and 
others will determine whether there will be another Dalai 
Lama.112 
• A named organization would lead a search for a 15th Dalai 
Lama.113 
• The Dalai Lama’s written instructions would guide a 
search.114 
Tibetan Buddhists in China likely regard the statement as of 
high importance due to its wording, formality, and significance to 
Tibetan Buddhism’s future.115 
ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Regulating pilgrimage. In December 2011, TAR authorities 
considered measures to manage ‘‘society’s floating personnel en-
gaged in religious activities’’—a broad phrase that could include 
long-term pilgrimage or pilgrimage by non-monastic persons—and 
to ‘‘cleanse and rectify’’ such activity.116 Substantial numbers of Ti-
betan farmers and herders engage in pilgrimage seasonally.117 New 
regulatory measures may heighten tension between Tibetan Bud-
dhists and the government.118 
‘‘Mass detention’’ for attending Dalai Lama teaching. In 
January and February 2012, security officials reportedly detained 
hundreds of Tibetans as they returned from a Tibetan Buddhist 
teaching—the Kalachakra—by the Dalai Lama in India.119 As 
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many as 7,000 to 10,000 Tibetans traveled from China to India for 
the teaching.120 Officials held detainees in various locations for two 
to four months of ‘‘education’’ 121 and released most of them by 
April.122 Based on the reports cited above, authorities treated at-
tending the teaching as a political infraction, not as an issue linked 
to the adequacy of travel documents.123 
Abandoned monasteries. In December 2011 and January 2012, 
monks and nuns in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, 
TAR, reportedly abandoned five monasteries and one nunnery rath-
er than conform to recent regulations.124 In March 2012, security 
officials in Biru detained five Tibetan men for planning a protest 
to demand, among other things, ‘‘the reopening of monasteries with 
full rights given to monks to study and practice religion.’’ 125 
Monastic legal education. As of May 2012, ‘‘rule-of-law propa-
ganda-themed education activities’’ were underway in monastic in-
stitutions throughout the TAR.126 Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), 
Chairman of the TAR People’s Government and Deputy Secretary 
of the TAR Party Committee, told a conference the education cam-
paign guides monks and nuns ‘‘to love the country, love religion, 
abide by the law, forsake evil and promote harmony, and pray for 
peace.’’ 127 
Status of Tibetan Culture 
PARTY OFFICIAL FAVORS ETHNIC ASSIMILATION 
This past year, the Chinese Communist Party and government 
increased pressure on and interference with the Tibetan people’s 
aspiration to preserve the viability and vibrancy of their culture 
and language. Zhu Weiqun, UFWD Executive Deputy Head and Di-
rector of the Party’s General Office of the Central Coordinating 
Group for Tibet Affairs,128 wrote in a February 13, 2012, article 
that he favors ending or changing some policies that have the po-
tential to benefit ethnic minority cultures. Instead, Zhu advocated 
ethnic ‘‘amalgamation.’’ 129 His views, if implemented, could ad-
versely affect the Tibetan people’s cultural and linguistic identity 
and further deepen resentment against the government. Zhu’s sug-
gestions included: 
• Promoting the assimilation of ethnic minority groups as 
‘‘natural amalgamation’’; 130 
• Establishing no further ethnic autonomous areas; 131 
• Ending inclusion of ethnic information on household reg-
istration (hukou) cards; 132 
• ‘‘Desegregating’’ education (i.e., ending minority-language 
education programs); 133 and 
• ‘‘Popularizing’’ the spoken and written use of Mandarin Chi-
nese ‘‘without fail.’’ 134 
Zhu did not suggest ending the system of ethnic autonomy estab-
lished under the PRC Constitution 135 and the PRC Regional Eth-
nic Autonomy Law (REAL),136 or comment on whether reducing 
ethnic rights would require amending the Constitution or REAL. 
On February 23, academic experts on ethnic minority issues con-
vened a symposium in Beijing under the auspices of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences to discuss ‘‘current hot-button ethnic 
theoretical and practical issues.’’ 137 A published summary of sym-
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posium views referred to a ‘‘leading cadre’’—likely Zhu—and 
warned of increasing risks posed by the declining status of ethnic 
minority affairs: 
The blind spot in knowledge, the erroneous zone in edu-
cation, and the deficiency in mutual trust, which can be 
seen everywhere across the ethnic spectrum in today’s 
China, are turning gradually into a social governance trag-
edy.138 
PARTY DEPLOYS TEAMS TO TAR VILLAGES 
As of March 2012, the TAR Party Committee had deployed teams 
of cadres to all 5,451 TAR village-level administrative entities to 
strengthen Party grassroots control.139 The measure was concur-
rent with the Party’s establishment of Monastery Management 
Committees in TAR monasteries and nunneries [see above].140 The 
first-ever such deployment involved more than 21,000 cadres and 
will last at least through 2014, according to Oezer (Weise), the Di-
rector of the TAR Supervision Department.141 TAR officials attend-
ing the National People’s Congress in March told President and 
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao that the deployment educates 
Tibetans on ‘‘indebtedness to the Party’’ and ‘‘further solidified the 
social foundation for . . . development and stability.’’ 142 TAR Party 
Secretary Chen Quanguo told a September 2011 teleconference 
prior to the deployment that the Party should ‘‘thoroughly and me-
ticulously carry out . . . the ideological work,’’ ‘‘strictly prevent the 
interference and involvement of hostile forces abroad and the Dalai 
clique,’’ and ‘‘insist on considering the work of safeguarding sta-
bility as a political task that overrides everything.’’ 143 
ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Cultural advocates detained. This past year, public security 
officials detained Tibetan writers, entertainers, and cultural advo-
cates including Lolo,144 Dawa Dorje,145 Urgyen Tenzin,146 Drubpa 
Kyab,147 Athar,148 Gyatso,149 Lhaten,150 Choepa Lugyal,151 and 
Choegon.152 A court sentenced Dawa.153 
Students protest language policy.154 On March 4, 2012, ap-
proximately 700 Tibetan middle-school students in Tongren 
(Rebgong) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, pro-
tested against the replacement of Tibetan-language textbooks with 
Chinese-language textbooks.155 Approximately 2,500 students in 
Tongren and Zeku (Tsekhog) county staged support protests.156 Of-
ficials told the Tongren middle-school students they would receive 
Tibetan-language textbooks in September.157 On March 14, stu-
dents in Gangcha (Kangtsa) county, Haibei (Tsojang) TAP, Qinghai 
province, reportedly staged a protest calling for ‘‘equality for lan-
guages.’’ 158 Authorities allegedly fired a Zeku education official and 
the heads of two Zeku middle schools, following the protests.159 
Private schools shut down, teachers detained. Qinghai offi-
cials reportedly closed a private school in Zaduo (Dzatoe) county, 
Yushu (Yushul) TAP, on February 12, 2012, and detained the direc-
tor, Lama Gewa, on March 8.160 Sichuan public security officials 
shut down a private school in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi TAP, 
that reportedly was established with official approval in the late 
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1980s, and detained the director, Nyandrag, and a teacher, Yama 
Tsering.161 Gansu officials in early May closed a private orphanage 
school in Luqu (Luchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, and de-
tained two teachers, Sanggye Dondrub and Jamyang.162 
Economic Development Policy and Implementation 
The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to im-
pose ‘‘adherence to a development path with Chinese characteris-
tics and Tibetan traits,’’ 163 a policy the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee established at the 
January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum.164 The policy subordinates 
Tibetan culture and aspirations to Party economic, social, and polit-
ical objectives.165 TAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo said in his 
November 2011 report to the TAR Party Congress that develop-
ment is ‘‘the foundation on which to resolve all of Tibet’s prob-
lems.’’ 166 Zhu Weiqun in his February 2012 article articulated 
views on how the Party should use development initiatives to 
transform ethnic minority areas demographically, socially, and po-
litically.167 Development plans, among other things, should: 
• Promote ‘‘consolidating national unification and central au-
thority’’; 168 
• Promote the trend of ‘‘mixed habitation’’ among ethnic 
groups and ‘‘make it irreversible’’; 169 
• Focus on geographic factors, not support for a specific ethnic 
group, and thereby ‘‘produce different results in social and po-
litical direction’’; 170 and 
• Consider how every economic investment in ethnic minority 
areas can ‘‘produce economic and political results.’’ 171 
UPDATES ON DEVELOPMENT TOPICS 
Railroad construction. The government provided construction 
updates on some segments of the railway network planned to criss-
cross the Tibetan plateau by 2020.172 
• Sichuan-Tibet railway, Yunnan-Tibet railway. In No-
vember 2011, Chen Quanguo called for acceleration of work on 
both railways.173 
• Lhasa-Linzhi (Nyingtri) railway. In April 2012, TAR offi-
cials met with Ministry of Railways officials and called for 
starting construction in 2012 of the eastbound segment from 
Lhasa to Linzhi 174 that would be part of the Sichuan-Tibet 
railway and the Yunnan-Tibet railway.175 
• Lhasa-Rikaze (Shigatse) railway. A TAR official said in 
January 2012 that the westbound segment from Lhasa to 
Rikaze would be complete by 2015.176 A September 2011 report 
stated that service would begin in 2014 177 (the initial date was 
2010 178). An April 2012 report implied labor problems on the 
project,179 and a November 2011 report referred to China’s 
railway construction as ‘‘cash-starved.’’ 180 
• Chengdu-Lanzhou railway. In March 2012, the Aba 
(Ngaba) T&QAP government reported funding was available to 
start construction of the Aba section of the ‘‘Cheng-Lan’’ rail-
way.181 The line will traverse Mao, Songpan (Zungchu), and 
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Jiuzhaigou counties in Aba,182 and Zhouqu (Drugchu) county 
in Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province.183 
Forced settlement. State-run media reported in January 2012 
that 1.85 million herdsmen had been settled in the TAR by 
2011.184 An August 2011 central government opinion on ‘‘develop-
ment’’ of pastoral areas called for settlement of all herders nation-
wide and provision of public services to them to be ‘‘basically’’ ac-
complished by 2015 and ‘‘fully improved’’ by 2020.185 
Environmental protest. Tibetans continued to protest against 
development initiatives they consider harmful to the environment. 
In February 2012, public security officials reportedly detained ‘‘ac-
tivists’’ Lubum, Dawa, and Dragpa, members of an environmental 
protection group in Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan 
province.186 In March, posters appeared in Henan (Yulgan) Mongol 
Autonomous County, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, 
calling for, among other things, the Tibetan environment’s preser-
vation.187 
Summary: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment 
As of September 1, 2012, the Commission’s Political Prisoner 
Database (PPD) contained 1,312 records of Tibetan political pris-
oners detained on or after March 10, 2008—a figure certain to be 
far from complete. 
Among the 1,312 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions re-
ported since March 2008 are 21 Tibetans ordered to serve reeduca-
tion through labor (17 are believed released upon completion of 
their terms), and 237 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to periods 
of imprisonment ranging from six months to life (101 are believed 
released upon completion of their sentences). Of the 237 Tibetan 
political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008, 
sentencing information is available for 224 prisoners: The average 
sentence length is five years and one month based on PPD data as 
of September 1, 2012.188 
CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT 
As of September 1, 2012, the PPD contained records of 626 Ti-
betan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently de-
tained or imprisoned. Of those records, 597 are of Tibetans de-
tained on or after March 10, 2008; 189 29 are records of Tibetans 
detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for the period 
since March 2008 is far from complete. 
Of the 597 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed cur-
rently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after 
March 10, 2008, according to PPD data as of September 1, 2012: 
• 283 (47 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teach-
ers, or trulkus. 
• 517 (87 percent) are male, 55 (9 percent) are female, and 25 
are of unknown gender. 
• More than half (308) are believed or presumed to be detained 
or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the rest are believed or pre-
sumed to be detained or imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (188), Qinghai province (66), Gansu province (33), the 
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Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1), and Beijing munici-
pality (1). 
• 140 Tibetan political prisoners reportedly were sentenced to 
periods of imprisonment (136 persons) or reeducation through 
labor (4 persons) ranging from one year and six months to life. 
Sentencing information is available for 130 of the prisoners: 
the average sentence is seven years.190 Sixty-five (50 percent) 
of the prisoners with known sentences are Tibetan Buddhist 
monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus. 
Sentencing information is available on 23 of the 29 Tibetan polit-
ical prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed cur-
rently imprisoned. Their sentences range from 5 years to life im-
prisonment; the average is 14 years and 6 months.191 
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VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau 
Hong Kong 
ELECTIONS IN HONG KONG 
During the Commission’s 2012 reporting year, Hong Kong held 
the first election of members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) and 
selection of the new Chief Executive (CE) under the 2011 electoral 
reforms. The Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) passed legis-
lation in 2011 implementing the reforms, which broadened the elec-
toral base somewhat for the 2012 election of LegCo by adding 10 
new members to the previous 60-member council, and increased 
the membership of the selection committee that chooses the CE 
from 800 to 1,200.1 Of the 10 new LegCo members, 5 were elected 
by geographical constituencies and 5 through a newly formed terri-
tory-wide District Council constituency.2 These reforms fell short of 
provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law which state, ‘‘The ultimate 
aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage 
upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating com-
mittee in accordance with democratic procedures’’; and ‘‘The ulti-
mate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative 
Council by universal suffrage.’’ 3 
On March 25, 2012, the 1,200-member selection committee chose 
Leung Chun-ying (C Y Leung) as Hong Kong’s next CE, in a proc-
ess characterized by ‘‘chaos and scandal-mongering’’ 4 and that the 
Wall Street Journal described as ‘‘an unusually colorful brawl.’’ 5 
The selection of the CE is inherently non-democratic in that an 
unelected 1,200-member selection committee (out of a population of 
over 7 million) chooses the CE.6 The selection process was charac-
terized by extensive interference by the mainland government, 
which initially supported Henry Tang, the former chief secretary.7 
Tang was involved in a series of scandals, which had a negative 
impact on his public support.8 The mainland government shifted its 
support to Leung, long considered a ‘‘closet Communist,’’ according 
to the Economist.9 A few weeks before the selection, a ‘‘source from 
Beijing’’ predicted the result, saying that Xi Jinping—likely incom-
ing president of China and the Beijing official in charge of Hong 
Kong affairs at the time—had determined that Leung would get 
over 700 votes, Tang 200, and Democratic Party candidate Albert 
Ho 100, remarkably close to the final tally.10 Disregarding the 
principle of ‘‘one country, two systems,’’ the central government 
communicated with members of the selection committee that they 
should vote for Leung.11 
On September 9, 2012, Hong Kong held its first LegCo election 
since the reforms. In the election, democracy advocates won three 
of the five seats created under Hong Kong’s 2011 legislative re-
forms, retaining the one-third of the seats needed to block ‘‘funda-
mental changes’’ in Hong Kong laws.12 This may be critical as 
LegCo considers legislation for the 2017 elections.13 The more rad-
ical group of democracy advocates added seats, while the more tra-
ditional Democratic Party lost seats.14 Pro-Beijing parties gained 
seats as well, potentially leading to legislative gridlock.15 
In the face of tens of thousands of protesters and on the eve of 
the LegCo elections, on September 8, C Y Leung removed the re-
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quirement that by 2015 Hong Kong schools start teaching a Bei-
jing-backed national education curriculum that one article charac-
terized as ‘‘contemporary Chinese history with a heavy dose of na-
tionalism and a favorable interpretation of the Communist Party’s 
role . . ..’’ 16 Tens of thousands of protestors had demonstrated for 
nine consecutive days, and emigrant groups staged protests over-
seas.17 Reportedly, there were even signs the activism could spread 
to the mainland.18 
The protests started in July, when thousands took part in dem-
onstrations against the controversial plan.19 In August, some Hong 
Kong students and teachers commenced a hunger strike to protest 
the plan.20 Former chief executive Donald Tsang initiated the plan 
in 2010,21 which the People’s Daily defended as in keeping with 
international practice of ‘‘patriotic education.’’ 22 However, in an 
editorial in the New York Times, one parent who took part in a 
demonstration against the plan in July 2012 described the new cur-
riculum as a ‘‘one-sided, totally positive portrayal of Communist 
Party rule. . . .’’ 23 An editorial in the Party-controlled Global 
Times refuted claims that the plan constitutes ‘‘brainwashing.’’ 24 
Notwithstanding Leung’s September 8 retreat, protests continued, 
with students from several Hong Kong tertiary institutions boy-
cotting classes on September 11, indicating that Leung’s conces-
sions were not enough, and demanding that the curriculum be re-
moved completely.25 
ACTIVE DISSENT IN HONG KONG 
During this reporting year, Hong Kong citizens have continued 
to express their dissent. A few weeks before the selection of the 
Chief Executive (CE), thousands took part in ‘‘fiery protests’’ 
against then-CE Donald Tsang and the process by which his re-
placement was to be selected.26 Pro-democracy protesters dem-
onstrated against the selection of C Y Leung as CE.27 Tens of thou-
sands of people attended the 2012 annual vigil commemorating the 
1989 Tiananmen protests, more than the number who attended in 
2011,28 and tens of thousands protested the government’s proposed 
national education plan. [See above.] 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Press freedom reportedly deteriorated in Hong Kong in 2011. Ac-
cording to non-governmental organization Reporters Without Bor-
ders’ 2011–2012 report, Hong Kong’s Press Freedom Index ranking 
dropped from 34th in 2010 to 54th in 2011, out of 179 countries.29 
The report noted, ‘‘Arrests, assaults and harassment worsened 
working conditions for journalists to an extent not seen previously, 
a sign of worrying change in government policy.’’ 30 (For compari-
son, the United States dropped from 20th to 47th during the same 
period because of actions during protests, and China dropped from 
171st to 174th.) 31 U.S.-based Freedom House in its 2012 Global 
Press Freedom Rankings listed Hong Kong as ‘‘partly free.’’ 32 In an 
April 2012 survey by the Hong Kong University public opinion pro-
gram, half the 1,012 respondents thought the media practiced self- 
censorship, but saw the media as more willing to criticize the Hong 
Kong government than the central government.33 According to Mak 
Yin Ting, chair of the Hong Kong Journalists Association, in a sur-
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vey of journalists in Hong Kong, 87 percent said press freedom had 
deteriorated since 2007.34 Mak cited a number of causes, including 
government control of information, rough treatment of reporters, 
denial of media access to events, restrictions on movement around 
government offices, self-censorship, and censorship by media out-
lets, many of the owners of which have business interests in the 
mainland. 
Macau 
ABILITY OF MACAU CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE THEIR GOVERNMENT 
During this reporting year, there was some discussion concerning 
electoral reforms in Macau, but no real progress toward universal 
suffrage or greater participation by the people of Macau in the po-
litical process. As is the case in Hong Kong, the ability of the peo-
ple of Macau to influence their government is restricted by the ter-
ritory’s constitutional system. Under Macau’s system, prior to re-
forms approved this year [see below], the chief executive (CE) is se-
lected by a 300-person committee, and only 12 of 29 seats in the 
Legislative Assembly (AL) are filled by direct election.35 In Novem-
ber 2011, Macau’s Chief Executive Fernando Chui Sai On raised 
the possibility of reform in his annual policy address, saying that 
the government would ‘‘put forward proposals on need for and pos-
sible change to the composition of 5th Legislative Assembly (AL) in 
2013 and the way to elect the fourth Chief Executive in 2014.’’ 36 
Some assembly members’ initial responses to Chui’s remarks 
were positive.37 After obtaining guidance from the mainland Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC),38 in January 2012, the Macau gov-
ernment held a consultation exercise—which some civil groups 
criticized as flawed and one group said was manipulated to ‘‘fab-
ricate’’ public opinion—for reporting to the NPC.39 The ‘‘consulta-
tion’’ consisted of eight sessions, only one of which was open to the 
public.40 During the consultation, speakers at some sessions called 
for greater suffrage or other changes such as greater transparency 
in the selection of appointed lawmakers, and others said the cur-
rent system should remain unchanged.41 
After this first consultation exercise, Chui submitted a proposal 
to the NPC Standing Committee to increase the number of seats 
in the CE selection committee and the number of directly elected 
seats in the AL, which the NPC approved in March.42 Mainland of-
ficials made clear, however, that any changes must be in keeping 
with the Macau Basic Law, which has no provision for direct elec-
tion of the CE or timetable for democratic reform.43 The Macau 
government held a second consultation exercise, consisting of 10 
meetings, 3 of which were open to the public.44 Like the first con-
sultation, the second was severely flawed. According to one Macau 
lawmaker, the process was ‘‘manipulated’’ 45 to fabricate support for 
the government’s proposal, which provided for the addition of two 
directly elected and two indirectly elected seats to the AL and an 
extra 100 members to the CE selection committee.46 On June 30, 
the NPC Standing Committee issued its approval.47 After ‘‘long 
hours of debate,’’ in August, Macau’s Legislative Assembly ap-
proved bills making the changes,48 which one legislator had earlier 
described as ‘‘democracy rolling back.’’ 49 
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VII. Endnotes 
†Voted to adopt: Representatives Smith, Wolf, Manzullo, Royce, Walz, Kaptur, and Honda; 
Senators Brown, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Merkley, Collins, and Risch; Deputy Secretary Har-
ris, Under Secretary Otero, Under Secretary Sa´nchez, Assistant Secretary Campbell, and Assist-
ant Administrator Biswal. 
Notes to Section I—Political Prisoner Database 
1 The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exer-
cising his or her human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of 
religion, freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful so-
cial or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is 
illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the Political Prisoner Database were 
detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China’s Con-
stitution and laws, or by international law, or both. Chinese security, prosecutorial, and judicial 
officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprison-
ment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having com-
mitted a generic crime. In such cases defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt 
to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. 
If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone to provide him or her legal counsel and 
defense, as China’s Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the 
counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel’s access to evidence, and 
not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a defense. 
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Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General As-
sembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolu-
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Notes to Section II—Population Planning 
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